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A B S T R A C T 
The present thesis is an attempt to study the 
role and attitude of the Muslim League in Indian Poli-
tics from 1940 to 1947, Since the inception of the 
All-India Muslim League in December 1906 at Dacca cor-
dial relations existed between the Leagu^ e and the 
Congress and it was only in 1929-30 that they parted 
company because of the non-settlement of the conmunal 
problem. At all stages the League endeavoured to make 
the Congress realise Muslim aspirations and grievances 
and at every step the Congress failed to see that the 
League was a representative body of the Muslims and a 
major factor in Indian politics which could not be 
ignored. My researches have led me to the conclusion 
that had the Congress taken the communal problem seriou-
sly, Lahore resoluti(»:i and finally the Partition would 
not have taken place. 
The period between 1922 to 1926 had witnessed 
the rise of coramunalism, which uprooted the brotherly 
relations between the Muslim League and the Congress. 
The communal relations had reached such an extent that 
even the Nehru Report rejected the Lucknow Pact« which 
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had commented the Hindu-Muslim xinity, and forced M.A, 
Jinnah, Maulana Shaukat Ali« Mohanmad Ali and many 
other influential Muslim nationalists to leave the 
Congress. The settlement of the 'Minority Question* 
was the corner-stone of Jinnah's and Mohammad Mi's 
political philosophies which they preached till they 
lived. The League^ thereafter met at Allahabad in 1930 
and for the first time high-lifted its policy of secur-
ing a 'Muslim India' and declared eo^hatically that it 
would not be content with any of the constitution that 
fails to guarantee full Muslim represoitation on popula-
tion basis in the Punjab and Bengal. 
Efforts to secure the above goal continued. 
The Government of India Act 1935 envisaged a Federal 
structure with Provincial Autonomy. Both the Congress 
and the League condemned the federal scheme but decided 
to utilized its provincial part. In 1936 the League 
for the first time planned to organise itself for the 
election and projected the idea of Muslims being a 
'nation' and not a 'community.' In the election that 
held in 1937, the League could not secure the expected 
number of seats but the Congress won the majority of 
seats. 
- 3 -
Thou^ in O.P. Muslim populatlcm figured only 
14% but because of Its Influence, the Congress had 
agreed to give the Muslim League two seats on the U.P. 
Cabinet. But when the Congress won the majority, it 
could not stick to its former promise and intafided to 
offer only one seat to the League. Moreover the Cong-
ress sent a letter to League stating pre-condition for 
the inclusion of League in the Cabinet. The letter 
stated that *The Muslim League party in the United 
Provinces Assettbly shall become part of the Congress 
party and will fully share with other members of the 
party their privileges and obligations as members of 
the Congress Party. The Muslim League Parlisnentary 
Board in the United Provinces will be dissolved and no 
candidate will, therefore, be set up by the said Board 
at any election.' 
Ihis was taken by the League an attempt to 
merge the separate entity of the League into the 
Congress. It created suspicion among the Muslims that 
the Congress wanted to integrate the Muslim community 
with the Hindus. Extreme hostility between the two was 
the outc<Mie of this letter and the League henceforth 
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bitterly criticised the Congress ministries. It cele-
brated the Day of Deliverance and In Lahore In 1940 
In Its Annual session presented Lahore Resolution on 
the basis of two-nation theory* demanding a separate 
homeland for the Muslims. 'Rils was not accepted by 
the other political parties. 
Since the Second World War had already started 
and the Congress refused to support the Allies and Its 
ministries resigned^ Jlnnah made the most of such an 
opportunity and prevailed on Lord Linlithgow, the 
Viceroy, to accept that the British Government would 
not frame any constitution Wit's; the approval of the 
League and that In the Executive Council the number of 
Muslim members would be equal to that of the Hindus. 
The August Offer was the result of this persuasion. 
While War position In 1942 was not satisfac-
tory, America* Australia and China* supported the cause 
of India's Independence. "Rie British Government there-
fore sent Sir Stafford Crlpps to explain to Indian 
Leaders certain constitutional proposals accepted by 
the Government of England. The Congress and the League 
both rejected the Crlpps proposals on their respective 
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grounds. While the Congress rejected it because 
whatever it had offered was to be implemented after 
war and Indian aspirations could not be put in check 
for such a long time, the League criticised the proce-
dure of the Constitution-making body feeling that ins-
{iite of the separate electorate, mentioned in the 
Cripps proposals, it would not be able to get more than 
25 per cent of its representatives in the Constituent 
Assembly. Cripps failure was thus evident. 
The attitude of the League towards the Quit 
India was also not friendly. Its opposition mainly 
rallied the point that the settlement of the communal 
problem should get the top priority and the issue of 
Independence should be given secondary position. The 
League was afraid that after the withdrawal of the 
British, the Muslims would not get their due. It was 
only in the presence of the British Government that 
they could get their grievances secured. This fear of 
the League continued and nothing was done by the Cong-
ress to allay their fear. To say that the League was 
opposed to the Independence of India is wrong. It only 
wanted the safety and security of Muslims In India along 
with the Independence of India. 
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The war abided in May 1945 with British victory 
and the British policy took a new turn to solve the 
constitutional deadlock. Lord Wavell« the Viceroy, 
called a Conference of Congress and League represen-" 
tatlves at Simla to form the government. But the Con> 
ference failed because Jinnah wanted the Muslim members 
of the Cotincil to be chosen from the League. He further 
wanted some effective safeguards* other than the Viceroys 
veto, to protect Muslim interests from majority decisions* 
Later, elections for the Central Legislature were fou^t. 
The League fou^^t election on the basis of its demand 
for Pakistan and won almost every Muslim seat. The 
result of the election had now proved that the Muslim 
League had full control over the Muslim masses, securing 
96.69^  of the total votes cast in Mohammedan constituen-
cies and the Congress had secure 91.3?& of the votes cast 
in non-Mohammadan constituencies. It had also proved 
that there were two major parties - the Congress and 
the League. 
While each party was busy to prove its follow-
ing, the Government of England sent a delegation of 
Cabinet ministers to settle the issue of Pakistan and 
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Indian Independence. The Conference which discussed 
the above issues could not settle the main differences 
of the Congress and League. The main point of differ-
ence between the two gitaapg was that the Congress wanted 
a United India with a unitary national government and 
the League opposed it and wanted the creation of Pakistan 
on the basis of two nation-theory. Later the Mission 
created grouping of the Provinces in Section A, B, and C 
and Jlnnah agreed to accept it on the condition that "if 
the Congress would accept the Group^«the Muslim League 
would accept the Union.* But It was rejected by the 
Congress. 
Ttie League in its ten points memorandum (May 12, 
1946) said that the six Muslim provinces (Punjab, NWFP, 
Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal and Assam) should be grouped 
together in one and would deal with all the subjects 
except Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communication and a 
separate constitutlon^malclng body for six provinces would 
frame the constitution while the Congress stood for one 
Constitutlon->making body and after the Constituent 
Assembly had decided the constitution for the All-India 
Federal Union, the represoitatlves of the Provinces may 
form groups to decide ^ =^=^ jfl^ «t4tut ions for their group. 
AscNo. 
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Thus both the parties had different approach and did not 
agree to participate in the formation of the interim 
Government. Later the League agreed to participate in 
the interim Government and somehow reluctantly accepted 
the Cabinet Mission Plan. But Jawaharlal's statement 
that he had every intention of modifying the plan and 
the Constituent Assembly was a sovereign body and that 
in all probability there would be no groups at all« 
shocked the League. To Jinnah if the Congress could 
change so many times while the British were still there^ 
what assurance would the minorities have that once the 
British left« the Congress would not again change.Jinnah 
was not so keen for Pakistan. 
Jinnah himself was not clear about the implica-
tions of his demand^ HJS. only wanted at least 'Pakistan' 
in principle to be accepted. He wanted some statutory 
safeguards for the minorities to be incorporated on the 
basis of parity in any scheme which was to deliver inde-
pendence to India. Jinnah said 'Let us live as good 
nei^bours# let the Hindus guard the South and West and 
let the Muslims guard the frontiers we will then stand 
together and say to the world "Hands off India. India 
/. 
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for the Indians.** Sri Prakasha, India's first High 
Commissioner to Pakistan coroborates the above by say-
ing that Jlnnah wanted the two states to be known as 
parts of India* 
Attlee the Prime Minister realised that the only 
solution lay In the partition of India Into two separate 
states - Hindustan and Pakistan and sent Lord Mountbatten 
to solve this who did his Job In August 1947. 
ThouQ^ Jlnnah achieved Pakistan In 1947 but the 
question that comes In the mind of a reader Is: Did 
he actually stand for It or he singly wanted safety and 
securltyi^for Muslims within India. A study of this 
question reveals that Jlnnah took Pakistan as a bargain-
ing counter. He actually wanted that some solution to 
come Out If the dialogue between the League - the Cong-
gress and the British continued. Mr, Kuldlp Nayar has 
right written! 
"Mr. Jlnnah was certain In his mind that 
If India got full independence and British 
control was altogether eliminated* the Hindu 
majority, could not be relied upon for deal-
ing Justly with the Muslim populatlcm of 
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India. He« therefore, was clear In his 
mind that some how or the other, overall 
British control must be retained over the 
Indian sub-continent. He never believed 
that Britain would withdraw leaving India 
totally independent ••••• He consequently 
put-up objections and obstructions 
and expected that the Congress demand for 
total independ«ace would not be acceeded 
to by the British and the Muslim popula-
tion would continue to have overall 
British protection," 
This is also clear from the letter of Dr, Chaman-
lal which goes to prove of Jinnah*s ideas on the unity 
of India. Congress attitude towards the League or 
Jinnah was not respective. When Mountbatten in his 
first visit with Nehru asked his estimate about Jinnah, 
Nehru presented him as a "monster of negativism." Later 
when Mountbatten argued with Jinnah for a United India 
Jinnah replied that 'even though nothing would have 
given him greater pleasure than to see such unity, it 
was the behaviour of the Hindus that had made it impo-
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sslble for the Muslims to share It.' Congress never 
treated League as a representative body of Muslims 
and Jlnnah as its sole spokesman while Jlnnah wanted 
both of these to be accepted by the Congress. "That 
is all that I seek**, he told Durga Das* Creation of 
Pakistan could have been avoided* if the Congress 
had been in a conciliatory mood. Besides the clashes 
of personalities the safety of the Muslims was the 
major issue to Jinnah. Had it been provided, it 
would have satisfied him. He accept the Cabinet 
Mission Plan thinking that it would secure what he 
wanted. But Jawaharlal statement changed the course 
of history and his bargaining counter could not get 
his vision of a United India. 
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P R E F A C E 
The Partition of India and the dismemberment 
of the British Raj in 1947 are the most significant 
events in the history of India. It has generally been 
felt that the Muslim League is responsible for the 
vivisection of India which had brought massacre to 
the millions of people. This thesis is an attempt 
to study compr^ensively the forces that had finally 
culminated into the creation of Pakistan. 
The period under study is a very important 
one as it shows how a dormant organisation which had 
stood by the Congress from 1906 to 1936 became hos-
tile to it and in 1940 raised its demand for a sepa-
rate Stat* for the Muslims of India on the basis of 
two nation theory. In this thesis an attempt has 
also been made to study if the Partition was inevi-
table. Could it have been avoided or how all this 
resulted into the division of the country? 
The whole work is divided into Eight chapters. 
The First chapter is Introductory which traces the 
historical background of the All-India Muslim League 
upto 1940 and without which it would have been difficult 
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if not Impossible to understand Muslim politics. 
The Second chapter deals with the Lahore 
Resolution. The circumstances which led to its presen-
tation to the Twenty Seventh Session o£ the All.lndia 
Muslim League in 1940 at Lahore. 
The Third and Fourth chapters study the Cripps 
Plan and the Quit India Movement vis-a-vis the League*s 
attitude. The Fifth chapter brings to light Rajaji's 
formula* Liaquat-I>esai Pact and Gandhi-Jinnah corres-
pondence to break the Constitutional deadlock. 
In 1945 the British emerged victorious and the 
Viceroys-Lord Wavell and Lord Mountbatten in view of 
the rising tide of nationalism tried to solve the 
constitutional problems. The Simla Conference and the 
Cabinet Mission were the attempts made to this end and 
the Sixth chapter is devoted to its study. 
Chapter seven presents a study of the long 
tussle between the British and the Congress, Congress 
and the League and the League and the British. This 
studies the Transfer of Power and the drawing of the 
boundary line to demarcate India and Pakistan. 
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Chapter eight fornns the conclusion of the whole 
study. In t h i s I have c r i t i c a l l y examined the v^ole 
trend of Muslim p o l i t i c s . My studies have led me to 
the conclusion that i t was due to some Tactical mis-
takes of the Congress and also of Mountbatten's hurried 
calculations that the Partit ion had taken place. Parti-
t ion could have been averted had not Mountbatten speeded 
i t up for h i s own ambition to become the First Sea Lord. 
Jinnah raised Pakistan slogan as a bargaining counter 
to secure the safety and security of the minority. He 
accepted Pakistan only when he was disheartened and when 
there was no way out. 
There i s no dearth of published material m the 
period of my study. Though the o f f i c i a l documents deal-
ing with the Transfer of Power in India w i l l not be 
o f f i c i a l l y released unt i l 1999, yet Wavell's Journals 
Professor Mansergh*s Transfer of Power in twelve 
volumes^ Professor Ziegler's Mountbatten give s u f f i -
c ient documents through which one can derive conclu-
s ions . Most of the original material was found at the 
National Arohleves of India and the N^ru Memorial 
Museum and Library and the Indian Council's of Social 
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Sciences Research/ New Delhi. Relevant Newspapers 
and microfilms were provided by these Libraries, 
some secondary sources were also found at the Maulana 
Azad Library, Allgarh Muslim University, Allgarh. 
I owe my Indebtedness to my supexrvlsor Professor 
Shan Mohammad, who had been a source of Inspiration and 
encouragement throughout this study. He supervised the 
worX with profound Interest. I am also beholden to 
Professor A.P. Sharroa, Chairman, Department of Political 
Science, Allgarh Muslim University, Allgarh for provid-
ing me facilities to work on this crucial period of the 
Indian National Movement. My thanks are also due to 
Professor A.P. Usmani, who helped me whenever Z contac-
ted him. 
I am equally thankful to the staff members of 
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research by providing relevant material. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The dawn of the twentieth century found the Muslims 
of India in a great mental anxiety. Political awakening 
was around them and they were unable to decide their 
1 
course of action. While a section of their community 
wanted to indulge in politics to secure 'adequate repre-
sentation' in the Coxmclls* a sizeable section among them 
still adtf^ red to the advice of sir Syed Ahmad Khai|#the 
great saviour of the community* who told them to be aloof 
from politics which he considered to be the other name of 
revolution and thus going back to the days of the great 
2 
Mutiny. The speech of John Morley# the Secretary of State 
for Zndia« finally settled down the controversy; whether 
or not, the Muslims should participate in politics. A 
pressurised Mohsin-ul«Mullc formed the Simla Deputation 
1. See Articles in the Alioarh Magazine 1900 written 
by leading Muslims« some of them advising their 
co-religionists to Join political movement and the 
others asking them to be aloof from it. 
2« See Sir Syed's speeches in opposition to the National 
Con^tess in Lucknow, 1887 and Meerut« 1888, Mulckamul 
Malmoa Ijectures Sir Sved Ahmad Khan# (Lahore, 1900)« 
pp. 295-325. 
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which presented an * Address' t o Lord Minto, the v iceroy 
of India# at Simla on October 1,1906 that marked t h e 
3 
beginning of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y among the Muslims. The 
'Addifess* h i g h l i g h t e d the gr ievances of the Muslims cc»nmu-
n i t y and implored the Viceroy for *a due cons iderat ion of 
t h e i r genuine gr ievances , in the for th_coming p o l i t i c a l 
4 
se t -up of India . As a r e s u l t of a l l t h i s , the Al l India 
Muslim League was founded in Dacca on December 30,1906, with 
5 
Nawab Viqarul Mulk as the Pres ident of the S e s s i o n . 
The foundation of League had created the general 
impression among the Indians-Hindus and Muslims - that 
6 . 
i t was t o oppose the Indian National Congress. But i t 
was oombated by the Muslim leaders who explained t h a t the 
League was founded "to prevent the r i s e among the Musalmans 
of India of any f e e l i n g of h o s t i l i t y towards other commu-
7 
ni t ies .** The League in i t s o b j e c t i v e s very c l e a r l y mentioned 
3 , Syed Razi Wasti, Lord Minto and the Indian National 
Movement« 1905-1910, (Laborer 1961}, pp. 69 ,75 . 
4 . For the Address presented t o Lord Minto by the Simla 
Deputation see Struggle for Indepei 
(Karachi, 1958) , Appendix I I , p . 3 . 
5 . see Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan 
A l l - I n d i a Muslim League Documentst 1906-1924, Vol . lT" 
(Karachi, 1969) , pp. x x x i i i - i i i . 
6. The Pioneer, October 25, 1906, s ee a r t i c l e 'Mahomedans 
and Hindus.* 
7. The Englishman. December 31, 1906. 
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that it would promote among the Musalmans of India feel-
ings of loyalty to the British Government and safeguard 
8 
their p o l i t i c a l r i ^ t s . 
Since 1892 they had always been under-represented 
or sometimes even had no representation at a l l in the 
councils and the majority community won a l l the s e a t s . 
Therefore the Muslims fought for the separate e lectorate 
in 1908-09 and the League in i t s annual sess ions of 1907-
1908 demanded and resolved for the grant of the separate 
electorate* The Right Hon'ble Syed Ameer All , President 
of the London Branch of Muslim League^ led a delegation 
to Lord Morley to convince him of the urgency of the 
separate e lectorate . The outcome of a l l these persuasion 
9 
was the Minto-Morley reform scheme of 1909 which provided 
the rig^t of separate electorate to Muslims. The moderate 
Congress leaders welcomed the separate electorates but 
the other section of the Hindus looked down upon the scheme 
11 
as unfair to them. This led to a tenporary clevage between 
8. Ibid. 
9. See The Times, January 14,27,28» 1909, June 4,25,26, 
1909. 
10. See Vidya Dhar Mahajan, some Aspects of Qokhale's 
Political Thought, The Indian Journal of Political 
Science. July-September 1944, Vol.VI, No.l, p.21. 
Contd... 
. 4 > 
Hindus and Muslims but the Tripoli and Balkan Wars (1911-12) 
and later the World War I (1914) united them. The Hindu-
Muslim unity Was further cemented when the Lucknow Pact 
(1916) provided adequate representation to the important 
minorities by election and the Musalmans through special 
electorates on the Provincial Legislative Councils. The 
Pact also said that £or the Imperial Legislative Council 
"one-third of the elected members should be Mahomedans 
elected by separate Mahomedan electorates in the seven 
provinces in the proportion, as may be, in which they are 
represented on the Provincial Legislative Councils by 
12 
separate Mahomedan electorates .** Thus the long cheri-
shed dream of the League and Congress was fulfilled and 
Mrs. Sarojlnl Naldu, Maulana Mazharul Haq# Mr. Mohammad 
All« Mr. Mohammad All Jinnah and Pt. Jagat Narain, A.Rasool 
thanked their communities for tolerance, adjustment and 
political insight which was to create a United India in 
(Continued from the previous page) 
11. the yioneer, August 20, l906t See also the Modern 
Review, October, 1907, p. 338 and p.486 respectively. 
The Pioneer, July 18, 1909, see also the Presidential 
Address of Pt. Madan Mohan Malaviya to the Lahore 
Sessltm 1909 of the Indian National Congress. 
12. Report of the Thirty-Flrslp Session of the Indian 
National Congress held at Lucknow, December 1916, 
pp. 78,79,80. 
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future. The e f forts made by Jinnah for t h i s unlftcat lon 
was hlQ^ly applauded and Sarojini Naldu Is said to have 
repeated the remarks of Mr. CSokhale which he had made for 
Jinnah that "He i s the best arobaasador of the Hindu Muslim 
13 
Unity." The Hindu-Muslim rapprochement , in 1916 marked 
an epoch which spearheaded the Khllafat and Non-Cooperation 
Movements in which both the communities stood unitedly to 
oust from India their common enemy, the Brit i sh . Indian 
nationalism was mixed up with Pan-Islamism and one drew 
strength from the other. But the Hindu-Muslim al l iance 
was short-l ived and Just after the suspension of the Non-
Cooperation Movement by Mahatma Gandhi, the British once 
again succeeded in tearing asunder the unity of both the 
14 
communities. 
The period between 1922 to 1926 had witnessed the 
r i s e of communallsm, finding expression in communal r io t s 
in India which further uprooted the ed i f i ce of t h i s unit]; 
so assiduously bui l t up between the two major communities. 
The eonmanal re lat ions had reached such a stage that even 
the Nehru Report rejected the Lucknow Pact, the base of 
HlndU'Musllm Unity, and forced nat ional i s t s l ike M.A.Jinnah, 
13. Ibid., p. 97. 
14. Moln Shaklr, Khllafat to Partition (Delhi, 1983), 
pp. 172-180. 
. 6 . 
Maulana M^ammad Ali, Maulana Shaukat All and scores of 
15 
other Muslim leaders to leave the Congress. 
The settlement of the 'Minority Question' was 
the corner-stone of Jinnah and Mohammad All's political 
philosophy Which they continued to preach till th4ir 
last days* Not that they were opposed to the Hindus 
but what they wished was the acceptance by the majority 
of their genuine rights to ensure perfect safety to the 
Muslim community. In a persuasive speech Jinnah said# 
"what we want is that Hindus and Mussalmans should march 
together until our object is achieved. Therefore it is 
essential that you must get not only the Muslim League 
but the Mussalmans of India# and here I am not speaking 
as a Mussalman but as an Indian. It is my desire to see 
that we get seven crores of Mussalmans to march along 
with us in the struggle for freedom. Would yoj be content 
with a few? Would you be content if I were to say I am 
with you? Do you want or do you not want the Muslim 
India to go along with you? YOU must remember that two 
major communities in lndia# I say this without the slight-
est disrespect to other communities like Sikhs# Christians 
15. Shan Muhammad* Freedom Movement in India# Role of 
Ali Brothers, (Delhi, 1979), pp. 217-223. 
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and naturally therefore these two communities have got to 
be reconciled and united and made to £eel that their 
Interests are common and they are marching together for 
16 
a common goal." But Jlnnah was unheard of and Maulana 
Mc^anmad All also met the same fate. Hence In sheer 
desperation they left the congress. The severence of 
Jlnnah and Mohammad All from the National Convention of 
the Congress was most unfortunate and it was from here 
17 
that the politics of separatism was perfectly on heels. 
The League, thereafter, met at Allahabad In 
December 1930 under the Presidentship of Dr. Sir Mohammad 
Iqbal who had unambiguously declared the goal of the 
All India Muslim League and supported the resolution of 
the All Muslim Parties Conference passed a little earlier 
at Delhi. In his Address, Sir Iqbal pointed out the 
areas which he considered to be as 'Muslim India.* He 
said - "I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West 
Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan amalgamated 
into a single state. self-Oovemment within the British 
16. Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims; A Political History 
1857«1947, (Bombay, 1959), p. 215. 
17. Shan Muhammad, Freedom Movement in India, op.clt., 
pp. 213-18. 
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Empire* or without the British Empire, the formation of 
a consolidated North West Indian Muslim state appears to 
me t o be the f inal destiny of the Muslims* at l ea s t of 
18 
North-West India. ** The League, thus, for the f i r s t 
time high<»lighted i t s policy of securing a 'Muslim India' 
and d e c l a r e enphatically that i t would not be content 
with vny of the const i tut ion that f a i l s t o guarantee f u l l 
Muslim representation on population basis in the Punjab 
and Bengal* All th i s was certainly not l iked by the 
Congress. 
The British stood as an observer of the situation 
and to solve the constitutional deadlock the Home Govern-
ment called a Round Table Conference on November 12, 1930 
of the leading political parties, prominent being the 
Indian National Congress^the Muslim League, Hindu Liberals, 
Hindu Mahasabha, Depressed Classes, Indian Christians and 
Princes of states. The galaxy of the Indian representa-
tives discussed the constitutional problems of their 
community. There was a sharp difference at the attitude 
of the British and Indian members of the Conference on the 
18. Sharaloo, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal. (Compiled) 
(Lahore, 1948), p. 12. 
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issue of Dominion Status. The British Government was 
willing to grant Dominion Status only when the process 
of realising responsible government was complete. It 
mig^t take yeats. But the British Government accepted 
to take steps in the Provinces regarding the full res-
ponsible Government with certain safeguards. Towards the 
end of the general discussion the conference decided to 
set up a Federal Relations Committee to consider the 
19 
structure of a federal system of Government in India. 
While discussions were in progress minority quest-
ion loomed large on the Conference. Like their previous 
standi the Muslim delegates While desiring India to be 
free* wanted some safeguards for the Muslims and to achieve 
20 
this they made the convincing speeches in the conference. 
The Congress did not participate in the First Round Table 
Conference and it Joined the Second Round Table Conference 
and devoted most of its time on constitutional and communal 
problens. Gandhiji who also Joined the Conference infor-
mally convened the meeting of leaders to study and get 
19, Indian fipund Table Conference November 12th.1930 
January i9th Proceedings, Qoyemment of India """ 
Publication* (Calcutta* 1931)* pp. 92*95. 
20. Ibid. 
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some coinraunal settlement but he did not l i k e many of the 
communal demands o£ the Muslim delegates. He had brou^t 
with him the Congress scheme for communal settlement. 
Th« adthm^ insisted on the * Joint electorate* as the basis 
of representation in the future constitution of India 
and 'reservation of seats' for Hindus and Muslims in 
provinces^ where they were less than twenty five per cent 
of the population. When the details were worked out« the 
minorities OOuld not reach any satisfactory solution. 
Thtl* (Sandhiji failed to secure an agreed solution of the 
21 
*C<nnminal Question* and communal problem stood where it 
was in the First Conference. The Conference ended on 
December 1# 1931 without achieving any solution for mino-
rity problem. The Third Rovmd Table Conference which 
met on November 17, 1932, took stock of the first two 
conferences and prepared a complete out line of the new 
constitution which was submitted to the Parliament and 
22 
which came out as the Government of India Act 1935. 
21, see Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, 
(New Delhi, 1977), p.74. See also S.K.MaJumdar, iinnaJi 
and Gandhi (Calcutta, 1966), p. 141. 
22. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide (London, 1969),p.60. 
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The Constitution of 1935 envisa^d a Federal 
structiire with a scheme of Provincial Autonomy in the 
provinces* The All-India Muslim League condemned the 
Federal structure vehemently but decided to utilize 
its provincial part. In its Twenty-Fourth Session 
held at Bombay on April 11, 1936« the All-India Muslim 
League formally defined its attitude towards the Act of 
1935« In its resolution the session resolved that "The 
All-India Muslim League enters its emE^atic protest 
against forcing the Constitution as embodied in the 
Government of India Act of 1935« upon the people of 
India against their will, and in spite of their repea-
ted disapproval and dissent expressed by various parties 
and bodies in the country, the Muslim League considers 
that having regard to the conditions prevailing at pre-
sent in the country the Provincial scheme of the Consti-
tution be utilized for what it is worth, in spite of the 
most objectionable features contained therein, which ren-
der the real control and responsibility of the Ministry 
and the legislature over the entire field of Government 
23 
and the administration nugatory.* This session, also 
23. G«Allana, Pakistan Movement Historic Documents, 
(Karachi), pp. 123,24. 
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enphaaised that Hindus and Muslims were not "two comtnu-
24 
nlties" but "two nation" in many respects. 
Sir Wazir Hasan* the President o£ the said session* 
also stressed on the reorganisation of the Muslim League 
and suggested the creation of its district branches to en-
force League*8 policy in view of the planned introduction 
25 
of Provincial Autonomy, Keeping in view the new constitu-
tional scheme the League under Mr« M.A«Jinnah formed a Cen-
tral Election Board consisting of 35 members to take steps 
to contast the approaching elections. This was to be follow-
ed in Provinces also. But League was still a very weak org-
anisation with no primary organisation worth the name and 
very insufficient means of propaganda to send its represen-
tatives to the assemblies to fight for the cause of the 
26 
Indian Muslims. 
A screening of the session of All-India Muslim 
League of 1936 reveals that for the first time it planned 
to organise itself for the election; became very active 
24. See Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada* Poundatlong of Pakistan: 
All India Muslim League Documents! 1924-1947, Vol.11, 
25. Ibid.« p. 259. 
26 . Choudhry Khaliguzzaroan, Pathway t o Pakistan, (Lahore, 
1961), p . 141. 
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and posttd itself as the only representative body of the 
entire Muslim community of India. For the first time, 
in its chequered career the League pushed the idea of 
Muslims being a 'nation* and not 'community*. Never 
before such ideas were projected and it was a novelty. 
Henceforth the League mustered its courage to fight stu-
27 
bbomly for every issue related to Muslims in India. 
In view of the approaching election for the Pro-
vincial Legislatures under the scheme of 1935 which were to 
be held in February 1937 the League released its elec-
tion manifesto* stating that it would see that democra-
tic self-government'« be realised and it would utilize 
the legislatures to extracft the maximum benefit out of 
the constitution. The election manifesto also stood for 
the protection of the religious rights of the Mussalmans 
and pledged to fight against all measures which encroach 
upon the fundamental liberties of the people and economic 
28 
exploitation of the country. 
From the beginning the Congress stood for Hindu-
Muslim as one nation. Throughout its long career* it 
27. Ibid., pp. 152-56. 
28. For more details see Ram Gopal* Indian Muslims* 
op.oit** pp. 243* 45. 
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fought for the cause of India and Its people. In its 
Election Menifesto released in Bombay in its meeting 
of Jtogust 22,23,1936 the Party high-highted its pro-
gramme, "The policy of Congress**# the Manifesto said* 
"will be to resist British Imperialism and to end its 
various Regulations* Ordinances and Acts", It promised 
•decent standard" of living, regulated hours of work 
and conditions of labours* settlement of disputes and 
relief against old age sickness and unemployment and 
the right to form Unions and to declare strikes'* remo-
val of untouchability and uplift of Harjijans* develop-
ment .Of cottage industry and the improvement in the treat-
ment of political prisoners were also given very promi-
nent place in the Manifesto. To acquaint the Muslim 
m«8««s and to bring them in its fold* the Congress star-
ted a Muslim Mass Contact Movement and this also found 
29 
place in its Manifesto, 
As scheduled the elections were held in 1937 and 
the Congress won the majority of seats in the Legislative 
Assemblies of six out of eleven provinces* whereas the 
League failed to win majority in any of the four Muslim 
29. Dr. Pattabhi sitaramayya* The History of the Indi»in 
Si 
P. 
National congress 1935-47, Vol.II (Bombay, 1947)* 
)7 24, 
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30 
majority provinces. It won only 108 seats out of 484 
seats contested. Seats captured by both the League 
and Congress and others were as follows: 
Madras 
Bombay 
Bengal 
u.p. 
PunJ ab 
Bihar 
C.P. 
N.H.P.P. 
Assam 
Orlssa 
Sind 
No. of 
seats 
215 
175 
250 
228 
175 
152 
112 
50 
108 
60 
60 
1585 
Seats 
won by 
Congress 
159 
86 
54 
134 
18 
98 
70 
19 
33 
36 
7 
714 
No. Of 
Muslim 
Seats 
28 
29 
117 
64 
84 
39 
14 
36 
34 
4 
35 
484 
Seats 
won by 
Muslims 
11 
20 
40 
27 
1 
-
-
-
9 
-
-
108 
won by 
other 
Muslim 
(;r9UDS 
17 
9 
77 
37 
83 
39 
14 
36 
25 
4 
35 
376 
30. Y*V.6ankovsky« L.R. Gordon Polonskaya, A History 
of Pak^tan. 1947-1958, (Moscow, 1964), p.65. 
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31 
A perusal of the able table reveals that the 
performance of both the League and the Congress was not 
satisfactory. Congress performance in the Muslim majo-
rity areas as well as in its own was below expectation 
and similarly the League also failed to do well in its 
majority areas* This can be attributed to their organi-
sational Immaturity. Jawaharlal had realised this and 
after the election he remarked that *only in regard to 
th« Muslim seats did we lack success. We failed because 
we had neglected working among Muslim masses and we would 
32, 
not reach them in time. However the Congress leaders 
were happy on their election results and declared that 
the Congress had entered the Legislature to combat the 
Act, It was also believed that the League and the Cong-
ress would cooperate in the Legislature to further the 
interest of the people of India as Mr. Jinnah had repea-
tedly declared his intension to work with other groups 
and parties. But now the position was changed. The 
Congress had emerged victorious and refused to enter-
tain any {proposal that might have the appearance of re-
presenting the Muslims as a separate political unit.The 
31. G.Allana, Pakistan Movement t Historic. Documentff. 
op.cit., p. 137. 
32, The Times of India> March 3, 1937. 
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Congress refused to form any coalition ministry with the 
Muslim League unless they liquidated their organisation 
and repudiated all vestiges for their claim to form a 
33 
separate political body. Itiis was soon proved in U.P. 
which was a testing-ground for the Congress. 
In U.P. Muslim population figured only 14?( but 
had been politically active and influential. The Cong-
ress won majority of seats in this province but was unwill-
ing to accomnodate League. On the eve of the formation 
of Congress ministry* Pt. Ctovind Ballabh Pant* asked 
Choudhry Khaliquzzaman* the leader of the Muslim League* 
about the adjustment of seats.Khaliquzzaman replied that 
the League would accept one third seats of the total 
strength of the Cabinet and assured his pairty's full co-
operation in all Congress programme. But he refused to 
accept any Congress Muslim to be on the Cabinet and 
argued thet only the Muslim Leaguers were entitled to 
represent Muslims in the Cabinet. The Congress had no 
objection to it but wanted League to cease functioning 
as a 'separate group*. Pt. Govind Ballabh Pant and 
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad handed over to Khaliquzzaman a 
33. Kamlesh Sharma* Role of Muslims in Indian Politics 
1857-1947, (Delhi, 1985), p. 207. 
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letter of the Congress paxrty stating pre-conditions for 
the inclusion of League in the Cabinet. The letter 
stated that *The Muslim League party in the UnitM 
Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress 
party and will fully share vlth other members of the 
party their privileges and obligations as members of 
the Congress party.* The letter also said that 'The 
Muslim League Parliamentary Board in the United Pro-
vinces will be dissolved, and no candidate will, there-
34 
fore, be set up by the said VIBoard at any election. 
The letter was interpreted in the Muslim League 
circle as a mischievous attempt of the Congress to merge 
the separate entity of the League into the Congress. It 
created suspicion among the Muslims that the Congress 
wantifd to integrate the Muslim community with the Hindus. 
Kh*).if|U9««man called it a * death warrant* of the Muslim 
League and refused to accept any compromise between the 
League and the Congress • League wanted Khaliquzzaman 
and Nawab Ismail Khan# both leaguers on the Cabinet and 
no Congress Muslim while Jawaharlal's strategy was to give 
one seat to League and the other to a Congress Muslim. 
34. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 161. 
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This was in keeping with the postures of the Congress that 
it was a body composed o£ both Hindus and Muslims and the 
League did not represent the entire Muslim connnnunity.League's 
deoiatid was jaooeptable to Maulana Azad but unacceptable to 
JawnhatlaH and the former could not prevail upon the latter. 
The negotiation between the League and. Congress was a total 
failure and from here the Muslim League stood more firmly as 
ever to fight for Muslim cause, Jawaharlal's refusal hdd 
changed the course of Muslim politics in India and strength-^  
ened the conviction among the League circle that the Cong-
ress was an organisation of Hindus and represented them 
35 
only. The refusal of the Congress for the inclusion of two 
Muslim Leaguers on the Cabinet was certainly a blunder. The 
Congress could not have lost any thing but gained the Muslim 
it 
support if>|[had taken two leaguers on the Cabinet. It was 
also not foreseen by Congress leadership that such a small 
incident would flare up into a might opposition in future. 
Assessing the incident Maulana Azad in his India wins Freedom 
sayst "Jawaharlal's action gave the Muslim League in U.P. 
a new lease of life. All students of Indian politics know 
36 
that it was from the U.P. that the League was reorganised." 
35. I b i d . 
36, Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom. (New Delhi, 1959) 
p. 144. 
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Jinnah made the most of such a situation, appealed to the 
Muslims to unite and fight against Congress. From here 
onwards the League and Congress never saw face to face and 
as Ram OOpal rightly puts Its, 'It was one of the most 
fat«£tll and distressing failures In the political history 
of India/ it gave strength to the belief, held by adventu-
rous Muslim leaders, that the Muslim should have a separate 
37 
homelands 
fhe popularity of the Congress among the Muslims 
waa deteriorttlng but Jawaharlal, the Congress, President, 
still claimed that two forces British and Congress domi-
nated the Indian scene and the Muslim League represented 
38 
only a small group of Muslims. This was immediately rep-
lied by M*A.Jinnah who said that the Congress did not rep-
resent the Muslims at all and had no authority to speak on 
their behalf. He said that besides the two, there was the 
third party, the Muslim League which could not be ignored 
39 
in the emerging constitutional set up. 
The Congress had formed its ministries in provin-
ces in 1937. Their treatment to the minority had been 
37. Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims, op.cit., pp. 247-48. 
38. Ajtt Prasad Jain, Rafl Ahmad Kidwai : A Memoir of 
His Life and Times.(Bombay, 1965), p.31. 
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r.ax)kllng In th* League* s bosom. When tales o£ woo and 
oppr«flslon on Muslims in the Congress provinces were sympath* 
etlcally described by the League Legislator , they were 
40 
ridiculed and laughed at by the Congress, 
The pli?^t of Muslims in the Congress ruled provin-
ces was a burning issue with the League and Jawaharlal's 
speeches for the Muslim Mass contact Movement drew the atten-
tion of many observers of Muslim politics. Dr.Sir Moha-
mmad Xqbal was one of them. He immediately wrote to Jinnah 
to counteract Jawaharlal's argument for the Mass Contact 
Movement and pressed him to call a Muslim convention at 
41 
Delhi to combat Congress activities, in one of his letters 
dated June 21,1937 Iqbal wrote to Jinnah : 'You are the 
39* Sep J«waharlal Nehru, Bunch of Letters, (Bombay, 
1945), Pi 405. 
40. Jinnah in his presidential address said "when Nawab-
eada Liaqat Ali Khan was reciting in the U.P.Assembly, 
the tales of oppression on Muslims in different pla-
ces, and was even giving concrete instances in supp-
ort of his allegations, what were the Congressmen in 
the House doing? They were laughing and ridiculing 
him*, see Ibid., p. 288. 
41, See atruaqle for Independence 1857-1947, op.cit. 
Appendix V, p,35, 
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only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a 
right to look up for a safe guidance through the storm 
which Is coming to North-west India# and perhaps to the 
whole of India*' Palestine question was also an i ssue 
which agitated the minds of the Muslim masses and Dr. 
42 
igbal told Jlnnah to utilize it as well. 
Jinnah was quick to react and in the annual session 
of the All-India Muslim League held at Lucknow in October 
1937 he condemned v^emently the attitude of Congress to-
wards minorities. Delivering his Presidential Address he 
held the Congress responsible for alienating the Musalmans 
of India by pursuing a policy which was exclusively Hindu. 
He appealed to the Muslims to reorganise themselves to for-
mulate a constructive programme for the uplift of the Mus-
lim India, He called them to seek protection under one 
flag. '*I entreat and implore that every man, women and 
child should rally round the common platform and flag of 
the All-India Muslim League. Enlist yourselves by hundreds 
and thousands as quickly as you can as members of the All-
India Mudlim League, Provincial Leagues and District Lea-
gues.** Leagues Lucknow session of 1937 was a milestone as 
42. Ibid., pp. 32«33. 
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It was for the first time in the history of the League 
that it alao worked on the Mass Contact programme for 
43 
Muslims. 
Ihe Working Committee of the All-India Muslim 
League was directed to frame and put into effect an eco-
nofflic, socio-educational programme with a view to fix 
working hours for factory workers and other labourers; to 
fix minimum wages, to improve the housing and hygienic 
conditions of the labourers and make provisions for slum 
clearance, to reduce rural and urban debts; to derive means 
for the relief of unemployment, to advance compulsory edu-
cation, to establish clubs and military colleges, to en-
force prohibition; to abolish un-Islamic usages from Muslim 
society; to recognise a voluntier corps for social service 
and devise measures for the attainment of full indepen-
dence and invite the co-operation of all political bodies 
44 
working to that end. 
To review the whole situation a special session of 
the All*Indla Muslim League was convened in Calcutta on 
43. All-India Muslim League, lAicknow Session October 
1937 Presidential Addresa by Mr. M.A.Jlnnah, THnted 
and published by S.Shamsul Hasan, Assistant Secretary 
All-India Muslim League at Muslim League Printing 
Pi^ ess, Darya Ganj, Delhi, 1945, pp. 6-18. 
44. Syed Sharifuddln Plrzada, Foundations of Pakistan, 
Vol*It, op.clt,, p. 280. 
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April 17, 1938 under the Presidentship of Mr.M.A.Jinnah, 
Over two thousand delegates ffom different parts of India 
participated, Mr, Pazlul Haq in his welcome speech drew 
the attention of Muslim India on the extremely critical 
position of Muslims created by the Congress and Hindu Maha-
sabha resulting into the suppression of the legitimate 
45 
rights and liberties of the Muslim community, 
Jinnah who delivered the Presidential speech acqu-
ainted the audience with the tremendous progress the League 
had mAdft during this period by creating Provincial and 
District Leagues and enrolling laXhs of people, "Within 
less than six months*** he said, **we have succeeded in org-
nising Musalmans all over India as they never were at any 
time during the last century and a half. They have been 
galvanized and awakened in a manner, which has astounded 
and staggered our opponents, Musalmans have shaken off 
their torpor and shed the miserable state of despair and 
demoralization into which they were sunk so deep. They 
are beginning to realize that they are a power. They po-
ssess the strength, the potentialities of which they have 
not yet realized, and if only they will take their affairs 
45. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, 
Vol,II,op,cit,, pp, 282-83, 
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in their own hands and stand together united there is no 
46 
power that can resist their will." Thus Jinnah reinvigo-
rated the League which it had never been in its history. 
He had taken the challenges of the Congress most 
seriously and his speeches in opposition to the Congress 
were a sort of the 'declaration of war' against it. It 
surprised Oandhi who on February 3, 1938 in a letter exp-
ressed his anxiety over this change. He wrote to Jlnnaht 
"Yoxi seem to deny that your speech was a declara-
tion of war, but your later pronouncements too confirm my 
firdt impression ..... In your speeches I miss the old 
nationa^list. When in 1915 I returned from my self-imposed 
exile in South Africa everybody spoke of you as one of the 
staunchest nationalists and the hope of the Hindus and 
Mussalmans. Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah? If you say 
you are* in spite of your speeches, I shall accept your 
47 
words," 
46. Ibid., pp. 290-91. 
47. Indian Annual Reg i s ter , Vo l .1 , January-June, 1938 
p . 35$. 
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But this letter could not modify Jinnah's stand. 
He characterised the Congress as a 'Hindu body' and dec-
lared that the Muslims have made it clear more than once 
that# besides the question of religion, culture, langu-
age and personal law, there is another question, equally 
of life and death for them, and that their future destiny 
and fate are dependent upon their securing definitely 
their political rights, their due share in the national 
48 
life, the Gtovemraent and the administration of the country. 
The high-handedness of the Congress against the 
Muslims in the Congress ruled provinces was League's main 
concern. In its meeting of March 20, 1938 it resolved 
to approint a special committee to collect all informations 
about Congress atrocities. This led to the appointment of 
an Enquiry Committee under the Chairmanship of Raja Mehdi 
of Plrpur to investigate Muslim complaints against Congress 
49 
ministries. 
48. All-India^uslim League - Calcutta Special Session 
Aprii,1938, Presidential Address by Qaid e-Azam 
Ji^lfA.f ihftah. Printed and Published by S.Snamsul H as an 
Assistant Secretary, All-India Muslim Lea gue at Muslim 
League Printing Press, (Daryaganj, Delhi, 1945),p.9. 
49. Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the 
Council of the All-India Muslim League to investigate 
ffluslim Grievances in Congress Provinces, 7th Pioneer 
Preslii, (Lucknow, 1938) , p. 1. 
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Besides the Pirpur committee A.K.Fazlul Haq# the 
Premier of Bengal, in December 1939 a l s o Issued a booklet 
e n t i t l e d Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule which a l s o 
b r o u ^ t t o l i g h t the Congress a t r o c i t i e s on Muslims. 
Both the Pirpur Conunittee Report and Fazlul Haq's 
booH, c l e a r l y pointed out that the Muslims were the worst 
50 
mifferers under the Congress r u l e . The Working Committee 
of the Bihar Provinc ia l Muslim League a l s o appointed a 
committee t o inquire Into the hardships of Muslims under 
the Congress Government, The Report came t o be known as 
the flSiareef Report which a l s o brought out that the Muslims 
51 
in Bihar were in a s t a t e of constant f ear . 
These Inquiry Committee Reports provided mach l i t -
erature t o the authors of the League and Congress, While 
the League authors c r i t i c i s e d the Congress for i t s revenge-
52 
fu l p o l i c i e s the Congress authors defended i t . To Maulana 
50 . see A.F.Fazlul Haq, Muslim Suffer ings Under Congress 
Rule, Printed at the Calendonian Print ing Co.Ltd. 
Calcutta and published under the Bengal Provincial 
Muslim League, December, 1939, p ,18 . See a l s o Repor^ 
of the Al l - Ind ia Muslim League t o inquire i n t o Muslim 
^ri^vanaes in Congress Provinces . The Pioneer Press , 
(Luokhow, 1938) , pp. 48-49 . 
the Enquiry Committee, appointed by the 51. ggPgflP 9S )mmlttee of the Bjhar Provincial Muslim 
League to inquire into some Grievances of Mu 
in Bg^ har^  (Patna, 1938) , p.9, 
Contd..,. 
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Abul Kalam Azad, all these charges 'were absolutely falsfe,' 
"If there had been an lota of truth in any of these charges", 
he wrote, "I would have seen to It that the injustice was 
rectified, 1 was even prepared to resign if necessary on 
53 
an issue like this." But in view of the discovery of 
letters of the Muslims addressed to the Congress High Cotnnand 
in the All-India Congress Committee papers, Azad's defence 
appears to be partisan. These letters were written to 
the Congress President and the Secretary by Muslims request-
ing the Congress leaders to tour their localities which 
54 
suffered under the Congress Raj. Not only did the Muslims 
write these letters, even Christians too complained the way 
55 
Hindu treated them. 
(Continued from the previous page) 
} In 
[Allahabad, 1942), pp.371-72. 
52 , gee Mohammad Noman, Muslim dia . Rise and Growth of 
A l l - I n d i a Muslim League, ( lla a a , 1942: 
Gbpinath Srivastava, When Congress Ruled. 
53 . Abul Kalam Azad, o p . c i t . , p . 19 . 
54 . See A l l India Congress Committee Papers. Mass Con-
^ * 3 ^ / ? § ? r ^ ^ ^^^* ^ ° ' °-^^^^^^'^^' ^^^^ No. l l /1940> 
35 . See l e t t e r of Mr. A.W.Moore t o P t . Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Dr. Kailash Nath Katju, April 20, 1938, AICC 
Papers F i l e No. G-32/1938. 
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Under these circumstances the League convened its 
Twenty Sixth Session at Patna in December 1938. To chall-
enge the Congress atrocities the course of action was to 
be decided here. Jinnah chaired the session and in his 
Presidential Address he refused to adroit that the Congress 
was a representatives body of Muslims or Christians, It was 
a*Hindu body* and represented 'Hindus only', Swaraj meant 
a Hindu Raj and the National C3ove»nment a 'Hindu Government.* 
He criticised the Congress policies in most vehement manner 
and said that its policies had forced the Muslims to a life 
56 
and death struggle, jinnah*8 speech infused fresh energy 
in League eve|:y year and day by day it was gaining momentum. 
The League charges were refuted by the Congress 
President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad. He desired the complaints 
of League to be investigated by an iropertial authority such 
as Sir Maurice Gwyer, the Chief Justice of India. But Jinnah 
had already referred the mattej: to Viceroy and did not agree. 
Meanwhile the World War II had started and the Viceroy 
declared India a belligerent without consulting the Cong-
ress ministries* This administered a rude shock to Congress 
and it resigned on October 28,1939. the teague heaved a 
sign of relief and celebrated the 'Day of DJU.iVer«nce and 
57 
thanks giving*, on December 2, 1939, 
56. See Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan. 
Vol,II, op.cit,, pp, 294-95, 
57, M.H.Saiyid. Mohammad Ali Jinnah^ A Political Study 
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Jinnah# had been a believer, of one nation theory 
but held that the rights of minority be duly considered. 
Slnoe Nehru Report failed to give the Muslims their due, 
he left Congress and became active member of the League 
but his Ideas of a composite nation never wavered. The 
Congress ministries of 1937 which were atrocious to Muslims 
had shaken his faith and he started feeling in terms of 
Muslim being a separate nation and in reply to one of 
Qafidhi's letter he wrote: • I have no illusion in the 
matter, and let me say, again, that India is not a nation 
nor a country, it is a sub-continent composed of natlona-
58 
llties Hindus and Muslims being the two major nations." 
Similar ideas were expressed by him in an article for The 
Tlrpe an^ Tf^e in which he reiterated, "Experience has 
proved that whatever the economic and political programme 
of any political party, the Hindu, as a general rule will 
(Continued from the previous page) 
(Lahore, 1962), p. 309. See also Mr. M.A.Jinnah's 
statement to the press on 'Day of Deliverence in 
The War* Problem of India's Future Constitution, 
published by Kawabzada Liaquat All Khan, p.32. See 
Jlnnah's speech at the National Convention. 
58, O. Allana, Pakistan Movement Historic Document, 
op.clt., p. 170. 
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vot« fot .his castefellow and the Muslims for his corell-
59 
glonists," He concluded that 'Democracy* of the Western 
type would not be suitable to India where things were 
determined by majority detrimental to minority. The Cong-
ress ministries served as an example and experience had 
also proved that Jlnnah would not agree to any such Cons-
titution. Hence he appealed to the British Government to 
60 
consider the entire problem of India's future constitution. 
According to Sulerl, Jlnnah's fear regarding the federation 
were well founded for he foresaw that ••once saddled in the 
Centre (Federal Government) the Hindus will be in a command-
ing position to muzzle the four or five Muslim provinces 
61 
into complete subordination," 
As stated earlier after 1938 Muslims had developed 
the idea of their being a separate nation but they had not 
caught the idea of a separate homeland for themselves. Of 
course^ they viewed with great concern the principle of self 
determination to decide their future in India. Various 
schemes were suggested from time to time. Iqbal in his 
59, See India's Problem of Her Future Con3titutlon#p.23. 
60, The Statesman/ Calcutta, November 21/1938, 
61, B,A»Sulerl/ My Leader, (Lahore, 1946)/ p.110. 
- 32 -
Presidential Address of the Annual Session of the All-
India Muslim League at Aliahabad Ih 1930 demanded the 
formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best inter-
62 
ests of India and Islam. During the Round Table Conference 
in London Muslim students propagated among the Muslim de-
legates a proposal for 'Muslim India' and 'Hindu India*» 
llift Muslim delegates took It as no more than a student 
63 
scheme. The booklet of Rahmat All also found much 
cxirrency In England in 1935 In which he took himself as 
the fouild«r of the Pakistan national movement, similar 
64 
other schemes put by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan of Punjab 
and Dr. Syed Abdul Latlf of Hyderabad In 1939 also pro-
65 
posed the division of India. The League did not take them 
seriously. But the Congress ministries in 1937 and its 
anti-Muslim politics disturbed the League and there vras 
non escape for it now. 
62. Rafiq Zakaria, The Break-up of Pakistan^ The Illus-
trated Weekly of India* December 19,1971, p.10. 
63. see C.Rahmat All, The Millat of Islam and the Menace 
of Indlanlsm, Published by the Pakistan National 
Movement 16, Montague Road Cambridge, pp.14-15. 
64. tJma Kaura, op.cit., p. 156. 
65. The Annual Regis te r . Vo l .1 , January-June 1939, pp. 
l66''iiOf See a l so The Pakistan Issue edited by Nawab 
Pr. Nazir Yar Jung with a ^oreward by Dr. Syed Abdul 
Lat l f . 
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The League met at Lahore on March 22, 1940 for 
its 27th Annual Session with Jinnah as its President. 
This session is very remarkable in the annals of the 
All-India Muslim League as it is for the first time that 
Jihnah boldly proclaimed Muslims a separate nation and 
slno# Hindus and Muslims could not live together because 
of thfflr social, economic and political differences they 
66 
needed a separate country. 
66, Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, 
Vol.11, op.cit., pp. 327,40. 
C H A P T E R TWO 
LAHORE RBSOVOTlOn 
From the beginning the League dl<3 not agree 
to the federal scheme o£ the Qovf^ rtweht and Jinnah 
opposed the British idea of introducing danooirwtic 
institutions in India based on tht Parliameatary Govern-
ment. To Jlnnah India was a heterogeneous country, hav-
ing people of different faith and religions and it would 
be futile to apply western type of democracy in India* 
"It is accepted** Jlnnah remarked, *that there Is In In-
dia a major and a minor nation, it follows (therefore) 
that a parliamentary system based on the majority prin-
ciple must inevitably mean the rule of the major nation, 
fbcperience has proved that, whatever the econoaiic and 
political programme of any political party, th* Hindu, 
as a general rule, will vote for his castefellow and 
1 
the Muslims for his co-religionists*" It was on this 
that Jinhah was opposed to the Weftejrn type of democracy 
in India and suggested that on th« batle of the escperi-
ence gained by the working of th« Ccngress miQistrtts, 
the British Government should consider the entire prob-
2 
lem of India's future constitution. The Congress minis-
tries would mean a 'Hindu Raj*, which w«f unacceptable 
1. India's Problem of Her Future Coni^ t|^ tutlQn, See JlhUah's 
article written for. Time and Tide* ditW January 
19, 1940, pp. 23-28. 
2. Ibid. 
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to th« League* In the League's c i r c l e , therefore, the 
Federal aohem* was rejected and even Choudhry Khallquzzaman 
In an interview at Ix^ndon, apprised the Under-Secretary 
of State Col, Muirhead of League's viewpoint. He sugges-
ted two sones i . e . North-West and North-East in which 
3 
Muslims were in majority to be separated from India. But 
even Khallquzzaman did not have a clear picture of the 
proposed zones. Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State, 
wrote to Lord Linlithgow on March 28, 1939 that what 
Khallquzzaman and Abdul Rahman Slddiqui proposed was the 
establishment of three or four federations of provinces 
and states which would be co-ordinated by a small central 
body of some unit. "The whole object of the scheme was, 
of course," he said, "to give the Muslims as great a 
measure of control at the centre as the Hindus, They 
were very vague when they came to the details of the 
scheme, but l rather gathered that what was in their minds 
was a federation of the Muslim provinces and princely 
states in the north west India, a further federation of 
Bengal and Assam and possibly Bihar and Orissa in the 
east." 
3, Choudhry Khallquzzaman, o p . c l t . , pp. 205-07. 
4. Quoted in V.V. Nagarkar, Genesis of Pakistan, 
(New Delhi, 1975), p. 309. 
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By this time a few other schemes had been sugges* 
ted to the League and they were all under Its serious 
consideration* But no scheme was taken up as £lnal. This 
was all to escape Congress domination which collapsed 
because of the Congress resigning from the ministries and 
the League announced to celebrate the Day ol^  Deliverance 
on Friday December 22, 1939 by organising rallies and 
public meetings against the Congress which was responsi-
ble for the wrongs done to the Muslims and other mlnorl-
6 
ties* 
Oandhl made a personal appeal to Jlnnah to call 
off the observance of the Day of Deliverance but Jlnnah 
would not listen to It and only said that he had asked 
the Brltlnh Government to appoint a royal commission to 
Investigate the charges. Jawaharlal also wrote to him 
to discuss communal question. But Jlnnah Insisted that 
the Congress had not accepted League as the sole repre-
sentative of the Muslims. Hence» there was no question 
5. sir Mohammad Iqbal's scheme* Rahmat All's scheme* 
and Dr. Syed Abdul Latlf's scheme etc. 
6* Jamlluddln Ahmad* (ed.)* Some Recent speeches and 
Writing^ of Mr. Jlnnah. (Lahore* l$42J, pp.i64-05 
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of any discussion. Moreover he also said that the League 
Was not prepared to baclc the Congress demand for the 
deolaration of War alms and convening a constituent 
a9SesU»ly. 
J^Att from the Congress* the Hindu Mahasabha was 
also very much opposed to the League's*Day of Deliverance' 
and its demand for the appointment of a royal commission 
to investigate the alleged atrocities of the Congress* It 
had been very critical to the League from the very beginn-
ing. 
Hindu Mahasabha condemned League's approach to 
the formation of a federation. Sarvarkar* like his pre-
vious arguments* made some more significant additions to 
it and he gave a new definition of the term 'Hindu* 'Any 
one who considered India as both his fatherland as well 
as holyland in the sense of the land of the origin of his 
religion was a Hindu*. According to V.V.Nagark^r* *By 
this definition* the Muslima, the Christians, the Jews 
and also the parsies came to be excluded implying thereby 
that the followers of these religions might not be accor-
7 
ded equal citizenship rights.' The League was not going 
to concede such attitudes. 
7. V.V. Nagarkar* op.cit., p. 316. 
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Jinnah was having separate meetings with the 
Viceroy on November 4* and 7« 1939 and many letters 
were also exchanged between him and the Viceroy* In 
this correspondence Jinnah stood for two things. 
(1) *No declaration should be made by the British 
Government without the approval and consent of 
the representatives of the Hindus and the 
Muslims and 
(2) The British Government should not frame any 
constitution or make any declaration regarding 
the question of further constitutional advance 
without the consent and approval of the Muslim 
League.* The Viceroy appeared not to be in 
concurrence of the League's demand as he thou^t 
that other constitutional problem would arise 
but he assured that the Government 'would give 
8 
due weight to the views of the Muslim community.' 
The League after the celebration of the Day of 
Deliverance very seriously started working for the safety 
84 Ibid.t P* 318. 
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and security of the Muslims in India. The Working Commi-
ttee of the League met for four days from February 3, 
1940 and pressurised the Viceroy to reconsider the matter 
regarding the assurances demanded by the League in its 
earlier resolutions of September 18 and October 22« 1939, 
The MOrking Committee also concluded that a delegation 
comprising the premiers of the Punjab and Bengal* and 
Nasimuddin and Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman be sent to London 
to gain th<i British support. This vias a very crucial 
meating of the Working Committee which was considering 
all fa<^ et<l of an all-India federation* Khaliquzzaman 
says that on the second day, his suggestion for partition 
by separating the Muslim zones in the north.west and Ben-
gal and As$am in the east from the rest of India was acc-
epted by Jinnah. Jinnah in return informed the Viceroy 
9 
about the decision of the League for Partition which 
worried both the viceroy and the secretary of State who 
wanted to come to a settlement with the Congress and 
Leagua in view of the unfavourable situation of the 
Allies in War* But no settlement was reached at* On 
February 25« 1940 again the League met to review the 
situation and expressed its determination to fight for 
the Muslims in India* 
9* .JChaudhry Khaliquzzaman, op*cit., pp* 237-239, 
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Meanwhile early In 1940 Choudhry Rahmat All 
ptQPagated his scheme £or a sovereign Bang-e-Islam 
inolttdihg Bengal and Assam. It was a much talked off 
Scheme in the Congress circle, At that time the Indian 
National Congress was meeting at Ramgarh for its fifty 
third session on March 19,20, 1940 under the Presidentship 
of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Maulana Azad devoted the 
major portion of his speech on the communal problem. It 
will not be out of place to quote him in extensct 
"I am a Musalman and am proud of that 
fact. Islam's splendid traditions of thirteen 
hundred years are my inheritance. I am unwill-
ing to loss even the smallest part of this 
inheritance. The teaching and history of Islam, 
its arts and letters and civilisation are my 
wealth and my fortune. It is my duty to pro-
tect them. 
As a Musalman I have a special interest 
in Islamic religion and culture and I can not 
tolerate any interference in them. But in addi-
tion to these sentiments, I have others also 
which the realities and conditions of my life 
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hav« forced upon me* The spirit of Islam does 
not come in the way of these sentimentst It 
guides and helps me forward. I am proud of 
being an Indian. I am a part of the indivi-
sible unity that is Indian nationality. I am 
indispensable to this noble edifice and with-
out me this splendid structure of India is 
incomplete. I am an essential element which 
has gone to build India* I can never surrender 
this claim 
Full eleven centuries have pass.ed by 
since then Islam has now as great a claim on the 
soil of India as Hinduism. If Hinduism has been 
the religion of the people here for several thou* 
sands of years, Islam also has been their reli-
gion for a thousand years. Just as a Hindu can 
say with equal pride that he is an Indian and 
follows Hinduism so also we can say with equal 
pride that we are Indians and follow Islam. I 
shall enlarge this orbit still further. The 
Indian Christian is equally entitled to say 
with pride that he is an Indian and is following 
a religion of India, namely Christianity. 
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Eleven hundred years of coasnon history 
have enriched India with our common achievements. 
Our|languages« our poetry* our literature, our 
Gi|i).ture» our art, our dress, our manners and 
customs, the innumerable happenings of our 
daily life, everything bears the stamp of our 
joint endeavour. There is indeed no aspect of 
our life which has escaped this stamp. Our 
languages were different, but we grew to use a 
common language; our manners and customs were 
dissimilar, but they acted and reacted on each 
other and thus produced a new synthesis. Our 
old dress may be seen only in ancient pictures 
of by-gone days; no one wears it today. This 
Joint wealth is the heritage of our common 
nationality and we do not want to leave it and 
go back to the times when this Joint life had 
not begun. If there are any Hindus amongst us 
who desire to bring back the Hindu life of a 
thousand years ago and more, they dream, and 
such dreams are vain fantasies. So also if 
there are any Muslims who wish to revive their 
past civilization and culture, which they brou^^t 
a thousand years ago from Iran and Central Asia, 
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they dream also and the aooner they wake up the 
better. There are unnatural fancies which cannot 
take root in the soil of reality, I am one of 
those who believe that revival may be a necessi-
ty in a religion but in social matters it is a 
denial of progress. 
These thousand years of our joint life 
have moulded us into a common nationality, lliis 
cannot be undone artificially. Nature does her 
fashioning throu^ her hidden processes in the 
course of centuries. The cast has now been mou-
lded and destiny has set her seal upon it*whether 
we like it or not« we have now become an Indian 
ntttion* united and indivisible, NO fantasy or 
artificial scheming to separate and divide can 
break this unity, we must accept the logic of 
fact and history and engage ourselves in the 
10 
fashioning of our future destiny." 
In « resolution* the Session said that "It will always be 
ready as it ever has been to make every effort to secure 
10. Arsh Malsiani, Abul Kalam Azad>(Publication Division* 
Delhi* 1976), Appendix 4* pp. 154-156. 
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coi<tmunal harmony* no permanent solution Is possible 
except through a Constituent Assembly, where the rights 
of all recognised minorities will be fully protected by 
agrewnent, as far as possible between the elected repre-
sentatives of various majority and minority groups or by 
arbitration If agreement is not reached on any point. 
The resolution further high-lighted the long standing 
policy of the Congress. It said that "India's Constitu-
tion mast be based on independence, democracy and national 
unity* and the Congress repudiates attempts to divide 
India or to split her nationhood. •• 
A study of the above speech of the Congress Presi-
dent, Maulana Azad and the resolution passed in the Ram-
gajrh session reveals the differences of approach between 
the League and the Congress. League stood for two nation 
theory and was opposed to the convening of the Constitu-
ent Assembly and thus drastically differed with the Cong-
reB8» It Was in response to thse Congress challenges 
that th* League met at Lahore on March 22, 1940. In view 
11, See A.M.Zaldi, (ed.), INC t Glorious Tradition, 
1939-1950, vol.IV, lexts of the Resolutions passed 
by the INC, the AICC and the CWC,(New Delhi,1988),p,96. 
12. See The War i Problem of India's Future Conatitutioni 
published by Liaguat All Khan, pp. 39-93. 
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of the great victory. League achieved in overthrowing the 
Congress ministries by Its clamour and thus celebrating 
the day of Deliverance this session of the League vas also 
to be momehtum. 
On Friday* March 22« 1940 the League took its 
27th session at Lahore in a decorated Pandal a few fur-
long from the Mu^al Fort, Over one lakhs people has 
the 
assembled to watch/WorXlng of the session which started 
with the Chftlrman of the Reception Committee, Nawab Sir 
Shah Nawaa Khan of Mamdot who recalled the struggle of 
the League In protecting Muslims and other minorities, 
Referring to the working of the Congress ministries. Sir 
Shah Nawas Hald that a popular Government could only func-
tion when the minorities were satisfied. He regretted 
that the Congress ministries failed to inspire confidence 
13 
in the minorities and had to pay heavy cost. 
He was follotred by the Presidential Address of 
Jlnnah who described the Congress policy of oppression 
and said that he had 'never thought that the Congress 
High Connand would have acted in the manner in which they 
actually did in the Congress- governed provinces*. But 
13. Syed Sharifuddln Pirzada, Foundationsof Pakistan, 
Vol,II, op.clt,, p, 325, ~" 
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h« w«8 thanXful that the Muslims realised this. They 
w«r# aVttken and the League was grown Into such a strong 
Institution that Its £all was now Impossible. He refe-
rred to the statements o£ C.RaJgopalacharla, Babu Rajendra 
Parasad and Oandhl, who talked about the joint electo-
rate and tha constituent Assembly which was only a myth • 
Jlnnah $ald that Gandhljl should not be shy of calling 
himself a *Hlndu' and saying that Congress was a 'Hindu* 
organisation with a total Hindu backing. He rejected 
the oft-repeated sentence that the Muslims were a mino-
rity and pleaded that they were *a nation by any defini-
tion** Me supported the comments of the Times* which 
wrote that '*the difference between the Hindus and Muslims 
la not of religion In the strict sense of the word« but 
also of'law and culture*« representing, *two entirely 
dlitlnet and separate civilizations.* He asked the 
British Oovemment to realise the 'fundamental truth* 
and divide India into * autonomous national state* to 
'secure the peace and happiness of the people of this 
IS 
sub-continent. 
Continuing his Presidential Address* Jlnnah said, 
"It Is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu 
14. Ibid,, pp. 326-337, 
15. Ibid. , p.337. 
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friends f a l l to understand the real nature of Islam 
and Hinduism. Ihey are not re l ig ions in the s t r i c t 
sens* of thtt word« but are, in fact , different and 
d i s t inc t soc ia l orders. I t Is a dream that the Hindus 
and Muslims can ever evolve a cominon nationality* and 
t h i s misconception of one Indian nation has gone far 
beyond the l imits and i s the cause of most of our trou-
bl^ft and w i l l lead India to destruction If we f a i l to 
rev i t* o\ir notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims be-
long to two different re l ig ious phi losophies-social cus-
toms# l i t eratures . They neither inter-marry,nor interdlne 
together and,Indeed they belong to two different c i v i l i -
zations which are based mainly on conf l ic t ing ideas and 
16 
conceptions*" He further said that "their aspects in l i f e 
and of l i f e are di f ferent . I t i s quite c lear that Hindus 
and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different 
sources of history. They have different epics , the ir 
heores are different , and they have different episodes. 
Very often the hero of one i s a foe of the other and l i k e -
16* Mdress (Delivered Extempore) bv Qajd-e-Azam Mr.M.A. 
Jinnah. Printed and Published bv S. Shamsul Hasan. 
Assistant Secretary, All-India Muslim League at 
Muslim teague printing Press, (Darya GanJ, Delhi, 
ld45), p. 11. 
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wl8« thttlr victories-and d«f«at overlap. To yoke together 
two such nations luider a s ingle State« one a numerical 
minority and the other as a majority must lead to grow-
ing discontent and f inal destruction of any fabric that 
may be so bui l t up for the government of such a state ,* 
Continuing Jinnah said that by any def init ion 
'Mutsaln«ns are a nation' and *they must have their home-
18 
l«nd« their territory and the ir s t a t e . ' The acceptance 
of any Constitution without the consent of Muslim League 
would mean *a Hindu majority government.* 'Hindus and 
Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced 
upon the minorities can only mean a Hindu Raj. Democracy 
0f th# kind with which the Congress High command i s enam-
ouired wou^d mean the complete destruction of what i s most 
19 
precioud to Islam." 
!?• AllfXndia Muslim Leacwe Lahore Session March 1940 
Yerb t^tam Report of th» presidential Address by 
p4ifl4>fTA''am Mr. M.A.JJnnah, printed and published 
by S.8n#asul Hasan# Assistant Secretary, All-India 
Muslini League at Muslim League Printing Press (DatyaganJ, Delhi, 1945), p.20. 
18. Ibid. , p. 21. 
19. Ib id . , p. 21. 
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Th« speech of Jinnah was highly cheered. The same 
day in the night the Subject Committee discussed the draft 
of the historic Lahore Resolution which was to be presen-
ted to the open session next day. 
Fazlul Haq moved the Lahore Resolution which 
saidt 
"Revolved that it is the considered view of this 
session of the All*Xndia Muslim League that no Constitu-
tional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable 
to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic 
prineiplea* viz* that geographically contiguous units are 
demarcated in to regions which should be so constituted* 
with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary* 
that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a 
majority* as in the North Westeim and Eastern zones of 
Ineia* should be grouped to Constitute Independent states 
in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and 
2C 
sovereign. 
W.> 
The resolution was prefaced by a long speech of 
the fiengal Premier who apprised the audience of the latest 
development in Congress circles. He criticized Maulana 
Decwiiber 1938 to March 1940 pul 
LiaqUat All Khan at i^lhi* pp. 
20. pggg;L»^4gn8 9f tn? All-Ind^t malim Ltagu^ grow 
;h 1940 published by Nawabaada 
47-51. 
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Ag(ad*8 Ramgarh address which said that 80 million Muslims 
should not be afraid of any forca, **Situated as we are# 
our political enemy can take advantage of the situation"» 
he said* He asked the Muslims to be united and exercise 
21 
a calm and sober Judgement to prove their strength• 
The Lahore Resolution was seconded by Choudhry 
Khaliquzsaman who p>ointed out to the audience that the 
Mualims of India had been forced to demand for a separate 
h0fn#land* He condemned other Muslims who created organi-
zations other than League and added that 'the responsibi-
lity of those Muslims v^o had damaged Muslim rights in 
India was great, for they were not only betraying the pre-
22 
sent generation, but the future generations also.' 
Bxtending his support to the Resolution, Maulana 
Zafar Ali Khan said that he had been a member of the 
Gongress for quite a long time but found that the Congress 
wils not an3flous to achieve freedom. Its sole objective 
23 
was to suppress the minorities. 
21. Ibid., p. 342. 
22« Ibid., p« 343, 
23. Ibid., p. 344. 
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Other prominent members of the League were Sardar 
Aar«ngzeb Khan of Frontier^ Sir Abdullah Haroon of Sind, 
Nawab MDhtfTinad Ismail Khan (Bihar)/ Mohammad Isa Khan 
(Baluchistan) and Abdul Hamid Khan (Madras)« l.I.Chund-
riger (Bombay^ Syed Abdur Rauf shah (C.P.), Dr. iqbal 
Aflam (Punjab)* Syed Zalclr All and Begum Mohammad All. 
While Sardar Aurangzeb« concluded that "we do not want 
British democracy which is nothing but a counting of heads. 
Muslims are a separate nation; we want a home for the 
Muallm nation* and our home is as indicated in the reso-
lution*** Sir Haroon warned the Hindus that if the Muslims 
in Hindu provinces were not Justly treated, the Hindus 
24 
in the Muslims provinces would also be treated likewise. 
After a heated discussion which continued next day also* 
the Lahore Resolution was declared passed amidst great 
25 
rejoiolng. In that very session the League's constitu> 
tion was slightly modified to strengthen it with more 
disciplinary powers in dealing with the Provincial League 
which 'fails in its duties* and infringes or ignores the 
deoisions or directions of the All*lndia Muslim League or 
hinders the progress of the League in any manner whatso-
ever* subject to a right of appeal to the council of the 
26 
All*India Muslim League.' 
24, Ibid.* p. 345. 
25. Ibid., p. 347. 
26« Ibid.* p. 348. 
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The Lahore session was a landmark In the history 
o£ Muslim India* It was a landmark as It finally def-
ined their goal which they had hitherto failed. The 
eonaludlng remarks were given by the Quald-e-Azam him-
self who sald« "the more you organise yourself, the 
27 
more you Will be able to get your rights.* The Lahore 
resolution did not employ the word Pakistan, although 
In his Presidential speech he specifically said that 
the Hindus and Muslims represented two different cul-
tures and social orders and could not evolve a common 
nationality. A Hindu correspondent asked him whether 
the resolution 'meant a demand for Pakistan?" Jlnnah in 
r^ly said that he would think and that he was prepared 
28 
to accept his Interpretation.* 
The Idea of a separate home land was not a new one. 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century it had been 
realised by Muslims that they were not adequately treated 
l7y the t^ lndus. The formation of the Muslim League and 
the deihaAd of separate electorates was the outcome of 
this feeling. But circ\imstances united them temporarily 
27. Ibid., p. 348. 
28* Durga Das, India from Curzon to Nehru and After, 
l[Paper Back, Calcutta, 1973), p.195. 
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till 1922. Between 1922-26 communal riots again separa-
ted them and It was realised that both the communities 
would not be able to live together, Lala Lajpat Ral In 
1924, therefore, suggested a scheme of Muslim state In 
the provinces of the Punjab, North West Frontier, slnd 
29 
and Bengal. 
six years later. Dr. Iqbal also In his President 
tial Address to the League In 1930 suggested a federation 
of autonomous states with a weak centre within India, 
The great historian Dr. Tara Chand says that a 
memorandum by Plowden-Justice of u.P, High Court, was 
also sent to the Tory group stating the division of India 
into Hindu and Muslim states to ensure peace in the coun-
30 
try. The special correspondent of the Bombay Chronicle 
in liondon had also suggested the vivisection of India 
31 
into Hindu India and Muslim India. At that very time, 
Chaudhry Rahmat All, a student of Cambridge University^ also 
floated a scheme of the division of India. He published 
a pamphlet in 1933 which gave the shape of wh«t Pakistan 
29. Tara Chand, Historv of the Freedom Movement in India. 
Vol,IV# (Mew Delhi, 1972), p.318. 
30. Ibid., p. 318, 
31. Bowbav Chronicle/ September 9, 1931 quoted in the 
tils|QiV Qf the Freedom Movement in India* Vol,IV, 
o^.eit,, p, 318, 
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was to comprise with. Though It was rejected as 'a boy-
ish exercise' and 'a chimera* but soon thereafter many 
schemes provided a common central government for all Indie.. 
By 1938-39 the idea of Pakistan had become clearly mani-
fest and Choudhry Khaliquzzaman in consultation with Chaudhry 
Rahiinat All at Cambridge brought h6me a complete picture 
of the division of the country. Jinnah is credited with 
having put the scheme so logically and emphatically in 
32 
1940 which was not done by any one before him. 
The whole of India watched the development of 
Muslim politics in Lahore with great anxiety. The Lahore 
resolution shocked it and produced a quick reaction throu-
^out the country. Its discussion in Press ultimately 
gave it the name of the Pakistan resolution. Sarvarkar 
was the first to declare that his party would fight to 
33 
the last to the partition of India. 
Jawaharlal who had hitherto been thinking of bring-
ing the Hindus and Muslims on one platform through negotia-
tion felt disappointed and apprehended that there was no 
32. Choudhry Khliquzzaman, op.cit., pp. 230-240. 
33* The Hi|a4u. March 26. 1940. 
- 55 -
34 
quest ion of se t t lement ^^ n e g o t i a t i o n on t h i s I s s u e . 
Gandhi wrote a s e r i e s of a r t i c l e in the Harljan in which 
he expressed h i s resentment* 
Sdio lars on Indian History have a l s o c r i t i c i s e d 
the La)>0)^ e Reso lut ion . Dr. Tara Chand i s of the opinion 
that t^1>e tttsolution bears the marks of prec ip i tancy and 
inadequacy of t h o u ^ t and appears t o have been passed 
because the leaders were a p p r ^ e n s i v e l e s t t h e worsening 
of the war s i t u a t i o n in Europe and the hardening of the 
Congress a t t i t u d e might force the Government to y i e l d t o 
35 
the Congress demand.' To Lai Bahadur "The Lahore Resolu-
t i o n was the h ighes t culmination of Muslim asp ira t ion rou-
sed by leaders from Sayyid Ahmed's t ime. Not only the 
Hindus but there was a l s o a s e c t i o n among the Muslims who 
did not approve of the Lahore Reso lut ion . They were Allah 
Baksh Of dind# Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan from North Western 
f r o n t i e r Province and Syed Abdul Rahman of Bengal. They 
speculated t o present a United front but the r i s i n g and 
i n f l u e n t i a l persona l i ty of Jinnah did not encourage them 
t o go ahead beyond murmuring. 
34. The atateman,(Calcutta)« April 16, 1940. 
35. Tara Chand, History of the Freedom Movement of India. 
Vol.IV, o p . c l t . , p. 317. 
36. Lai Bahadur, The Muslim League; I t s History A c t i -
v i t i e s apd Achievement,(Agra, 1954), p .254 . 
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Jlnnah defended the resolution and to its critics 
he replied coraprAensively with all the aspects of the 
scheme* He seidt* 
"In the first place a wrong idea and false pro-
paganda appear to be set in motion in order to frighten 
the Huslim ittinorities that they would have to migrate 
en bloc and wholesale. I wish to assure my Muslim breth-
|ren that there is no Justification for this insidious 
mistepresentation. Exchange of population^ however* on 
the physical division of India as far as practicftble 
will have to be considered. Secondly the Muslim minori-
ties are Wrongly made to believe that they would be worse 
off and be left in the lurch in any scheme of partition 
or division of India. I may explain that the Musalmans, 
whenever they are in minority cannot improve their position 
imder a uhited India or under one central government. What-
ever happehs* they would remain a minority. They can rightly 
demand all the safeguards that are known to any civilised 
government to the utmost extent. But by coming in the 
way of division of India they do not and cannot imp-
rove their own position. On the other hand, they 
Can, by th^ir attitude of obstruction, bring the Muslim 
homeland and 60,000,000 of Musalmans under the govern-
ment, where they would remain no more than a minority in 
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37 
perpetuity." 
Jlnnah continued replying to his critics wherever 
he had the occasion to explain his viewpoint. To his 
audience he again said "The issues involve the futtire 
fate and destiny of ninety million of Muslims and I am 
sure that Muslim India today is fully alive to the gra-
vity of the situation both internal and external that is 
facing us. Our ideal and our fight is not to harm or 
injure any other community or interest or block the pro-
gress but to defend ourselves, ^e want to live in this 
country an honourable life as free men and we stand for 
38 
free Islam and free India.** 
Viceroy, since the commencement of World War II, 
Was asking both the Congress and the League to support 
the British in their war efforts. He wanted their repre-
sentatives to join Executive Council. But the Congress 
rejected this. The League continued corresponding the 
Viceroy and finally in July, 1940 sent its proposals to 
the Viceroy. The proposals said that the Home Government 
37. Jamiluddln Ahmad, gome Recent speeches and Writings 
of Mr. Jinnah. op.clt., pp. 157-58. 
38. M.H. Saiyid, op.cit., p. 331. 
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would not announce any scheme which may be contrary to 
th« Lahore Resolution and that a previous approval by 
Muslim India of any scheme would be appreciated, Jlnnah 
assured full cooperation of the League In war efforts 
{>rovided equal representation was given to League along 
with the congress on the proposed war council and the 
Executive Council of the Governor General* It also clai-
med that all the Muslim members should be exclusively 
from the Muslim League. This resulted into the announce-
ment of the August Offer on August 8, 1940, by the Viceroy 
v^ich saidt 
"They could not contemplate the transfer of their 
present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of 
India to any system of Government whose authority is i 
directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's 
national life* Nor could they be parties to the coercion 
39 
of auoh elementa into submission to such a government.** 
This announcement was a departure from the previous 
policy of the Government, The Secretary of State for 
Indie was convinced that the question of minority was a 
major issue. The Viceroy annoiincing the British policy 
on ):his complicated question further said: 
39, Jarailiiddin Ahmad, (ed.) Historic Documents of the 
Muslim Freedom Movement, (Lahore, 1970), p. 386« 
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"His Majesty's Governments concern that f u l l 
welcj^t should be given to the views of the minor i t i e s 
In afty r e v i s i o n , has a l so been brought out . That remains 
the pos i t i on of His Majesty 's Government. I t goes w i t h -
out saying that they could not contemplate the t r a n s f e r 
of t h e i r present r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , for the peace and 
wel fare of India , t o any system of govexmment whose 
authority I s d i r e c t l y denied by large and powerful e l e -
40 
ments In I n d i a ' s nat ional l i f e . " 
The Secretary of State was conscious of the great 
fo l lowings of the Congress and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l prob-
lems of the B r i t i s h Government would have been diminished 
I f the other Important s e c t i o n had accepted Congress as 
a nat ional organ i sa t ion . This s e c t i o n was the Muslim mino-
r i t y , which was adamant to be treated equal ly with the 
Congress in any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance in India . I t wan 
t h i s element which could not be Ignored and the August 
41 
Offar was the outcome of this thinking. Thus the Viceroy 
tt. 
Lord Linlithgow and Lord Amry, the Secretary of State 
fully endorsed the Lahore resolution, based on the two 
nation theory. British attitude had emboldened Jinnah 
and in his birth day message on December 24, 1940 to his 
40. M.H.Salyid, op.cit., pp. 334-35. 
41. Ibid., p. 335, 
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nation he said that the Muslim nation had to prove its 
fitness to 'govern and achieve* the goal as enunciated 
in the Lahore Resolution. He reiterated that the Musliiji 
League was *The only authorltiatlve and representative 
bo<lv of the Muslims of India*. Pakistan was their goal 
42 
and they were determined to fight for it. 
Jlnnah led a vigorous campaign and through his 
speeches and writings explained the scheme of Pakistan. 
He spoXtt to the Muslim Progress Society and Muslim Youth 
Majlis on January 3, 1941/ the Kanpur Muslim Students 
Federation on March 30, 1941; the Muslim Educational Ser-
vice League at Bombay on January 10# 1941 and explained 
to them that the Pakistan was a necessity to them. He 
gave them a call for the observance of March 23, 1941 
as 'Pakistan Day* and told them that there could be no 
settlement because of the differences of approach between 
43 
the Congress and League. 
The Foreign Committee of the All-India Muslim 
League was also very active. It also published the 
scheme of Pakistan and divided India in three Sovereign 
42, Jamiluddin Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writings 
Qf Mr. Jinnah. op.cit., pp. 203-04. 
43. Ibid., pp. 232-33. 
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Muslim states - one in the North West streching upto 
Delhi* the second one in the East* comprising Bengal and 
Assam and the third one in the south with Hydi:«bad and 
44 
Berar, 
Anidst t h i s propaganda the Twenty-Ei^th Session 
of the A l l - I n d i a Muslim League was convened at Madras on 
April 12-15, 1941 under the Pres identship of M.A. Jinnah, 
A spec ia l feature of the session was the presence of a 
large number of non-Muslim l eaders , inc luding S ir R.K. 
Shanmukhan Chetty, Dewan of Cochin, S i r K.V. Reddy , s i r 
A.P. Patro, E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, leader of the j u s t i c e 
Party, Kumarajah M.A. Muthiah Chet t iar , C.R. Srinivasan, 
45 
Rao Bahadur M.C. Rajah and Rao Bahadur N. S i v a r a j . They 
were s p e c i a l i n v i t e e s and Jinnah had given them, the idea 
of the creat ion of another independent m s t a t e by the name 
of *^ravidiatan* which found emphatic suppoirt from Jinnah 
in h i s P r e s i d e n t i a l address . This was an extempore address 
which had taken two hours. The speech was confined not 
only t o p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s but to the Socio-economic u p l i f t 
of the Muslims. Jinnah wanted Muslims t o take commerce 
and i n d u s t r i e s which could p u l l them out of the morass 
in which they had f a l l e n for the l a s t e«ntury» He declared 
44. The s ta tesman. (Calcut ta ) , April 19 ,1941 , 
45. All>India Muslim League. Madras Sess ion . April 1941 
Pres ident ia l Speech by M.A.Jinnah, Published by 
Nawabzada Liaquat Al i Khan, Hon.Secretary from the 
Al l India Muslim League Press (DaryaganJ, D e l h i ) . 
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a Five Years Plan for Muslim India based on three things 
(1) a definite well considered educational plan (ii) 
Taking up cormnerce for the u p l i f t of Muslim India and 
46 
( i i i ) P o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g . 
Mr. Jinnah condemned the misrepresentat ion and 
m i s - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Lahore Resolut ion by the Con-
gress in the Press . Therefore he once again c l i r i f i e d 
the p o s i t i o n and the goal of the Muslim League: 
'Let me t e l l you as c l e a r l y as poss ible*« he s a i d , 
• the goal of the A l l - I n d i a Muslim League i s as f o l l o w s . 
We Want the establishment of completely independent s t a t e s 
in the North-Westem and Eastern Zones of India with f u l l 
contro l of Defence* Foreign Af fa ir s Communication, Customs* 
Currency, Exchange e t c . and we do not want under the c i r -
cwnstances* a c o n s t i t u t i o n of an A l l - I n d i a Charticter, with 
one Oovemment a t the Centre. We w i l l never agree t o that* 
I f you once agree, l e t me t e l l you that the Muslims w i l l be 
abso lu te ly wiped out of e x i s t e n c e . We s h a l l never be a s i g -
natory to any power of Government at Centre so far as 
the North-Westem and Eastern Zone's f r ee na t iona l homes 
47 
are concerned. This f u l l y expla ins J innah's s tand. He 
would not agree t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the Const i tuent Assembly 
46 . Ib id . 
47. Ib id . 
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du« to the fear of the Congress being in majority , which* 
by sheCr majortty of v o t e s , would force the Const i tuent 
Assembly to <}o what i t l i k e d . 
He supported the demand of Dravidistan and c r i t i -
c i s e d 3 per cent of Brahmin high c a s t e s t o ru le the r e s t 
of the races inhabi t ing South-Expressing h i s sympathy and 
f u l l e s t support to non-Brahmins and Chris t ians he sa id 
that "the only way for you t o come in to your own i s t o 
yodr 
l i va . your own l i f e , according to your c u l t u r e , according t o / 
48 
language and according to your own history." 
This was a masterly address, an address which 
touched every thing from top to bottom and fully explained 
the view point, of the Muslim League, A slight modifica-
tion, to suit the changed condition, in the League's 
constitution was made and resolutions to achieve the goal 
passed. 
48. Ibid. 
C H A P T E R THREE 
THE AftER'~MATH OF THE LAHORE RESOLUTION 
' AND THE CRIPP3 PLAN 
The Lahore r e s o l u t i o n accepted by the Al l - Ind ia 
Muslim League in i t s s e s s i o n at Lahore in 1940 was a 
watershed in the h i s t o r y of India . I t presented a sharp 
departuJre from the Hindu-Muslim uni ty who were t h i n l y 
tagged with the one nation theory. The Lahore r e s o l u -
tion# as we have seen, t reated Hindus and Muslims as 
two d i f f e r e n t nat ions and demanded a separate homeland 
for Musilims. But i t was not favourably viewed by the 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s in India . After two days of the accep-> 
tance of Lahore Resolution by the A l l - I n d i a Muslim Lea-
gue« the Hindu Mahasabha leader , Mr. Savarkar declared 
h i s p a r t i e s view and proclaimed that i t was unacceptable 
1 
to it and that it would wage war against it. 
Master Tara Singh, leader of the Sikh conununity, 
presiding at the First U.P. Sikh Conference at Lucknow 
said, "If the Muslim League wants to establish "Pakistan" 
they will have to pass through an ocean of Sikh blood." 
He further said "opposing the Pakistan scheme, some sikhs 
have lost their heads and are preaching establishment 
1. The Hindu. March 26, 1940. 
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Of Sikh rule. This will simply be adding to the confu-
sion already created by the Muslim League, The 'Pakis-
tan* scheme may prove to be a declaration of civil war 
2 
«0d therefore proposed in mad," 
Mahatma Gandhi called the two nation theory or 
Lahore Resolution as 'an untruth' and wrote: 
"The vast majority of Muslims of India are con-
vert* to Islam or are the descendants of converts. They 
did not b«come a separate nation as soon as they became 
conveirts. A Bengali Muslim speaks the same tongue that 
the Bengali Hindu does, eats the same food and has the 
s«une amusements as his Hindu neighbour. They dress 
alike, I have often found it difficult to distinguish 
by outward sign between a Bangali Hindu and a Bengali 
Muslim, The same phenomenon is observable more or less 
in the south among the poor, who constitute the masses 
of India Hindus and Muslims of India are not two 
nations. Those whom God had made one, man will never be able 
3 
to divide," 
2. Indian Annual Register, Vol.1, January to June 1940, 
p. 61. 
3, S,R« Mehrotra, Towards India's Freedom and Partition, 
(New Delhi, 1979), p. 207. 
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But whi le Congressmen did not accept t h e two 
nation theory and the proposed p a r t i t i o n of India they 
continued t o make i t c l e a r t h a t they would not use 
coercion to r e s i s t the demand for Pakistan or Lahore 
4 
Reso lu t ion , ' 
The Muslim leaders of d i f f eren t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s 
a l so expressed t h e i r views and condemned the Lahore Reso-
l u t i o n . 
Aaad Muslim Conference c a l l e d a meeting on behalf 
of the Jamiyatul-Ulama and other Muslim organizat ions 
l i k e MaJl i s -e -Ahrar- i - Is lam, the Independent Party of 
Bihar, the Al l - Ind ia Momln Conference, the Anjuman-e-
Watan of Baluchistan and the Central Standing Committee 
of the Al l - Ind ia Shia Conference in April 1940 a t Delhi . 
This conference voiced i t s oppos i t ion t o the d i v i s i o n of 
India* I t r e i t e r a t e d i t s deep concern for the r e l i g i o u s 
and c u l t u r a l safeguards of the Muslim community in any 
5 
future c o n s t i t u t i o n a l se t -up of the country. The Jamiyat 
t 
never admited the p r i n c i p l e s of two nat ion theory advoca-
ted by the League. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ziyaul Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the pemand 
for Pakistan (Bombay, 1963), p.96. see alsoIndian 
Annmll Register, Vol, I, January to June, 1940, p, 19, 
6. SiyaUl Hasan Faruqi, op.cit., p. 96, 
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But Jlnnah was not a man to be stooped down. 
Like a rock he stood firmly and replied to his critics. 
In one of his replies he clarified the misunderstanding 
of the MtiHims who had said that they would have to mig-
rate Pakistan if it was created. Jinnah continued: 
"in the first place a wrong id#a and false pro-
paganda appears to be set in motion in order to fright-
en the Muslim minorities that they would have to mig-
rate enbloc and wholesale. I wish to assure my Muslim 
brotheren that there is no justification for this insi-
dious misrepresentation. Exchange of population, how-
ever, on the physical division of India, as far as prac-
ticable, will have to be considered. Secondly the Mus-
lim minorities are wrongly made to believe that they 
would be worse off and be left in the lurch in any 
scheme of partition or division of India. I may explain 
that the Musalmans, whenever they are in a minority, can-
not improv* their position under a united India or under 
one Central Government, Whatever happens, they would 
remain a minority. They can rightly demand all the safe-
guards that are known to any civilised government to the 
utmost extent. But by condng in the way of division of 
India they do not and can not improve their own position. 
On the other hand, they can, by their attitude of obstruc-
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tlon, bring the Muslim homeland and 60,000,000 of the 
Musalmans under one government where they would remain 
7 
no aK>re than a minority in perpetuity." In reply to 
Jinnah's call to celebrate Pakistan Day on April 19, 
1940 thousands of public meeting of the Muslims were 
convened and attended by tens of thousands of Muslims in 
all parts of India. Jinnah sent his messages to these 
meetings in which League's point of view was further 
clarified* In a message to the Bombay Presidency Provin-
cial Muslim League conference convened at Hubli on May 
26, 1940, Jinnah saidt 
"I am asked, will the British agree to the basic 
and fundamental principles of Lahore Resolution, namely 
to create independent Muslim states in the North-Western 
and Eastern Zones of India? Whether they agree or whe-
ther they do not, we shall fight for it to the last ditch, 
I know that the British politicians, press and public 
are still holding on the conception of unity and one India, 
but I tm oonvined that it Is a self-deception and comp-
lete ignorance of reality. At the same time I am confi-
dent that we have successfully dispelled the false pro-
7. JamilUddin Ahmad, gome Recent Speeches and Writings 
of Mr. Jinnah, op.cit.Tpp. 157-58. 
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paganda and removed the delusloh under which the British 
public are suffering, they with their sense of sagacity 
8 
will not fail to meet us." The Working Committee of the 
All-India Muslim League Council met in Bombay on June 
15*16, and passed a resolution authorising Jinnah to 
corresponed the Viceroy to explore the possibility of 
9 
effective measures regarding India's defence. 
Meanwhile on July 1, 1940 Jinnah made some very 
itnportant proposal to the Viceroy, persuading him to 
accept thatt 
(I) The British Government would not make any 
declaration which would go contrary to the 
Lahore Resolution, 
(II) The Government would not frame any Constitution 
without the approval of the Muslim League. 
(ill) In the event of the expansion of the Executive 
Council, the number of Muslim members would 
be equal to that of the Hindus, and if the 
Congress fails to join Muslims must have 
the major share. 
8, Ibid., pp. 162-163. 
9. A.M.Saidi ( e d . ) . Evolution of Muslim p o l i t i c a l Thoucdit 
An India i The demand for Pakis tan . vol .V (Delhi , 1978) 
p. 230. 
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(Iv) In the proposed War Advisory Committee, Indian 
princes should have sufficient representation 
and with regard to the representation from 
British India, Muslim representation should 
10 
be equal to that of the Hindus. 
The Viceroy Lord Linlithgow In reply to Jlnnah 
on July 6, 1940 endorsed Jlnnah's viewpoint and wrote 
that *I readily accept the Importance in the event of 
any expan8ion# of securing adequate representation of 
Musllia interests and that Is a point which I would bear 
in mind. 
The British policy was moving favourably to the 
Muslims. Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, on August 8, 
1940, declared the British policy and said that It could 
not contemplate the transfer of their present responsi-
bilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system 
of government whose authority is directly denied by large 
and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor 
could they be parties to the coercion of such elements 
12 
i n t o submission t o such a Oovernment." 
10. Francis Low <ed.) m ^ yndtflO YeflT 999Ki ^9^^'iiii 
(Bombay* 1947), p .916. 
11. Speeches by the Marquis of Linlithgow, V o l . I i , 
(Siihli , 1944) , pp. 9 l6*17 . 
C o n t d . . . . 
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This was very appealing to the Muslim League and 
its Working Committee expressed its satisfaction with 
the Viceroy's announcement and gave a mandate to Jinnah 
to seek further details from Lord Linlithgow, When 
Jinnah had a talk with the Viceroy, he was unsatisfied. 
Jinnah actually wanted Muslim League's majority on the 
Exeoutive Council to which the Viceroy did not agree and 
Jinnah rejected the offer with regard to both the Execu-
tlv« Council and the Defence Advisory Body on December 
26« 1940, Two days earlier to the rejection Jinnah in 
his birth day message on December 24, 1940 said "we have 
now to prove to the world that we are fit to govern and 
achieve our goal as laid down by the Lahore Resolution 
of the Muslim League, popularly known as Pakistan, Our 
organisation, which is undoubtedly the only authorita-
tive and Representative body of the Muslims of India has 
given us a flag, a platform, a programme and a coerished 
goal, which we are determined to fight for and. If nece-
ssary, to die for. But we have yet to do many (things) 
13 
before we can achieve our political emancipation,* 
(Continued from the previous page) 
12. Ibid., pp. 238-42. 
13. Jamiluddin Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writings 
of Mr. Jinnah. op.cit., pp. 203-4. 
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kB seen e a r l i e r the Congress was not happy over 
th» ElritJuh a t t i t u d e on the quest ion of the dec larat ion 
of war and res igned. The Linlithgow announcement of 
August 8, 1940 had annoyed i t deeply. Since freedom 
of speech was r e s t r i c t e d the Congress proposed to launch 
a 'Satyagraha' under the l eadersh ip of Mahatma Gandhi 
who suggested that i t would be an ' Indiv idual Satyagrah,* 
On October 17, 1940 the campaign was succes s fu ly taken 
and many of the Congressmen offered themselves for impri-
sonment, in 1941 the movement was v igorous ly taken up 
and about 20#000 men and women were imprisoned and put 
on t r i a l . 
The counci l of the A l l - I n d i a Muslim League met at 
and 
Delhi on February 23, 1 9 4 1 / c r i t i c i s e d the C i v i l Disobe-
dience Movement of the Congress and in a statement i t 
sa id that i t was designed t o p r e s s u r i s e the Br i t i sh Govern-
ment from the p o s i t i o n i t h«d taken in regard t o the 
future of India r e l a t i n g to the Muslims and other minori-
t i e s . 
On July 21» 1941 the Viceroy again i s sued a Govern-
ment comnnunigue regarding the expansion of the Viceroy's 
14. P*ter Heens, Ind ia ' s Freedom Struggle , 1857-1947, 
(Oxford, Delhi , 1988) , p . 138. 
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Coxincil and the Const i tut ion of the National Defence 
Council . He r e i t e r a t e d that the o b j e c t i v e of the above 
bodies were "non-po l i t i ca l and non-communal" and further 
announced that the Government s t i l l held the promises 
made in the August Offer and there was no change of po-
l i c y s ince then . The Viceroy nominated the members of 
the League a l s o in the Councils to win the support of 
the Muslim League and some of them had Joined i t a l s o 
without seeking the permission of the League. The Vice -
roy a c t u a l l y prevai led over the Muslim premiers who j o -
ined the Coxincil without re ferr ing i t t o the League. 
Jinnah objected to t h i s and regret ted that the nomina-
t i o n of the Muslim members would not so lve any purpose 
as " i t w i l l not secure the whole hearted, w i l l i n g and 
genuine support . . . for the simple reason that the per-
sons chosen and nominated . . . are n e i t h e r real represen-
t a t i v e s of the people nor w i l l they command the c o n f i -
15 
dence and t r u s t of the Muslims." He continued to oppose 
the Viceroy who in s p i t e of the dec larat ion of August 
Offer did not g ive the represen ta t ive s of the Muslim 
15, The Indian Annual Reg i s t er . Vo l .11 , July-December 
1941, pp. 301-02. 
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League a real and substantial share In the authority and 
16 
power of the Government. 
Ihe League brought to the notice of Government 
one of the statements of Gandhi who wrote in the Harljiant 
"So long as there Is no workable arrangement with the 
Muslim League civil resistance must Involve resistance 
against the League." On the basis of the above state-
ment of Oandhl, the League said that it had no doubt that 
the Satyagraha Movement was launched against the British 
as well as the League. It warned the Government that if 
any concession to the Congress was made which was against 
Muslim demand it would resist it. But the Individual 
Satyagraha Movement of Congress had to be stopped in view 
of war situation. Russia was hard pressed by Germany 
and Japan also had entered into the war and was knocking 
at the gate of East of India, The Government realised 
thtt gravity of the situation and began releasing the 
Satyagrahld one by one. The Congress Working Committee 
16, Government of India Home Department, F.No.17/4/41, 
P611 I, Telegraphed by the Viceroy to Secretary of 
State. 
17, Jafniltiddln Ahmad (ed.) Historic Documents, op.clt., 
pp. 404-405. 
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wa« worrj «d on the entry of Japan In war which threatened 
Indlt and therefore the Satyagraha was suspended. 
The Working Committee at its meeting at Bardoli 
on December 23, 1941, repeated that full cooperation 
would be forthcoming if its demands were met. Gandhiji 
wrote to the Congress President that the means contemp-
lated by the Working Committee were those of violence 
while he was a believer of non-violence. He asked that 
18 
he should be relieved of the Congress, 
As stated above Japan had entered into the war 
and it was feared that its entry would create more prob-
lems for the Allies in India and therefore America and 
Australia who were also anxious for a solution of the 
Indian problem pressurised the British Government to solve 
th« ticklish problem of India. Mr. Churchill did not 
listen to it first and was known to have said that 'I 
did not become the king's First Minister to preside over 
19 
the liquidation of the British Empire." But on February 
22# 1942» President Roosevelt of America and Dr. Evatt, 
18. Ib id . 
19, Petejr Heens, o p . c i t . , p . 139, 
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Foreign Minister of Australia* again made speeches in 
the ParllAment supporting the cause o£ India's indepen-
dence. In view of the American and Australian pressure, 
Mr. Churchill sent Sir Stafford Crlpps, a member of the 
British war cabinet, to explain to the Indian leaders 
certain constitutional proposals accepted by the Govern-
ment of England. Sir Stafford Crlpps, had been a very 
successful British diplomat in Russia who had persuaded 
the Russian Government to join the Allies. He was spe-
cially selected by Churchill to go to India to gain its 
support in vfar while convincing them with full British 
20 
sympathy for its national aspiration. 
Sir Stafford Cripps landed in India on March 23, 
1942. After reaching Delhi, Cripps soon called a Press 
Conference and in the course of his opening speech he 
saidi 
"I have come here because I am, as I have always 
been, a great friend and admirer of India and because 
I Want to play my part as a member of the war cabinet in 
reaching a final settlement of the political difficulties 
20. Ibid.. 
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which have long vexed our relationship. Once these ques-
tions are resolved, the Indian peoples will be enabled 
to associate themselves fully and freely, not only with 
Great Britain and the other dominions, but with our great 
allies, Russia, China and the United States of America, 
so that together we can assert our determination to pre-
serve the liberty of the peoples of the world. There Is 
no time to lose and no time for long discussions «... My 
intention is to stay at Delhi for two weeks ... and I 
believe that within that time with energy and goodwill, 
21 
the essentials of success can be achieved." 
Continuing the speech he further said, "My asso-
elation in the past had been more close with my friends 
the 
in the Congress than with/members of other parties or 
communities, but I am fully impressed with the need in 
any scheme for the future of India to meet the deep anxi-
eties which undoubtedly exist among the Muslims and other 
communities. I shall therefore embark upon my task with 
a "mind equally open to all points of view - Hindu,Muslim, 
22 
Sikh and others." With these notions in mind he imme-
21. R.Cotipland, The Cripps Mission. (London, 1942), p.25. 
22. Ibid., .^^^^^^B^h^ 
Ace No. ^ (1 
'^^sua uNi^t^ 
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dlately plunged into negotiation with the Viceroy, his 
councillors and advisors. Thereafter he proceeded to 
int»rvlevf the leaders of the various leading political 
parties. He talked to Gandhi, Maulana Azad and Jawaharlal 
Nehru todether with other members of the Congress Working 
23 
Connlttee. Of the League members, he called upon M»A, 
Jlnnah, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Fazlul Haq and others. 
He held discussions with leaders of minor though influ-
ential political parties. Important among them were 
Savarkar (Hindu Mahasabha); Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and 
M.R. Jayakar (liberals); Dr. Ambedkar and M.G.Rajah 
(Depressed classes); representatives of Sikhs, Indian 
Christians; Anglo Indian and Europeans and representa-
tives of Indian states. 
On March 29, Crlpps published the Draft Declaration 
at a Press Conference, The summary of the proposals is 
as followst 
(1) To speed up the realisation of self-government 
In India the British Government proposed that 
steps should be taken to create a new Indian 
Union, with full status of a Dominion by a 
23, V.p.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India.(Calcutta 
1957), pp. 115-22. 
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common allegiance to the Crown, and free in 
Its internal and external affairs. The Union 
could secede from the British conrmionwealth, 
(2) At the cessation of hostilities a constitution 
making body was to be set up on the basis of 
the proportional representation by the lower 
houses of the Provincial Legislatures; Indian 
states were to send their representatives in 
the same proportion of their total population, 
(3) The British Government would implement the 
constitution so framed on two conditions. 
(a) Any Province of British India not prepared 
to accept the new Constitution had a right 
to retain the existing constitutional po-
sition. It could acceed to the Union 
later if it so wished and for that pro-
vision would be made later. Similarly 
the states were also free to take a deci-
sion according to their willingness. 
(b) A treaty would be negotiated and signed 
between the British Government and consti-
tution-making body for the complete transfer 
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of responbllity. Minorities interests would 
be looked after in accordance with the 
British Government's past commitments to 
them, 
(4) During the making of the Constitution, the 
British Government would remain responsible 
for the defence of India, but they Invited 
effective participation of the leaders of 
24 
principal sections of the Indian people. 
A thorough analysis of the Draft Declaration 
reveals that the clause beginning with the complete 
transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands 
waa certainly a promise for the future Independence of 
India. The other clause of the Declaration was concerned 
with the method by which the new constitution was to be 
framed and it dealt with a treaty between the British 
Government and the Constitution-making body. The Draft 
Declaration also dealt with the right of any Province 
of British India to retain its position if it was not 
25 
prepared to accept the new constitution. 
24, R.Coupland, The Cripps Mission, op,cit,, p. 28, 
25. Ibid, 
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It is said that the Draft Declaration made no 
improvaraent over the August Offer, The August Offer had 
pr«viou8ly promised Dominion Status after the war and 
also accepted that the framing of the new constitution 
was the responsibility of the Indians, ^t a close 
study of the two documents reveals that it did make an 
advancement over the August Offer. Prof. Reginald Coup-
land« assessing the two has rightly said that the ^ r^aft 
Declaration was more 'concrete and constructive'. It 
clarified the meaning of Dominion Status and explicitly 
declared that the people of India would be solely res-
ponsible for making the new constitution. 'It can not 
be H»id', Professor Coupland pointed out that 'those 
improvements on the August Offer' were of no great mo-
ment. On the contrary, the Draft Declaration provided 
precisely those additional aids required to bring a 
settlenent between the British Government and the Indian 
26 
parties within the bounds of possibility^ 
But these proposals were subject to vehement 
vehgff.ant criticism from all political parties. The Cong-
ress was disappointed on the question of independence for 
which promise was made for some future date. It wanted 
26. Ibid., p. 50. 
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that the National Government must be a Cabinet Government 
with full power while Crippa from the very beginning said 
that no change was possible during war. On March 25, at 
th« second conference, he made it absolutely clear that 
•there is no question of negotiating a fundamentally 
different scheme,' And on March 30, he further said 
I Everyone agrees that in these troublous times we can-
27 
not, here and now set about forging a new c o n s t i t u t i o n . ' 
Gandhiji sa id that i t was 'a post-dated cheque on a 
28 
bank that was obviously c r a s h i n g , ' Secondly the c lause 
concerning the provis ion for the non-access ion of pro-
v inces t o the new c o n s t i t u t i o n was a l s o not acceptable 
to the Congress, which implied that i t d i r e c t l y encour-
aged the p a r t i t i o n of India, a demand ra i sed by the 
29 
League, 
Cripps met Maulana Azad the Congress President on 
March 25, 1942, Azad insisted that to mobilize Indians 
"effectively" it was "necessary" to give them''control of 
the defence" of their country, Cripps pointed out that 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid., p. 35. 
29. Ibit^ ,, 
- 83 -
strategically India had to be regarded as part of "a 
much greater theatre of war^.Azad reiterated his point, 
however, and Cripps decided that what Congress really 
wanted was the "appearance and name of an Indian Defence 
Minister", not actual control over, "the movement of tr-
30 
oops or other military arrangements," This solution 
demanded uthat the Government should make a fair appraisal 
o£ the Congress stand. The sympathy of Congress lay with 
the Allies. It was willing to support Britain in the 
war provided two main conditions were fulfilled. First, 
the British Oovemment should give a definite and solemn 
assurance that India would be made independent immediate-
ly after the war, and would be allowed to frame its own 
constitution through a democratically elected constitu-
ent assembly. Secondly, Congress should be allowed to 
form a 'national government' at the centre with other 
parties during the continuation of the war. Congress 
was in a distrustful mood. The past experiences of its 
leaders had made them believe that the British Government 
did not Intend ever to transfer power to Indian hands 
but was parpetually occupied in out-manoeuvring tlie nat-
ional movement by setting against it the communal forces 
30. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan.(Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1984), p. 198, 
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of the Muslim League, which was entirely their own crea-
tion. Congress had noticed with grief that it had taken 
decades of hard struggle and sufferings on its own part 
to get one of its demands accepted by the British Govern-
ment, while the Muslim League's demands were incorporated 
in toto In British policy even before they were made. The 
congressman believed that the Muslim League movement thri-
ved on the support of the British, It had neither body 
nor soul and would evaporate as soon as the British left 
31 
India. 
Throughout the negot ia t ions the provision of the 
non-acceseion of the Provinces of Br i t i sh India formed 
the crux of the controversy, spec ia l ly in view of the fact 
tha t Sir Stafford Cripps had in h is broadcast speech on 
March 30, 1942 declared tha t in the great sub-continent 
of India there were more than one people. There were many 
p«*oples and races - as there were in the great sub-cont i -
nent of Russia. "Our object i s to give t o the Indian peo-
ples fu l l self government with complete freedom as to how 
they wi l l devise and organise t h e i r own c o n s t i t u t i o n . " To 
31. B.N, Panday, The Break.up of Br i t i sh India , (New York, 
1969), pp, 158-59. 
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Congress it was quite enough, and soon after the Draft 
Declaration was published, the Hindu Press started a 
powerful campaign of propaganda against it. The Congress 
objected from the every beginning to several Important 
and far reaching proposal* for the future. It had ima-
gined that the new government would function with full 
powers as a cabinet with the Viceroy acting as a consti-
tutional head. 
The interim proposals contained in the declara-
tion were vague. The long term proposals contained cer-
tain features which were unpalatable to the Congress, 
such as 'provincial option' and the inclusion in the con-
stitution-making body of states representatives who would 
not be the choice of the state people, but it was conten-
d«»d that «Aich provisions were essential in order to make 
th« scheme as a whole tolerable to other parties and in-
terests in India, and to fulfil certain solemn pledges 
32 
of His Majesty's Government. 
The attitude of the other non-Muslim political 
parties was also not favourable. The Depressed classes, 
the Sikhs, the Indian Christians, the Anglo-Indians, the 
32. V.P, Menon, op.cit., pp. 125-26. 
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Libera ls , and the Europeans community took d i f fe ren t 
vi«w8 of the Cripps proponni. The Depressed c lasses 
needed special safeguards from the ca s t e Hindu domina-
t ion and said that they were a d i s t i n c t community and 
not a ' p a r t of the great Hindu s o c i e t y ' . To Dr. Ambed-
kar and Mr, Rajah, the proposals were ' c i r c u l a t e d to do 
the oireatest harm to the Depressed c l a s s e s , and were ' su re 
to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu r u l e , ' 
The Indian Chr is t ians and the Anglo-Indian were more app-
rehensive of t h e i r fa te and pleaded tha t the ' sa feguards ' 
should be given to them for about f i f t y yea r s . The Lib-
e r s l s l i ke s i r Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar mainly 
concentrated, l ike the Congress, on the non-accession 
proposals . They declared tha t ' t h e crea t ion of more 
than one Union, however cons i s t en t in theory with the 
p r inc ip le of se l f -de terminat ion , wi l l be d i sas t rous to 
the l a s t i n g i n t e r e s t s of the country and i t s i n t e g r i t y 
33 
and s e c u r i t y . ' The Hindu Mahasabha re jec ted the propo-
s a l s on the ground t h a t the option given to the provin-
ces to stay out of the Union would destroy the uni ty of 
the country. 
33. I b i d . , pp. 40-41. 
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The Sikhs a l s o p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t t h e non -acces s ion 
of the p rov inces and s a i d t h a t they vrould r e s i s t by a l l 
p o s s i b l e means s e p a r a t i o n of t h e Punjab from t h e a l l 
34 
I n d i a Union. 
When Cr ipps came t o Delhi a i r p o r t , t h e second 
ann ive r sa ry of the ' P a k i s t a n Day' was c e l e b r a t e d i n 
Delhi by a m i l e - l o n g p roces s ion and a mass p u b l i c meet-
i n g Was addressed by J i n n a h , 
" I can say wi thout f*>ar of c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t t h e 
Muslim League s t a n d s more f i rmly for t h e freedom and i n -
dependence of t h i s count ry than any o t h e r p a r t y " , t h e 
Quald-i-Azam t o l d a crowd of 50,000 Muslims in Urdu Park. 
•*We a r e ask ing for j u s t i c e and f a i r - p l a y . We have no 
dttaigns upon our s i s t e r communit ies . We want t o l i v e i n 
t h i s land as a f r ee and independent n a t i o n . We are not 
35 
mino r i t y but a n a t i o n * About Cr ipps Mission J innah s a i d : 
'•There i s the f e a r t h a t he i s a f r i e n d of t h e 
Congress* He had enjoyed t h e h o s p i t a l i t y of Pand i t 
Jawahar lo i Nehru . . . . . That i s a l l t r u e but we should 
34. I b i d . , pp. 125-26. 
35. Stanly Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, op.cit., p.198. 
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no! be afraid on that score. Don't get cold feet 
We are prepared to face all consequences if any scheme 
or solution which is detrimental to the interests of 
Muslims is forced upon us. We shall not only accept 
it but resist it to the utmost of our capacity. If we 
36 
have t o d i e in the a t tempt we s h a l l d i e f i g h t i n g . " 
On Apr i l 2, 1942, J l n n a h l e f t Delhi for Allahabad 
where t h e annual s e s s i o n of the A n . i n d i a Muslim League 
Wat convened and which was t o be c h a i r e d by him. The 
League 's a t t i t u d e i s c l e a r trom t h e Chairman of t h e 
Recept ion Committee, S i r Mohammad Yusuf, who expla ined 
h i s p a r t y ' s s t a n d p o i n t . R e f e r r i n g t o S i r S taf fond Cr ipps 
he hoped t h a t some s o l u t i o n fo r a read jus tment of Hindu-
Muallm problem w i l l be found out which would be in conso -
nance wi th the two n a t i o n t h e o r y , l e a d i n g t o t h e c r e a t i o n 
37 
of P a k i s t a n , 
T h e r e a f t e r J lnnah made h i s P r e s i d e n t i a l speech . 
In h i s a d d r e s s he took up the Cripps P r o p o s a l s , He 
36. Ibid. 
37. Syed sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundationgof Pakistan, 
Vol. II, op.cit., pp, 378-79, 
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analysed the whole scheme to the audience and said tha t 
i t was bnsed on four important po in t s , ^he f i r s t was 
the crea t ion of a new India Union equal in every respect 
with other Dominions which had to give i t s a l l eg iance to 
the Crown; secondly a f t e r the cessat ion of h o s t i l i t i e s 
an e lected body would be crea ted t o ^rame a new c o n s t i t u -
t ion for Ipdla , t h i rd ly , provision for the Indian s t a t e s 
watf made and fourthly, the Const i tu t ion framed by the 
consti tut ion-making body would be accepted and implemented 
by His Majesty's Government with few exception. One very 
irapxartant exception was concerned with the r i g h t of any 
Br i t i sh Indian province t o r e t a in i t s ex i s t i ng c o n s t i t u -
t iona l pos i t ion , i f i t wa« not wi l l ing to accept the cons-
t i t u t i o n . The League had studied the pros and cons of 
the proposals and was very c r i t i c a l to the composition of 
the constitution^making body. Cripps in h i s scheme about 
the formation of the const i tut ion-making body said t h a t 
i t s members would be elected from the Provincial Legis la-
tu res by a system of proport ional r ep re sen t a t i on . I t meant 
that out of the Assemblies of 11 provinces an e l e c t o r a l 
col lege of 1600 members would be made which would be e n t i -
t l l e d to e lec t one- tenth, which means in a l l , 160 members 
by means of proport ional r ep resen ta t ion . Jinnah f e l t tha t 
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MuBalmans even by separate electorate, would not be more 
than 25 per cent in it and by the system of proportional 
representation, they might be still less in number in the 
Constitution-making body. Thus a non-Muslim majority 
would dominate the process of framing the constitution 
and the majority would be absolutely in favour of only 
38 
•one Union*. 
He also attacked the provision of the scheme which 
said that any province not willing to accept the consti-
tution hrtfl a right to seceded from it. There was no clear 
indication as to how that province or provinces would 
express their willingness to accept or reject the consti-
tution. A suggestion to this effect was made by Sir 
Stafford that if a province, in the Legislative Assembly 
of the province, was in favour of accession by 60 per cent 
of votes, there would be an end of it. It meant that 
the province was bound to accede. But if they got 59% 
of votes and the minority happens to be 41 per cent, then 
there would be a plebiscite of the people of the province 
and these non-acceding province or provinces couId form 
another Union or a Dominion or a single province may stand 
38. Ibid., p. 385. 
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by Itself as a Dominion. To Jinnah this was all mean-
ingless. He said that after the publication of the pro-
posals Muslim India felt 'dcteply disappointed that the 
entity and integrity of the Muslim nation has not been 
39 
expressly recognised,* He felt that the real issue i.e. 
the issue of Pakistan had been deliberately evaded "by 
over emphasizing the territorial entity of the provinces, 
which art mere accidents of British policy and adminis-
trative division is fundamentally wrong," He asked the 
British Oovernment to accept the right of 'national self-
determination* 'unequivocally recognised*for iMuslims. In 
a long speech Jinnah reiterated that India was never a 
country or a nation. Cultural, social, political and 
economic differences had been so fundamental among diff-
erent nations that it would be impossible to conceal them, 
40 
They need a clear handling by the realists. 
He did not agree with the power of minority in 
the matter of secession. To him it was * illusory* as 
Hindu India would give its decision in favour of one 
All-India Uni6n of all the provinces, and the Muslims of 
Bengal and the Punjab would be at the mercy of the Hindu 
39, Ibid., pp. 385-88. 
40. Ibid. 
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minority In those provinces. "The document shows" said 
Jlnnahf "that Pakistan is treated as a remote possibility 
and there is a definite preference for a new Indian Union, 
which is the main objective and suggestion, and the rules 
of procedure and the process; indicated in the document, 
and the interviews and explanations of Sir Stafford Cripps 
41 
so far, are against us." 
Later the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim 
League met on April 11, 1942 and while appreciating the 
pronouncement made by the British Prime Minister regarding 
the 'Draft Declaration* which maintained the validity of 
August Offer which had promised that no constitutional 
machinsry for the framing of the constitution should be 
set up or the constitution enforced without the consent 
of the Muslims of India, It expressed its disappointment 
on the Cripps Proposal. It objected to the rigidity of 
the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding the 
fundamentals of th« 'Draft Declaration' which were not 
open to any modification. The League, therefore, resolved 
that it, has finally decided that the only solution of 
India's constitutional problem is the partition of India 
into independent zones, and it will, therefore, he unfair 
41. Ibid., pp. 388-89. 
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to the Musalmans to compel them t o enter such a c o n s t i -
tut ion making body, whose main objec t i s the crea t ion of 
a new Indian Union, 
"Besides the machinery which had been proposed 
for the creat ion of the c o n s t i t u t i o n making body . . . i s 
a fundamental departure from the r i g h t of the Musalmans 
h iUierto enjoyed by them, to e l e c t t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
by means of separate e l e c t o r a t e s , which i s the only sure 
way in which true r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of Musalmans can be 
chosen." I t a l so reso lved that "The r ight of non-access ion 
t o the Union, 'as contemplated in the Draft Declarat ion, 
has been conceded, presumbly, in response t o the i n s i s t e n t 
demands by the Musalmans for the p a r t i t i o n of India , but 
the method and procedure l a i d down are such as to negat ive 
th« professed object The Musalmans cannot be s a t i s -
f l ed by such a Declarat ion on a v i t a l quest ion a f f e c t i n g 
t h e i r future des t iny and demand a c l e a r and p r e c i s e pro-
42 
nouncement on the subjec t ." 
True, the f a i l u r e of Cripps was because of the 
obst inacy of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s but i t was i t s e l f 
42. Resolut ions of the A l l - Ind ia Muslim League from 
April 1942 to May 1943 published by Nawabzada 
Liaquat Al i Khan, Honorary Secretary A l l - I n d i a 
Muslim League Delhi , pp. 1-6. 
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responsible for its failure. It did not explicitly des-
cribed the character of the proposed National Government 
or the method of its operation. It only talked about 'the 
immediate and effective participation of the leaders of 
principal sections of the Indian people in the councils 
of their country*. This was slightly different from the 
demand of the Congress which had been demanding from the 
very beginning a 'National Government.' 
On the question of personnels, it was agreed that 
the majority of them on the Viceroy's Executive Council 
would be Indian save the Commander-in-Chief, But its 
mood of operation was not diffused. The Governor-General 
was still required to act in his discretion when emergen-
cy arose and whereby the safety, or interest of British 
India or any part thereof, was in danger. 
Thus the powers of the cabinet consisting of In-
dians was still limited. But it should be said to the 
credit of Sir Stafford Cripps that he had come to secure 
an agreement on the Draft Declaration and his concern 
was not with the details. But the Congress Working Comni-
ttee did not look eye to eye and insisted on a 'Cabinet 
with full powers.' However, Sir Stafford Cripps could 
not have accepted it because the minorities were not to 
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acqulese. When Congress was proceeding ahead with its 
clarifioation, Jinnah told to a Press Conference on April 
13, that the Muslims would be at the •mercy' of the 
Congreas Rule, while his object had been to secure an 
inter-communal agreement 'as to how independence should 
be achieved after the war'and 'next, on the basis of such 
an agreement, to bring about the formation of an interim 
government. Thus minority opposition to the Congress 
d«inand was in Itself an obvious and conclusive reason for 
43 
its rejection,' 
After the Cripps Mission left India, the All-India 
Congress Committee met at Allahabad and resolved that it 
was impossible 'for Congress to consider any schemes or 
proposals, which retain even a partial measure of British 
control in India Britain must abandon her held on 
India. It is on the basis of independence alone jc that 
44 
India can deal with Britain or other nations,* Though the 
resolution was passed its objective was not to 'embarass* 
the British Government, The morale of the Congress Hlc^ 
Command was high and it was not going to surrender to Japan 
45 
or any invader. 
43. R.Coupland, The Cripps Mission, op.cit., pp.56-57. 
44. Ibid,, p. 63. 
45. Ibid. 
C H A P T E R FOUR 
THI mum ^EAG"E AND THg-^ JJiyiT INDIA MOVEMENT 
Genera l ly t h e i n c i d e n t of t h e Quit I n d i a Movement 
was of g r e a t importance t o the fo l l ower s of t h e Congress 
o b j e c t i v e s propagated by Gandhi, who planned i t as a 
means for g e t t i n g power from t h e B r i t i s h , but not for 
the Muslim League which c o n s i d e r e d i t a p r e c u r s o r of 
Hindu Raj in I n d i a . Why t h e Muslim League opposed t h e 
Movement? What were t h e consequences had t h e Muslim 
League j o i n e d Gandhi in t h i s movement? What b e n e f i t s 
J innah wanted t o gain dur ing t h e movement? Why t h e 
Gcivernment crushed i t ? Wjat was t h e impact of t h e Move-
ment on Indian p o l i t i c s ? Whether a l l the m i n o r i t i e s , 
the Muslims be ing the l a r g e s t , p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e Move-
ment? These a r e some of the q u e s t i o n s which emerge in 
the mind which need answer, bu t t o t h e d i sappoin tment of 
a s c h o l a r t h e contemporary w r i t e r s have w r i t t e n the 
l e a s t on t h e causes of n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e Muslim 
League and i t s r e a c t i o n t o t h e movement in d i f f e r e n t 
s t a t e s . 
However, t o have a c l e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e 
c i rcumstances of t h e movement and League ' s o p p o s i t i o n 
i t 
t o i t / i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o know t h e depth of t h e d i f f e r -
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ences between the Congress and the League. Since the 
Quit India Resolution was adopted at the Wardha Congress 
meeting (1942) the p o l i t i c a l developments have t o be 
reviewed before and a f t e r t h i s da te . 
For Churchi l l , "Freedom" meant freedom for the 
Br i t i sh and other European na t ions , and for Roosevelt dem-
ocrtcy meant democracy for the United S t a t e s , though they 
advocated the p r inc ip l e of independence through the U.N, 
Charter , The same policy continued to be followed by the 
Br i t i sh Government for r e t a i n i n g t h e i r cont ro l in the co-
lon i e s . During the world War I I the U.S. Government, 
though played a s ign i f i can t role in the e f fo r t of breaking 
the cons t l tu iona l deadlock in India, C h u r c h i l l ' s d i r e c t -
ives t o Crlpps, proved a l l h i s plans a fdrce . The Al l i e s 
had s t a r t e d war to safeguard t h e i r own i n t e r e s t against 
Germany, Japan and I t a l y . The United s t a t e s saw in i t a 
thr««t t o Afnerican global I n t e r e s t . Roosevlet - Churchi l l 
pronouncement for the l i b e r t y , peace and democracy in a l l 
th« dependent count r ies only aimed t o draw men and mater ia l 
support from them. The change in the U.S. and Br i t i sh 
1 
foreign policy was met with su rp r i se by the American and 
1. M.S.Venkataramanl and B.K. Shrivastava, Quit Ind ia ; 
The American Response to the 1942 Struggle. (New Delhi, 
1974), p. 23. 
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European nations. If the European nations and the United 
States , wftre fighting against the Axis powers for the 
establishment of peace, liberty and democracy, Churchill 
declared that this principle was not applicable to India. 
in view of this embarrassing statement, Cripps Mission 
to install and interim government in India with the assu-
rance to get India's assistance in the war and to grant 
Independence after War was a clear indication of the opp-
ressive British policy. As a result, the Congress opposed 
the Cripps proposal and demanded independence first and 
to taHe the question of the defence of India later, to 
which the British did not agree. When the war broke out 
on September 3, 1939, Linlithgow declared India a belli-
gerent without making any effort to consult the Indian 
2 
leaders. The British used the rule of force. The Congress 
asked the British Government to state her war aims, which 
matl* the Congress-Viceroy negotiations stagnant. Hence, 
the Viceroy turned towards the Muslim League for support 
in the British War aims. 
Initially, there was cleavage between the Muslim 
political parties. The United Muslim Party was led by 
2, Reginald Coupland, The Indian Problem.(Oxford, 1944), 
p. 212. 
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th« Nawab of Dacca, representing big landlords and the 
Krlahak Proja Party (KPP) wan led by Faz-ul-Haq, repre-
switlng the poor peasants. He was Vice-President of 
3 
th« Bengal Provincial Muslim League. In Bihar, the 
United Mualim and Ahrar Parties did not join the League. 
In central Provinces and Madras also, there were differ-
ences between the Muslim Parties. In Sind, since the 
Azad Muslim party did not like interference of others in 
the provincial matters, the formation of a single Muslim 
party in the state was not possible, in U,P,, the Muslim 
Unity Board, led by Khaliquzzaman was sympathetic to the 
4 
Muslim League. Jinnah had already purified and revived 
the Leagiae and stressed th« need for a Unitdd Muslim 
fiorit, Jinnah made the Muslim League the only tepresenta-
tiv« body of the Muslims. He exhorted the Muslims all 
5 
over I n d i a t o r a l l y round the League banner . After t h e 
1937 e l e c t i o n s , t h e League ' s p o s i t i o n became eo weak t h a t 
t h e Congress proposed the merger of t h e Muslim League with-
in i t s own. However, t he J innah League su rv ived and on 
June 30, 1937, J i nnah appea l ing t h e Muslims s a i d : 
3. z.H.zaidi (ed.) M,ft,^ inn.an - ;;:gpanapA corr^spgnafflgg^ 
1936-1948 , (Karachi , 1976) , pp. 8-9 . 
4 , Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, o p . c i t . , pp . 117-20. 
5 , The Leader, March 22, 1937, 
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"My only object in organising the Muslim League, 
and the Muslim League Parliamentary Board, and putting 
forward the programme for the "Nazm" (organization) of 
Muaalmans ... is that Musalmans should unite among them-
selves as they have been ordered to do by God and his 
6 
Prophet*" 
The appeal had a sharp effect on Muslim voters 
and the Muslim League emerged victorious at Bundelkhand 
and gained strength. In February, 1938, Pant wrote to 
N<»hni th,iit: it would not be possible to ignore the Muslim 
7 
Longue and, therefore, the Congress resolved to settle 
communal issues with it. The Congress Mass Contact 
and 
Movement/Its atrocities in the Congress governed provin-
ces created in the hearts of Muslims an anti-Congress feel-
8 
ing and made them a nation by 1939, Encouraged by these 
developments, Jinnah demanded the Muslim haneland for Mus-
lims in 1940 at Lahore, which caused the alienation of 
The Khjlafat, June 30, 1937. 
7, Pant to Nehru, February 11, 1938, Nehru Correspondence, 
Vol. 79, 
8, Khuraheed Kamal (ed,) A Do<;;umentarv Record of the 
Congress Government. 1937-39, Related to Muslim under 
Congress Rule, Vol,II, See Part XI, xil. 
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Muslim League from the Congress and l a t e r from the Quit 
India Movement. 
On May 10, 1940, Winston Churchil l replaced 
Nevil le Chamberlain as Prime Minister and on May 19, 
1940, L.S. Amery became Secretary of Sta te for India in 
place of Lord Zetland, while Lord Linlithgow remained the 
Viceroy of Ind ia . Amery, the Leader of the Labour Govern-
ment, changed the Bri t ish policy towards India and dec-
lared t h a t the "attainment by India of fu l l and equal 
par tnership in Commonwealth was the goal of Br i t i sh po-
9 
l i c y . " On the one hand, on June 15-16, 1940, the League's 
subject committee authorised Jinnah only to negot ia te 
10 
with the Congress, and on the o ther , the Congress Work-
ing Committee meeting on July 7, 1940, resolved tha t i t s 
s t ruggle for I n d i a ' s independence would continue without 
11 
v io lence , and above a l l the Viceroy, on July 6, 1940, had 
assured the expansion of the Executive Council with ade-
quate representa t ion of the Muslims, If the Congress 
9. C.H.Philips and M.D.Wainwright ( e d s . ) . The P a r t i t i o n 
of India : Po l ic ies and Perspect ives , 1935-1947, (London, i970), p .563. 
10. Sir Reginald Coupland, Report on the Cons t i tu t iona l 
Problem in India , London, 1943. P. 243, 
11. V.p. Menon, o p . c i t , , p .89 . 
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demanded complete independence before assisting the British 
war committee, the League would mean it the establishment 
of Hindu Raj which would be unacceptable to the Jinnah 
League which demanded the creation of Pakistan. The Vice-
roy realised that the Congress help would not come and, 
therefore, he turned towards Jinnah for help asking the 
12 
League to cooperate with the Government in the war efforts. 
On August 8, 1940, Linlithgow declared that power 
would not be transferred to any system of government 
whose authority is directly denied "by large and powerful 
elements in Indias national life." Further, the Cripps 
proposal in 1942, indirectly indicated the recognition of the 
establishment of Pakistan, as it provided for the creation 
14 
of two or more independent Unions in India. The Congress 
Working Committee expressed its indignation over these 
proposals. On July 13, 1942, Gandhi threatened that 
either the British should recognise India's Independence 
12, See Correspondence between Jinnah and Lord Linlithgow 
between February 1940 to July 1940 in Jamiluddin 
Ahmad (ed.) Historic Documents. 
13, Gowhar Rizvi, Linlithgow and India : A Study of 
British Policy and the Political ImPasse in India. 
1936-47, (London, 1978), p. 158. 
14, Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from 
April 1942, to May 1943, Delhi, p.2. 
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15 
or he will launch an open rebellion. This was too much 
for Jinnah, He accused the Congress of aiming to estab-
lish 'Hindu Raj' placing the Muslims and other minorities 
16 
at the mercy of the Congress Raj, However, Jinnah was 
apprehensive that the British government would be press-
urised by the Congress to accept its terms, leaving the 
17 
League in the cold. 
In 1940, while the War between the Allies and 
the Axis powers was fought in Europe and Japan was cap-
turning British territories in the East and there was 
a possibility of Japanese attack on India also, the Cong-
ress on September 15, 1940, decided to start a civil 
disobedience movement against the British war efforts 
and announced its plan for "direct action" and consequ-
18 
e n t l y s t a r t e d sa tyagraha on November 7, 1940. The Gove-
rnment took r e p r e s s i v e measures and a r r e s t e d Nehru, Azad 
and as many as 4,749 congressmen. The Muslim League 
15, The S t a t e s m a n , ( C a l c u t t a ) , J u l y 15, 1942. 
16. The Statesman, ( C a l c u t t a ) , August 1, 1942. 
17, The Statesman, ( C a l c u t t a ) , J u l y 3 , 1942. 
18. P.D. Kaushik, The Congress Ideology and Programme, 
1920-47 (Delhi , 1964), p . 240. 
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characterised the Congress movement as a pressure on the 
British to concede its demand and declared to resist the 
19 
movement with its power. The Government suppressed the 
movement with all power at its command by arresting the 
Congressmen and the Congress was forced to suspend the 
movement. Jinnah was much encouraged by the statements 
of Aroery and Linlithgow on this occasion and he found in 
it a favourable climate to propagate the idea of Pakistan 
20 
and win the support of Muslim masses for it. In November 
1940, he said: 
••The whole effort of the Congress seems to me 
to be like that of a bat which has entered a room and 
flies round and round knocking against the walls but 
will not, cannot, see that the door is wide open. That 
21 
is what the policy of the Congress is like." 
Jinnah was happy on the failure of the Civil 
Disobedience Movement and gave an impression to the 
people that Congress aimed at capturing power by sword. 
He exhorted the Muslims not to cooperate with the Cong-
22 
ress and its movement. He said: 
19. Dr. J.J.Pal» Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan, 
(Delhi, 1983)7 P. 100. 
20, Jamiluddin Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writings 
6f Mr, Jinnah, op.cit., pp. 173-74. 
21, Ibid., pp. 173-74. 
22. Ibid. 
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"I say to Musalmans, please don't get mixed up 
or Involved in this terrible situations, for which the 
Congress alone is responsible. But if we find at any 
time that our interests are at stake we shall play our 
part and intervene, if necessary. Let that be understood," 
The Council of the All-India Muslim League met 
on February 23, 1941 and in a resolution it said that 
•the Civil Disobedience Movement started by the Congress 
is designed to bring pressure on the British Government 
to resile from the position it has taken in regard to 
the future constitution of India relating to the Muslims 
and other minorities and concede to the Congress demands, 
which are fundamentally opposed by Muslim India as they 
are detrimental to its vital interests,* The resolution 
also quoted a statement of Gandhi of November 5, 1939 
published in the Harijan which said, 'So long as there 
is no workable arrangement with the Muslim League Civil 
resistance must involve resistance against the League,' 
T^he resolution concluded by saying that 'if any con_ 
cession to the Congress is made which adversely affects 
or militates against the Muslim demands it will be resis-
ted by the Muslim League with all the power it can command 
and the Muslim League desires to place it on record that 
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if the situation demands it would not hesitate to inter-
vene and play such part in the struggle as may be nece-
ssary for the protection of the rights and interests of 
23 
the Mussalmans of t h i s country." This amply c l a r i f i e s 
the stand taken by the League, 
Thereafter the All - India Muslim League met a t Madras 
for i t s annual de l ibera t ion on April 12, 1941 and was 
attended by eminent leaders l i k e E.V, Ramaswami Naicker, 
the leader of the j u s t i c e Party: R«K. Shammukham Chetty, 
Dewan of Cochin, K.V. Reddy, A.P.Patro, Kumarrajah, M.A. 
Muttlah Chet t ia r , C.R, Srlnivasan, the e d i t o r of the 
Swadesl Mitran, and M.C, Rajah, besides N.Sivaraj and 
other non-Brahmin l eade r s . In the session Jinnah declared 
tha t the League goal was Pakistan and he extended h i s 
support for the establishment of Dravidis tan, He asked 
was 
the Muslims to have education which/a means t o an end and 
which was Pakistan. "Your biggest task i s t o have Muslims," 
he sa id , "so we l l - t r a ined in p o l i t i c a l science, in p o l i t i -
cal language, in the p o l i t i c a l movements not only of t h i s 
24 
country, but of the whole world. ," Defining the League's 
policy he said tha t under no circumstances, i t would accept 
23, Jamiluddin Ahmad, His to r i c Documents, op . c i t . , pp ,404 -5 
24. The Bombay Chronicle, April 15, 1941. 
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any constitution of an 'All-India Character with one 
Government at the Centre.' He was afraid that If the 
League agreed to this the Muslims would be absolutely 
wiped out of their existence. He bitterly criticised 
for 
Pandit Jawaharlal's statement in which he stood/'Akhand 
aharat* and said that Muslim did not like to live in 
25 
Democracy. It would mean the rule of majority. 
Announcing the League's policy Jinnah said that 
its policy was to endeavour to promote goodwill and 
harmony among other peoples on the basis of equality, 
fair play and reciprocity. This can best be secured by 
agreement with other peoples and parties,.,.Any ambition 
of domination by one over the other must be abandoned 
and the sooner that is abandoned the quicker will be the 
26 
solution of India's problems. 
The Conference also passed a resolution to the 
effect that "every Muslim \k\o is to join the League from 
now onwards will have to take an oath of allegiance to 
27 
Pakistan." The session characterised the Gandhi's Civil 
25. Ibid. 
26-. Ibid. 
27, A.M. Zaidi (ed.), The Demand for Pakistan, Vol.V, 
op.cit./ p. 306, "" 
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Disobedience Movement as a p r e s s u r e t a c t i c s on the B r i t i s h 
Goveimment t o make i t accede t o t h e Congress demand. The 
s e s s ion warned t h e Government t h a t any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
change, e i t h e r i n t e r im o r f i n a l / made wi thou t t h e appro-
va l of the League, would mean v i o l a t i o n of t h e solemn 
p ledges of August 1940, and t h r e a t e n e d t h a t " i f any a t t emp t 
was made t o d e p a r t , in any way, from t h e d e c l a r a t i o n s of 
August, 1940, t he Muslims would f e e l c o n s t r a i n e d t o 
r e s o r t t o any measure and method t o r e s i s t i t wi th a l l 
28 
the powers they pos se s sed . 
Meanwhile what annoyed t h e Muslim League more was 
Mr. Amery's Sta tement in t h e House of Common on Apr i l 22, 
1941. He s a i d : 
" I t Was sugges ted t h a t the framework of I n d i a ' s 
f u t u r e c o n s t i t u t i o n should be dev ised by Ind ian themselves 
and no t by t h i s House . . . ^ven more impor t an t in t h i s 
connec t ion i s t h e s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t t he c o n s t i t u t i o n i t -
s e l f , and a l s o t h e body which i s t o frame i t , ntust be 
t h e outcome of agreement between the p r i n c i p a l e lements 
in I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l l i f e . That i s a p r e - r e q u i s i t e t o t h e 
success of t h e f u t u r e c o n s t i t u t i o n . For i f I n d i a n s can -
not ag ree upon the kind of c o n s t i t u t i o n they a r e p repared 
28 . See Syed Shar i fuddin P l r zada , Foundat ions of P a k i s t a n , 
V o l . 1 1 , o p . c i t . , p . 373. 
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to work, how are they likely to agree upon the actual 
working of It. I have dwelt deliberately upon Indian 
responsibility in the matter; for unless -Indians are pre-
pared to face that responsibility now, they will fall to 
face it hereafter. Any agreement imposed by UE from 
without cannot survive the withdrawal of our power to 
enforce it. Only a real agreement freely reached, can 
stand that test." Contrary as it was to the previous 
policy of the Government, Ilie Working Committee of the 
League took the above statement very seriously and re-
quested the British Government to stand by their declara-
tion and pledges solemnly given earlier by the Viceroy 
and the Secretary of State. It threatened the Government 
that if the Muslim League's demand of Partition would 
not be forthcoming, Muslim League would be forced to 
29 
resort to methods which would be other than peaceful. 
There was no settlement between the League, the 
Congress and the Government while an understanding on some 
constitution which may serve as a future guide was very 
necessary at a time while all these were busy in specula-
ting their own efforts. Hence the British Government sent 
29. The Annual Register, Vol.1, January-June, 1941, 
p. 298. 
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Sir Stafford Cripps to India to negotiate with the Indian 
leaders about a workable constitution, 
Cripps Mission reached India on March 23, 1942. His 
arrival gave fresh hopes to the people of India because 
he called himself a great friend and admirer of India' 
who Was eager to bring a 'final settlement of the politi-
cal difficulties' of Indian people. He was confident 
that his efforts would resolve the problems and a generally 
acceptable line of practical action could be laid down. 
In his message to the people of India he said that His 
Majesty's Government desired to lay down in precise and 
clear terms the steps leading to the realisation of self-
Government in India. Their 'object is the creation of 
a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion asso-
ciated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a 
coftunon allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in every 
respect* in no way subordinate in any aspect of its do-
30 
mestic or external a f f a i r s . ' The Cripps proposals pub-
l ished on March 30, 1942 announced the formation of 'one 
Indian Union* and 'one const i tut ion-making body*, Thus the 
Draft Declaration on one hand had accepted the Congress 
demand to frame a cons t i tu t ion through a Const i tuent 
30. Indian Annual Regis ter , Vol .1 , January-June 1942, 
p . 220. 
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conceded 
Assembly and on the o t h e r / t o the Muslim League ' s demand 
for the establishment of Pak i s t an by g iv ing t h e Provinces 
31 
the right either to join or not the Indian Union, 
But the League was very critical to these proposals. 
Its Working Committee met on April 11, 1942 and criticised 
the idea of 'one Indian Union.' In a resolution it said 
that since Muslim League had been trying to be friendlier 
with the Indian National Congress and got no success it 
was neither just nor possible to constitute one Indian 
Union. It reiterated its demand of Partition of India 
into independent zones. It criticised the machinery which 
Cripps had proposed for the creation of the constitution 
making body and said that it would take decisions by a 
32 
bare majority and Muslims would not have their say. 
The non-accession clause and Cripps Defence Formula 
could not bring about a settlement between the Congress 
and the League and the Mission, having failed, flew back 
to England on April 2, 1942. After the departure of the 
Mission both the parties began to accuse it and the poli-
tical deadlock continued. The League met at Allahabad on 
31. B.R.Nanda* Nehru, The Indian National Congress and 
the Partition of Indian 1935-47 in C.H.Philips 
and Wainwright, op.cit., p.169. 
32. See Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League from 
April 1942 to May 1943, published by Nawabzada 
Llaquat Ali Khan, pp. 1-7. 
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April 3-6, 1942 for its 29th session and the Cripps pro-
posals were subject of heated discussion. In his Presi-
dential speech Jinnah concluded 'We will ... endeavour that 
the principle of Pakistan which finds only veiled recog-
nition in the document should be conceded in unequivocal 
33 
terms.' To solve this problem, Rajagopalacharl, better 
known as "Rajaji", on April 23,1942, recommended to the All-
India Congress Committee to "acknowledge the Muslim League's 
34 
claim for separation." Rajaji's resolution in favour of the 
creation of Pakistan was rejected at the All-India Cong-
ress Committee which met at Allahabad on May 2, 1942. 
Rajaji being disappointed began his campaign in favour of 
Pakistan and met Jinnah also. On July 22, 1942, Jinnah 
warned the Government that serious consequences will follow 
if the Congress demand against the creation of Pakistan 
would be accepted. The Congressmen were completely dis-
appointed and they realised that if the congress would not 
33, See All-India Muslim League Allahabad Session, April 
1942, Presidential Address, bv M.A.Jinnah, Printed 
and JPubllshed by S. Shamsul Hasan, Assistant Secretary 
All-India Muslim League at Muslim League Printing 
Press (Darya Ganj, Delhi, 1945), p. 12. 
34. The Indian Annual Register, Vol.1, January-June, 1942, 
pp. ^94-95. See also Jinnah-Gandhl Talks (September 
Contd 
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start any movement to engage the masses it would suffer 
35 
a great setback. 
Since news were forthcoming that Gandhijl will 
intensify the non-violence non-cooperation movement, the 
war cabinet was authorised to t«ke decisive action when-
ever It seemed necessary. The Governors were asked to 
take political leaders in their confidence in order to 
suppress the movenent, but they were unable to find any 
influential Indian politician to speak out against the 
Wardha All-India Congress Committee Resolution of July 
14, 1942, which stated that since the Government had not 
given any consideration to the Congress proposal, Gandhiji 
would be authorised to launch a non-violent and wide-
spread struggle. The Wardha Resolution was to be ratified 
by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay on August 
36 
7, 1942. 
(Continued from the previous page) 
1944) Text of Correspondence and other re levant docu-
ments. Foreword by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan,M,L.A, 
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35. B.R.Nanda, Nehru the Indian National Congress and 
the P a r t i t i o n of India in C.H.Philips and M.D. 
Wainwright, o p . c i t . , pp. 173-74. 
36. Judi th Brown, The Mahatama in Old age ; Gandhi's 
Role in Indian P o l i t i c a l Life, 1935-42 in Congress 
and Indian Nationalism (ed.) by Richard Session and 
Stanley Wolpert, Oxford 1988, pp. 293-95. 
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However, there was lull in the political activi-
ties in India, British officials were sceptical whether 
Gandhi could really start the non-violent non-cooperation, 
no-tax or no-rent movement interfering in the British 
military and administrative services. A responsible 
official of the British Intelligence Department noted 
that there was no apparent sign of Congress assault on 
the British Raj and it was simply a bluff on the part of 
37 
Gandhi. But, in fact. Congress and League workers were 
in action in the states. A Central Intelligence officer, 
Lahore, reported on January 15, 1942, that Congress work 
was proceeding without a break in NWFP and members of the 
Red Shirt Movement organised many demonstration?and hara-
ssed the Government. Abdul Qaiyyum was paid Rs. 2,000/-
to carry on the Congress work, while Dr. Khan Saheb was 
found unfit for piloting the Congress movement on socialist 
lines. Geo D. Parkin an officer of the Criminal Investi-
gation Department, wrote to all Superintendents of police 
of the United Provinces on July 24, 1942 that the Congress 
anticipated their arrest on the inauguration of the mass 
movement. Therefore, they had made arrangement of suitable 
successors. He also wrote that the Congress had planned 
37, Dr. P.N. Chopra (ed.) Quit India Movement ; British 
Secret Documents, DelhT^ i986, p. 1. 
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t h a t open and subve r s ive groups would p a r a l y s e t h e Govern-
ment. In Andhra Pradesh Dr. P a t t a b h l Sl taramayya and Kala 
Venkata Rao o rgan i sed programme fo r l a y i n g t h e t r e e s on 
road s i d e s , marching in government o f f i c e s , appea l i ng t o 
p o l i c e not t o do t h e i r d u t i e s , and removing f i s h p l a t e s 
38 
from ra i lway l i n e s . Park in r e p o r t e d on August 4, l y 4 2 . 
Congress p lans of b o y c o t t , non-payment of r e n t , s t r i k e s , 
sabotage and i n a c t i v a t i o n of army in U.P. to p a r a l y s e t h e 
39 
Government in the s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e t i m e . In Bengal t h e 
Congress movement seemed t o have no i n f l u e n c e . F a z - u l -
Haq said t o L t , Governor t h a t he d id not t h i n k t h a t c i v i l 
d i sobed ience would succeed i n Bengal and t h a t t he League 
and Hindu Mahasabha were enough t o d e a l with i t . But he 
was r e l u c t a n t t o i s s u e any s t a t ement a g a i n s t Gandhi i n view 
40 
of h i s r e l a t i o n s with J i n n a h . 
After t h e r e s i g n a t i o n of Congress m i n i s t r i e s i n 
October 2, 1939, t h e Governors i n t h e Non-Muslim m a j o r i t y 
s t a t e s and t h e Muslim League in t h e Muslim ma jo r i t y p r o -
38, P a t t a b h l S i t t a ramyya , V o l . 1 1 , s ee pp . 355-385. 
39, Dr. P.N.Chopra/ o p . c i t . , p . 1 0 . 
40, Herbert to Lenlithgow, July 23, 1942/ see Nicholas 
Mansergh/ (ed,) Constitutional Relation between 
Britain and India t The Transfer of Powerj 1942-47 
Vol.11, (London, 1971), pp. 439-40. 
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vinces had taken over the provincia l adminis t ra t ion and 
J innah ' s hand was considerably strengthened. Further, 
the Viceroy began " to lean more on the support of the 
41 
Muslim League" and Muslims began t r i c k l i n g i n t o the League 
and J innah, an ' a d r i o t p o l i t i c i a n t h a t he was* made the 
42 
most of the s i t u a t i o n . Jinnah organised the sca t te red 
forces of Muslim India and League's pos i t ion became more 
and more s a t i s f a c t o r y . The Viceroy r ea l i sed t h a t J i n n a h ' s 
p o l i t i c s were r e a l i s t i c and he was not a v i s ionary . His 
suggestions and cooperation made the Viceroy to think tha t 
he would be helpful in the most successful prosecution 
of the War. Thus, Jinnah considerably impressed the Govern-
43 
ment, and t h i s contr ibuted much to J innah ' s success and 
he laxinched an anti-Congress movement throughout the length 
and breadth of Ind ia . 
Congress was in a dilemma. I t could not go back 
to the Legis la ture or s t a r t a programme with a dual pol icy -
one to keep the leadership i n t a c t and other t o gain power 
by m i l i t a n t means. Jo in ing the Legis la ture was fraught 
with Hindu opposit ion and Government's harsh terms and 
41 . V.P. Menon, o p . c i t . , p . 69. 
42. I b i d . , p . 70. 
43. Gowhar Rizvi, o p . c i t . , p . 107, 
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surrender to Muslim League. Launching a movement was the 
only Way out which could engage the masses and therefore, 
the Congress adopted the second move, Gandhi declared 
that ••whoever did not coalesce with the Congress pro-
gramme was essentially selfish* and consequently against 
44 
India's independence," Gandhi committed mistake t. in 
assessing the strength o£ the Muslim League and its hold 
on Muslim India, in spite of protests and objections 
raised by them. In such political uncertainty, the All-
India Congress Committee met at Bombay on August 8,1942 
and endorsed the July 14th resolution, vhich proclaimed 
to start "a mass struggle on non-violent lines" under the 
45 
leadership of Gandhi. Gandhi remarked: 
"Mr. Jinnah does not seem to believe in the Cong-
ress programme and in the Congress demand. But I can 
not wait any longer for India's freedom. I can not wait 
till Mr. Jinnah is converted, for the immediate consumma-
46 
t i o n of Ind ian freedom," This impl ied t h a t J innah d id 
not want independence of India and this was t h e g r e a t e s t 
l i b e l on t h e Muslim l e a d e r . Gandhi ' s cha rges a g a i n s t 
44, Matlubul Hasan S a i y i d , The P o l i t i c a l Study of 
Mohammad All J i n n a h , Vol .11 (Delh i , 1986) , p . 7 7 7 . 
45 , P.D, Kaushik, o p . c i t . , s e e a l s o Subhas Chandra Bose, 
The I n d i a n S t r u g g l e , 1920-1942, (Bombay, 1964) , 
pp. 352-353. 
46, Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, Vol.11, op.cit., pp. 777-78, 
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Jinnah were characterised by the Muslims as extreme viof. 
lence on the Muslim League and the Muslim India. The All-
India Congress Committee demanded Britain to withdraw, 
which to League clearly meant handing over power to the 
47 
Hindus. Oandhiji said that he was fighting to evolve a 
National Government to ^represent the masses in the fullest 
sense of the term. An analysis of it reveals that the 
National Government would be in a position to decide the 
fate of India in the event of Axis entry in the country, 
and to decide the fate of Muslims in the event of British 
remaining in India after the war. 
A day before the resolution of Quit India was to 
be moved at Bombay there was a great deal of sensation in 
India, The Government was prepared to crush the movement 
in order to save the population from the evils of civil 
war. Police were tighten in view of the Congress threat 
to the administration of law and order. The Congress had 
made preparations in all parts of the country to launch 
the movement violently and it was the game of life and 
death for the Congress either to win independence by~ demon-
stration or to perish in jail. The Congress gave a 
47, Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, 
Karachi, 1962, p, 191. 
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feeling to the Hindus that the movement would completely 
annihilate the leadership of Jlnnah and would result in 
the fall-out of Muslims from the demand of Pakistan and 
thus« they would save the vivisection of their mother-
land, the EBiarat, This aroused the religious feeling 
among the Hindus and they were prepared to participate 
in the movement at the cost of their lives and property. 
The Muslims became very suspicious to the impending situa-
tion. Jlnnah visualised the situation that there was 
possibility of serious Hindu-Muslim clashes, which would 
bring about a complete estrangement between Hindus and 
Muslims while his silence would bring death to his own 
political career and the demand of Pakistan. In ca»e of 
conflicts, there was every possibility of Muslim support 
to him and the creation of Pakistan was crystal clear. 
t 
Thus h i s de s i r e of becoming the Father of Pakis tan ' began 
t o pang in h i s hea r t . However, he did not l i k e the des-
t ruc t ion of Muslim l i v e s and proper ty . Therefore, he 
appealed t o the Muslims to view the p o l i t i c a l developments 
calmly and wait for t h e decis ion of the Al l - India Muslim 
League Working Committee to meet in the middle of August, 
1942. The decision of the League depended on the p o l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n in India as a r e su l t of Gandhi's launching the 
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Quit India Movement. He, with his usual cool and thought-
ful mind, was watching the situation. 
In the morning of August 9, 1942, Gandhi, Nehru, 
Azad, Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Kripalani, Asaf Ali, Mrs. 
Sarojini Naidu and many other Congress leader were arres-
ted. This Was followed by the arrest of Congressmen all 
over the country. This was for the first time after the 
Great Revolt of 1857 that vast number of people stood to 
48 
challenge the British forces without arms. Matlubul Hasan 
Salyld| on August 9, morning was the first to break the 
news to Jinnah of the arrest of the Congress leaders in 
Bombay and the latter took the local paper from the for-
mer's hand and went through its columns. Soon Jinnah began 
to receive information of disturbances in the city. The 
Hindus committed outrages against the Muslims and angry 
mobs of Hindus surrounded the business premises of Muslims, 
who enqxilred. on telephone from Jinnah as to what they 
should do. Jinnah had made arrangements to face such 
happenings with the help of the local Muslim League, who 
49 
handled the situation with great tact and courage. 
48. P a t t a b h a i S i t t a ramayya , V o l . 1 1 , pp. 374-375. 
49. Matlubul Hasan S a i y i d , V o l . 1 , o p . c i t . , pp . 180-81 , 
Sha r l fu l Mujahid. 
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In Delhi, a large number of Hindus were arres-
ted Including a few Muslims, On August 9, there was a 
hartal in Delhi. "The Hindu shops were completely closed 
50 
although Muslim shops were generally open.'*The Communists 
had joined the processlon#but the Radical Democratic Party 
abstained. According to a c.I.D. report, "Of the 15,000 
mill-labourers in Delhi only a small portion were probably 
51 
involved." Another C.I.D. report dated August 14, says 
that "Ttie Delhi disturbances have been roughly planned 
52 
by Asif All." Another C.I.D. report dated August 15, 
says that "most Hindus closed their shops forthwith,but 
Muslims plainly refused to do so and are carrying on their 
53 
usual business," Despite Jinnah's opposition to the Move-
ment, Jamayat-uleroa-i-Hind Joined hands with the Congress. 
Maulvi Hussain Ahmad Madni was Imprisoned in U.P. The 
students of Banaras, Allahabad, and Lucknow Universities 
played an Important role in the disturbances and destruc-
tions in Urban and rural areas, while the Aligarh Muslim 
50. P.N. Chopra, op.cit., p. 13. 
51. Ibid., p. 15. 
52. Ibid., p. 16. 
53. Ibid., p. 17. 
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54 
U n i v e r s i t y was an e x c e p t i o n , i t i s r e p o r t e d t h a t "Vice-
Chancel lor S i r Ziauddin Ahmad had been most u s e f u l to 
t h e a u t h o r i t i e s and has kep t h i s s t u d e n t s comple te ly 
55 
aloof from the Movement." In Ba luch i s t an , a l a r g e number 
of Kandaharis took Interest in the movement because the 
Hindus aai<i t h a t t he Congress aimed a t t h e r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
of t h e i r e x - k i n g Amanullah on the t h rone of Afghanis tan , 
Abdus Samad Khan, t he Chief Leader of t h e Anjuman-e-watan 
a f t e r h i s r e t u r n from Sind on August 17, began t o o r g a n i z e 
suppor t for the Quit I n d i a Movement, According to t h e 
I n t e l l i g e n c e Report da t ed September 1 1 , 1942, t h e Khan 
56 
f a i l e d t o cref t te any i n t e r e s t . 
However i n Bombay, t h e e f f e c t of t h e Movement was 
very s e r i o u s and the s t u d e n t s , who led t h e Movement, and 
when mob v i o l e n c e s t a r t e d , receded i n t o t h e background. 
The Communists were in a dilemma whether or not to p a r t i -
c i p a t e in the movement, Hindu Mahasabha al lowed i t s mem-
b e r s t o j o i n the Congress movement, wh i l e t h e Muslim c a r r -
i ed on a c e r t a i n amount of an t i -Cong re s s and a n t i - c i v i l 
57 
Disobedience propaganda. The Government gave d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
54, I b i d . , p . 25, 
55, I b i d , , see a l s o P a t t a b h i Sitarammay, V o l , I I , o p , c i t , , 
P .373 . 
56, P,W, Chopra,, op. c i t . , p . 40. 
57, I b i d . , P. 43 , 
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powers to the Provincial Governments to deal with the 
Movement. Obviously the League Ministers in the Muslim 
majority provinces used their full influence to crush 
the movement. The All-India Muslim League Working Commi-
ttee met on August 16, 1942 at Bombay, Since there were 
disturbances and riotS/ a few Muslim leaders could not 
come in time. The League Committee passed a lengthy 
58 
resolution which deplored the Congress decision of Aug-
ust 8/ 1942, to launch an "open rebellion", which resul-
ted in lawlessness and considerable destruction of life 
and property. The committee considered that the Movement 
was directed "to coerce the British Government into hand-
ing over power to a Hindu oligarchy "and" to force Musal-
mans to submit and surrender to the Congress terms and 
59 
conditions." The Committee observed that while the Cong-
ress claimed the right of self-determination for India 
i.e. for Hindu majority, "it has persistently opposed the 
right of self-determination for the Muslim nation to decide 
60 
and determine their own destiny." The Committee also stated 
that settlement of communal problem was a condition pre-
cedent to the attainment of the freedom and independence 
58. Working Committee Meeting - All-India Muslim League, 
Bombay August 16-20, 1942, in Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, 
Foundations of Pakistan, Vol.11, op.cit., p.395, 
59. Ibid., p. 396. 
60. Ibid. 
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of I n d i a a n d , s i n c e t h e A l l - I n d i a C o n g r e s s Commit tee on 
May 1 , 1942 , r e p u d i a t e d t h e L e a g u e ' s demand f o r t h e r i g h t 
of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e C o n g r e s s had c l o s e d t h e d o o r 
f o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t and i n s t e a d " s u b s t i t u t e d t h e f a n t a s t i c 
t h e o r y t h a t t h e s o l u t i o n of t h e Hindu-Mus l im p r o b l e m 
c o u l d o n l y f o l l o w t h e w i t h d r a w a l of B r i t i s h power from 
61 
I n d i a ? The Commit tee d e p l o r e d t h a t t h e C o n g r e s s movement 
aimed a t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of Hindu Raj and i t was a d e a t h 
62 
blow t o t h e Muslim g o a l of P a k i s t a n , The Commi t tee warned 
t h a t " i f t h e C o n g r e s s demand i s a c c e p t e d , i t would b r i n g 
t h e h u n d r e d m i l l i o n s of Musalmans u n d e r t h e yoke of Hindu 
Raj which must i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t e i t h e r i n a n a r c h y and 
c h a o s o r c o m p l e t e s t r a n g u l a t i o n and a n n i h i l a t i o n of Musl im 
63 
I n d i a and a l l t h a t I s l a m s t a n d s f o r , " i n t h e end , t h e 
L e a g u e ' s Commit tee c a l l e d upon t h e Musalmans " t o a b s t a i n 
from any p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e movement i n i t i a t e d by t h e 
64 
C o n g r e s s and t o c o n t i n u e t o p e r s u e t h e i r p e a c e f u l l i f e . 
The Commit tee hoped t h a t t h e C o n g r e s s would a v o i d " t o 
i n t i m i d a t e , c o e r c e , m o l e s t o r i n t e r f e r e i n any manner w i t h 
6 1 . I b i d , , p , 397 , 
6 2 . I b i d , 
6 3 . I b i d , 
6 4 . I b i d , 
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the normal life of the Muslims", otherwise the Muslims 
"would be compelled and justified to offer resistance 
and adopt all such measures as may be necessary for the 
65 
protection of their life, honour and property. 
Jinnah described the movement as " tentamount to 
forcing their demands at the point of bayonet and inter-
66 
necine civil war," He appealed the Muslims not to par-
ticipate in the movement and "to stop this internecine 
67 
civil war' before it was too late. However by the end 
of 1942, police and army resorted to firing 538 times, 
as a result 40 persons were killed, 1,630 injured, 26,000 
convicted and 18,000 detained undet the D.I.R. The Govem-
68 
ment col lected Rs. 25,000,000 as f i ne s . 
Had the Muslims joined the movement Gandhiji could 
have claimed that he represented the whole of India alone 
and t h a t Itiis de.-nand was supported by Muslim India a l so . 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ishtiaq Husain Oureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, 
op.cit,, p. 191. 
67. Statesman, August 10, 1942. 
68. Sir Regionald Coupland, Report on the Constitutional 
Problem in India, op.cit., pp. 239-40. 
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But the Muslims did not f a l l i n t o G a n d h i j i ' s t r a p , J innah 
69 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d , t h e Movement a "gamble r ' s Law th row." 
J innah asked t h e Muslims, t o l e t them f i g h t i t out and 
t o l d them t o be n e u t r a l . This i s one of t h o s e c a s e s which 
70 
was t h e most e f f e c t i v e p o l i c y . The re fo re , t h e movement 
71 
went without even the slightest support of the Muslim. 
The British Government admitted that the Muslims 
had not cooperated with Gandhiji's Quit India Movement, 
with the exception of a few cases and hence,exempted the 
Muslims from the punitive tax that was later levied in 
certain areas on the saboteurs. Further, since the pro-
vincial Muslim Leaguers had been pursuading the Muslims 
to keep themselves aloof from the movement, the League 
devoted much attention to getting the Muslims exempted 
from collective fines, which was imposed on areas where 
72 
sabotage had taken place. m N.W.F.P. many Muslims had 
participated in the Congress movement, but there were also 
73 
antl Congress propaganda, "organised by British officials" 
69. Matlubul Hasan Saiyid , Vol.11, op.cit., p.782. 
70. I b i d . , p . 783. 
7 1 . I b i d . 
72 . The Morning News, September 1 and 8, 1942. 
7 3 . Cunningham t o L in l i thgow, September 28 ,1942 . 
N.Mansergh T r a n s f e r of Power, V o l . I l l , p . 5 3 , 
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through ulema. In the Central provinces and Berar, Muslims 
were "generally exempted from collective fines but indivi-
74 
dual liability was enforced." Although the League and 
Hindu Mahasabha kept aloof from the Movement in Bihar, 
there were cases of arrests of Muslims* because they par-
75 
ticipated in the lawlessness. Big landlords of Bihar did 
not participate in the movement. 
The remarkable feature of the Quit India Movement 
was that there was absence of any communal incident or 
disorder. It was because of two reasons. Jinnah on 
August 16, 1942, reiterated his faith in Pakistan as a 
peaceful solution of India's constitutional problem in 
the interest of both the Hindus and the Muslims and exp-
ressed his willingness to consider any proposals, with 
any party on the basis of equality. The Hindus should 
consider it a right of Muslims for self determination. 
Secondly, a number of parties, organisations and eminent 
persons opposed the Movement. Sapru called the Wardha 
74. Fortnightly Report for Central Provinces and Berar 
for t^ he ^ lygt half of September, Home Department, 
Political* File NO. 18/9/194 2. 
75. Fortnightly Report . for Bihar for the first half 
of September, Ibid, 
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76 
resolution "ill-considered*' and "ill-opportune." Savarkar 
appealed the Hindus not to lend any support "to the Cong-
77 
ress move." The Sikhs remained aloof from the Movement 
78 
and decried it. The newspapers like the New York Herald^ 
The Tribu nCj. The Washington Post» the Washington Star» 
the Washington Time Herald, Baltimore Sun, the CSiristian 
Science f^ on^ tor held the Congress responsible for the 
"ugly situation", "violent activities" and "lawlessness" 
79 
in India in strong terms. 
However, a few Congressmen were let loose to nego-
tiate a peaceful settlement between the Congress and the 
British Government. The Muslim League sensed some sort of 
compromise which could effect the Muslim interest. Jinnah 
thought that the Congress would never start the Movement and 
the British Government would never agree to any terras with the 
76, D.C,Gupta, Indian National Movement, (Delhi, 1970), 
p. 230, 
77, PattaUiai Sitaramayya, Vol.11, op.cit., p. 466. 
78, D.C. Gupta, op.cit., p. 230. 
79, Ibid., p. 231. 
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Congress in view of the contemplated Japanese attack on 
India. Therefore, it was the ripe time for Jinnah to 
assert the Lea-^ ue's stand. In November 1942, Jinnah made 
a bold and courageous statement; 
"People ask, supposing the British and the Congress 
make up their differences and the former yield and surr-
ender to the Congress demand, what will happen to us? 
The answer is. "If the British Government after all their 
solemn pledges attempt to sacrifice us, let us down and 
throw us at the mercy of the Congress Raj, believe me, 
80 
they will not succeed if we are united and organised," 
Jinnah, in the same statement, cautioned the British 
Government against any settlement with the Congress in 
harsher words. He said; 
"Now we are able to stand up and make such a 
of 
Government impossible. Even the combined forces/China 
and America cannot impose on us a constitution which will 
sacrifice Muslim India. But if such a mad blunder is 
committed by the United Nations, remember even a worm 
turns, and notwithstanding the foreign bayonets upholding 
80. Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, Vol.II, op.cit., p. 784. 
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the Congress Raj, we shall make the administration of 
the country impossible, for it is far too grave an issue 
81 
for us to submit to." 
The Quit India Movement was launched by the 
Congress as the British Government did not yield to 
their demand of handing over power to them. The Muslim 
League characterised the Congress move as a plan to anni-
hilate the Muslim League and its demand for Pakistan. 
Since the Movement involved disturbance in the country, 
the British Government crushed the movement and the 
Congress leaders were imprisoned. The League stood 
calmly to watch the development, believing that distur-
bances at a time when the British were busy in their 
life and death sturggle would be of no use. 
81. Ibid. 
C H A P T E R FIVE 
DIPFKREWT APPROACHES TO SOLVE THE LEAGUE-CONGRESS 
CONFLICT BETWEEN 1943>4S 
The Congress and the League both were instruments 
in the hands of their communal leaders, who were not 
visible in the political hue and cry but were playing a 
very effective role in the background, in view of the 
fact that neither all the non-Muslim communities in In-
dia took part in the Quit India Movement nor all the 
Muslims of the sub-centinent supported the Lahore Reso-
lution which purported the very objective of the creation 
of Pakistan. Hence, there were a few in both the commu-
nities who were leading the sheep. They organised mass 
movement to engage the people in politics to strengthen 
the flame of nationalism, patriotism and fight against 
colonialism. However all the people were not able to 
foresee the consequences of the Lahore Resolution and 
the Quit India Movement. A survey of the educational insti-
tutions of that period reveals that no more than 5 per cent 
people were educated and those educated were mostly offi-
cials. In the mind of common men the doubt crept that 
Jinnah*s demand for Pakistan In the Eastern and Western 
parts of India was alone to fight with their destiny. Like-
wise, average educated Hindu thou^t that the Quit India 
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Movement was a course of creating open gulf between 
the Hindus and the Muslim;giving unremedlal wound to 
the Motherland. 
In the above background, one would realise that 
the future panorama of Indian political scene could be 
no other than antagonistic,uncompromising and conflict-
ing between the Congress, which claimed to be represen-
tative of all the communities, including Muslims, and 
demanding Independence for a United India. The Muslim 
League, on the other hand, which claimed to represent 
all the Muslims In India and demanded a separate Muslim 
homeland including Bengal, Assam, Punjab, Baluchistan, 
Sind, NVTFP and Kashmir. The Congress did not agree to 
leave any comer of India for the creation of Pakistan, 
Cripps proposals envisaged the right of any province to 
secede from the Union and that the British Government 
would agree to accept their new constitution. Jinnah 
expressed doubt to Cripps that no noore than 25 per cent 
votes would be cast in favour of Muslims on the principle 
of proportional representation and they would not be able 
to join the Union. Cripps assured that "if less than 60 
per cent of the provincial legislature voted In favour 
of aecession, the minority would have the right to call 
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for a p l e b i s c i t e of the adul t male population of the 
province^ the ve rd ic t of which would be implemented by 
the Br i t i sh Oovemment* Jinnah was ra ther surpr ised 
and s a t i s f i e d with Cripps assurance and did not r a i s e 
2 
any object ion to i t . However, s ince Jinnah was convin-
ced t h a t the Whitehall was c rea t ing a p o l i t i c a l c l imate 
for consul ta t ion and t r ans f e r of power he avoided any 
3 
sett lement with the Congress. Truly, t he 1935 Act be-
came nu l l and void and the Br i t i sh Government was enga-
ged in search of an agreeable plan for t r a n s f e r of power 
t o India and the p r inc ip l e was or ien ted p a r t l y in the 
Cripps proposals , pa r t l y in the Congress demand for a 
United India and p a r t l y in the League*s demand for 
PaXistan. 
However a f te r t he f a i l u r e and departure of the 
Cripps Mission on April 12, 1942, the s i t u a t i o n in India 
had become very t e n s e . Oandhl j i ' s Quit India Movement 
1. Note by Cripps on Interview with Jinnah on March 25, 
See a l so Cripps t o Azad, April 2, 1942, N.Mansergh, 
Transfer of Power, Vol.1 (Lahore, 1970), pp. 480-610. 
2 . I b i d . , pp. 480-81. 
3. Note by D. Pilditch, Intelligence Bureau, Home Depart-
ment March 28, 1942 Home Department, Political, File 
NO. 221/42, p.18. 
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was l a b e l l e d with the charges of "ugly s i t u a t i o n " , " v i o -
l e n t a c t i v i t i e s " and "lawlessness" , whi le Jlnnah inven-
4 
ted the slogan of "Divide and Quit." s i n c e Jinnah orga-
n i sed the League and i t s membership rose in Central Pro-
v i n c e s to 33.541 (1943) , i n Bengal 5 ,50 ,000 (1944) and 
in Sind 3 ,30,000 (1944) with i t s d i v i s i o n s , s u b - d i v i s i o n s , 
c i t y branches and wards, i t became a "revolutionary* and 
5 
"mass movement." The Muslim National Guards infused a new 
s p i r i t in the Muslims. Jinnah*s second Five Year Plan, 
s tar ted a f t e r 1941, mainly concerned with the educat ional , 
s o c i a l and economic u p l i f t of the Muslims in the proposed 
area of Pakistan. He a l so des ired t o turn the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
environment i n t o that of an i n d u s t r i a l and commercial comp-
l e x with the he lp of Muslim businessmen. These deve lop-
ments were being made in Punjab. At the sanne time the 
Sikhs were planning t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own s t a t e . Cripps 
assured the Sikhs tha t , in case of p a r t i t i o n of Punjab, 
he would setup a semi-autonomous d i s t r i c t for them on the 
Soviet model. Since Cripps had assured p a r t i t i o n of Pun-
Jab, the f a i l u r e of Cripps Mission grea t ly r e l i e v e d the 
4 . M.V.Pylee , Cons t i tu t iona l Development i n India , 
3rd e d . , (New Delh i , 1977) , p. 126. 
2.H. Zaidi , 'Aspects o f the 
League P o l i c y , i 937 -47 , in ( 
wamwrignt, o p . c i t , , p .288 . 
5 . t  Development of Muslim 
? U v C.H. P h i l i p s and M.D. 
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Sikhs« but the Muslins and Sikhs became i n c r e a s i n g l y 
o 
susp ic ious of one another, A reign of terror p r e v a i l e d . 
The Akalis* the League* Hindu Mahasah^a« Rashtriya Sewak 
Saja^ and Khakaars ra i sed t h e i r v o i c e aga ins t each o t h e r . 
The Sikhs armed the Sikhs on the semi -mi l i tary b a s i s . 
The U.P. League Defence Committee was for the defence 
of Muslims against the a t tacks of Hindus. In Bihar* the 
League organised the Muslim protec t ion scheme against 
the Hindu aggress ion . However* the Congress opposed 
the formation of communal vo lunteer corps and c a l l e d 
for un i ty amongst the Indian t o f ight against the Bri-
t i s h Imperialism. The Congress i n v i t e d the League to 
p a r t i c i p a t e In a Non-Party Defence Committee* t u t the 
8 
League Defence Committee did not attend the meeting. The 
reason may be that there were already the Hindu m i l i t a r y 
organisa t ions l i k e RSS and Hindu Mahasabha working behind 
the curta in in the i n t e r e s t of the Hindus, whi le there 
was no such organi sa t ions except the League Defence 
6. Olancy to Linlithgow May 1* 1942* N.Manserg^* Transfer 
of Power* Vol . I I* o p . c i t . * p. 7 . 
7 . Fortnight ly Report to U.P. for Second Half of April 
1942* Home Department* P o l i t i c a l * P i l e No. 1 8 / 4 / 4 2 , 
8. Portni^fhtly Report t o Bihar for Second Half of April 
1942* Home Department* P o l i t i c a l , P i l e N o . 1 8 / 4 / 4 2 . 
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Committee to safeguard the Muslims in India. The British 
assessed the political deadlock and were in the process 
of imposing some formula for agreement between the Muslim 
League and the Congress* while the Hindu and the Sikh 
army officers had planned for the establishment of Hindu 
Raj in India. Sensing this danger^ the Muslim League 
had made their interests identical to that of the British. 
In the Congress circle there was a section led by 
d. 
Shrl Rajgopalachari who was willing to look into the 
demand of Pakistan. Rajagopachari met Gandhiji and the 
Viceroy and discussed with them the political situation. 
The advocacy of such a leading Congressman for Partition 
of India strengthened the demand of Muslim League for 
Pakistan. Further It was received with a shock by the 
non-Muslim communities, especially the Sikhs, who lost 
their confidence in Congress, and demanded demarcation of 
9 
the boundaries of the Punjab between Delhi and Lahore, 
for a state of Khalistan. To enforce their stand, they 
on the one hand rapproached the British Government for 
their favour of a separate autonomous Sikh state, and on 
the other, improved their relations with the Unionist Party, 
9. Weekly Summary No. 20, May 15,1942, L/Vs/l/1943,p.33. 
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which then dominated the Punjab ministry. Since the 
Sikhs were against the creation of Pakistan and Unionists 
also did not like Partition some Muslim unionists thou-
ght to strengthen their party with the Akall support. In 
June 1942, Sikandar-Baldev Pact was signed, which among 
other things, provided "maintenance of Sikh representation 
In the provincial services at 20 per cent. It was also 
agreed upon that the Sikh claim for representation in the 
Executive Council would be supported by the Unionists. 
Tara Singh challenged the demand for Pakistan and thre-
atened that It would amount to "Civil War." However the 
demand of Pakistan loomed over the head of Punjab and the 
Sikhs. 
Sir Sikandar Hayat was the leader of the Unionist 
party In Punjab and he opposed the partition of Punjab. 
He was a dominant force successful in keeping Punjab minis, 
try stable. He wanted a peaceful settlement of the parti-
tion and proposed a scheme as follows, 
"In the absence of 75 per cent majority of members 
of the Punjab Legislative Assembly in favour of either 
10. Fortnightly Report for Punjab for first half of 
June 1942, Home Department, Political, File No.18/6/42. 
11. Indian Annual Register, Vol.11, July-Decmeber, 
pp. 299-300. 
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accession or non-accession t o the Indian Federation, the 
Muslim comnmnity should be given an opportunity of decid-
ing on non-accession by means of referendum i f they so 
decided^ the non-Muslim por t ions of the Punjab should, by 
a s imi lar referendum, be accorded the r i g ^ t to cut them-
selves adr i f t from the provinces, i f i t a c tua l l y came 
to the point where non-Muslims decided t o break a d r i f t , 
i t would mean (assiiming the uni t concerned to be a d i s -
t r i c t } that the Ambala d iv is ion and a la rge par t of the 
Ja l lunder d iv i s ion , and also the Amritsar d i s t r i c t , would 
12 
cease t o belong to the Punjab," 
The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, discussed with s i r 
13 
Sikandar Hayat the scheme and intended to publish i t . 
Sir Sikandar Hayat had resigned from the Muslim 
League soon a f t e r the League conference held on May 29, 
1942, and in s p i t e of persuasion and request made by 
Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, on behalf of J innah, he did not 
withdraw i t as the League was not agreeable to change i t s 
s tand. 
12. V.P.Menon, o p . c i t . , p . 144. 
13. Ib id . 
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By the beginning of 1943, the Quit India Movement 
was completely suppressed by the Government while Gandhiji 
was still in Jail. However, after the Quit India Movement 
tiie British had decided to leave India at the earliest. 
The Indian officials were looking forward, without anta-
gonising any party - Congress or League, to go on to the 
winning side after Independence had been granted. The 
14 
Hindu officials had the Congress sympathies, while the 
Muslim officials had planned to reap a good harvest in 
15 
the Pakistan area. In this political environment, the 
Muslim League planned to capture ministries in Assam, Slnd, 
NWFP and Bengal. 
When the Congress leaders were in Jail in 1943, 
the Viceroy asked the Governors to form non-Congress mini-
stries In the provinces. 
In Assam the Congress ministry was in power since 
1937. After the arrest of Congrees MLAS, the ministry 
fell and Mohannad Saadullah formed a coalition ministry. 
14. Note by Conran Smith dated, October 19, 1942, 
N, Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol,III, op.cit., 
pp. 160-61, see also steward to Linlithgow, September 
19, 1942, L/P&J/5/178. 
15. Conran Smlnth, Ibid. 
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16 
with the representation of other parties. 
In Sind, Allah Bakhsh renounced his titles, which 
17 
gave an opportunity to Linlithgow to dispose him of and 
make the way open for G.H. Hidayatullah to form a minis-
try. The Provincial League Joined the ministry of Hidayat-
ullah in spite of Jinnah's instructions not to enter the 
government in which they did not have a dominant position.* 
Surprisingly, Hidayatullah joined the Muslim League. The 
League membership grew to 30,000. 
In NWFP, detent ion of e i g h t , of the twenty-one 
Congress l e g i s l a t o r s , had brought the Congress t o the 
18 
verge of defeat by the Muslim Leaguers. Firoz Khan Noon, 
a member of the Viceroy's Council , suggested the Governor 
Sir George Cunningham, to allow the League t o form the 
ministry as i t had the support of the non-Congress members, 
but the Governor re j ec ted h i s sugges t ion . However, in 
16. Fortn ight ly Report for Assam for the f i r s t half of 
September 1942, Home Department, P o l i t i c a l , P i l e No, 
1 8 / 9 / 4 2 . 
17. Viceroy to Governor of Sind Telegram, September 26, 
1942, Linlithgow correspondence. Vol . 98. 
18. Cunnin^am to Linlithgow, September 28, 1942, 
N, Manserg^, Transfer of Power, V o l . I l l , o p . c i t . , 
pp. 55-56 . 
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April 1943 Aurangzeb Khan formed the League minis try In 
co-operation with the Akalls , Aj l t S i n ^ accepted the 
p o r t f o l i o in Aurangzeb minis try on the condi t ion t h a t 
19 
Pakistan i s s u e would not be ra i sed in the Assembly, The 
Mahasabha withdraw from the c o a l i t i o n minis try and Mehr 
Chand Khanna was not appointed speaker. However the 
League-Akali ministry could not have the support of more 
20 
than 19 out of 43 members in the Assembly. 
In Bengal* the Governor Sir Herbert J.Maynard asked 
Fazlul Haq to resign and proclaimed the app l i ca t ion of 
s e c t i o n 93 in s p i t e of h i s majority and e s t a b l i s h e d Nizam-
uddin's minis try , supported by 2S Europeans, who had a l so 
supported the Haq min i s t ry . Al l the Muslims in the m i n i s -
try wer«members of ^^^ League. Bose group and Mahasabha 
stood a loo f . 
In the Punjab* a f ter the sad demise of Sir Sikandar 
Hayat Khan in December 1942, Jinnah s e l e c t e d Khizr Hayat 
Khan Tiwana, as the new leader of the Unionist party. The 
motion of confidence was seconded by Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan 
19. A.K.Gupta, North West Front ier Province and the 
Freedom Struggle , 1932-1947, (New Delhi , 1979) , 
pp. 132-34. 
20. I b i d . , p. 135. 
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21 
Mamdot* President o£ the Punjab Muslim League. Linlithgow 
doubted Khlzr's a b i l i t y , but he hoped that the Punjab 
Oovemor, S ir Bertrand James Glancy would g ive him a 
22 
great deal of a s s i s t a n c e , in the i n t e r e s t of war e f f o r t s . 
For t h i s purpose, he was committed t o prevent t h e f a l l 
of the Unionist min i s try . 
In the remaining provinces-Madras, Bombay, C.P, , 
U.P«# Bihar and Orissa the administrat ion was under t h e 
Governors s ince the re s ignat ion of Congress m i n i s t r i e s i n 
1939, Jinnah, thus^ a f t e r making the League's p o s i t i o n 
very strong and e s t a b l i s h i n g League's minis try i n the 
on 
f i v e important prov inces ,ce lebrated i t s v i c t o r y / A p r i l 24 ,1943, 
in Delhi , in a process ion of e lephants , camels and h o r s e s , 
thousands of c y c l i s t s and t e n s of thousands on f o o t . 
Jinnah in h i s speech saidt 
••I say t o the Hindus, and the B r i t i s h e r s know i t 
b e t t e r than anybody e l s e , that the qulckets way for the 
freedom of the peoples , both Hindus and Muslims i s Pakis -
tan . I t may come in my l i f e t ime or not , you w i l l remera-
21, The .SJiStegijjan, January 24, 1943, 
22. Linlithgow to Amery, January H , 1943, Linlithgow 
Correspondence, Vol. 12. 
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b«r these words of mine. I aay this with no ill-will 
or offence. Some nations have killed millions of each 
other. That is not permanent. An enemy of today is a 
friend of tommorrow. That is life, that is history, 
so I say this, with a clear conscience. My profound 
regret is that it is the Congress and its Hindu leader-
ship that are holding up the achievement of freedom of 
both the Hindus and Musalmans, Our conscience is clear. 
I appeal to the Hindu public and Hindu leaders.Revise 
23 
your policy." 
Jinnah claimed that all the Muslim majority pro-
vinces (Assam, Sind, Bengal, NWFP and the Punjab) were 
of 
under the control/the League ministries and presented a 
demand for Pakistan in a very forceful manner. He reit-
erating the Congress stand for establishing Hindu Raj, 
vhich the League would never accept, Jinnah, recalled 
the duty of the Congress to find a truce and saidi "No-
body would welcome it more than ray self." He inviting 
Gandhiji for direct negotiations saidt 
"If Mr, Gandhi is even now really willing to come 
to a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of 
1. Mohammad Raza Khan, What Price Freedom,(Madras,1969) 
p. 104, See also by Saiyed Matlubul Hasan, Vol. IT, 
<^.cit., p, 790. 
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PaXlatan, let me tell you that it will be the greatest 
day both for the Hindus and Muslims. If he has made up 
his mind, what is there to prevent Mr. Gandhi from writ-
24 
ing direct to me.' 
Explaining his viewpoint Jinnah continued! 
"Mr. Gemdhi gets all the information, all the news-
p)apers and knows and understands what is going on. If 
there is any change of heart on his part he is only to 
drop me a few lines, when I assure you, the Muslim 
League will not fail, whatever may have been our contro-
25 
vercies in the past." The Subject Committee of the 
Muslim League decided to oppose any move of the Govern-
ment to impose the all India Federation. He exhorted 
the Muslims to sacrifice everything to reach their 
26 
cherished goal of Pakis tan . 
The most t r a g i c inc ident of 1943, i s that Gandhljl 
wrote a l e t t e r from prison to Jinnah express ing a d e s i r e 
to meet him and without re ferr ing anything to the League's 
24. M<^ ammad Raza Khan, o p . c l t . , p . 104. 
25. I b i d . , p. 105. 
26. V.P, Menon, o p . c l t . , p. 148. 
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dfwnand. Th« Government held up t h i s l e t t e r and sent an 
abstract of i t . The press s e r i o u s l y commented t h a t the 
h« Was afraid of the Government and would re t race h i s 
s t e p s . 
The other tragedy was the imposit ion of r e s t r i c -
t ion on Allama Inayatul lah Khan Mashrlqi to 
go out of Madras. Therefore, the Allama met Rajaji and 
other pro-Congress leaders and Issued i n s t r u c t i o n s t o h i s 
fo l lowers to inf luence Jinnah t o meet Gandhijl . A fana t i c 
KhaXsar from the Punjab went to see Jinnah at h i s r e s i -
dence and in h i s frenzy attacked him with a k n i f e . How-
27 
ever, he was overpowered and Jinnah was saved. 
In spite of the Governments pro-League politics, 
Jinnah could not escape accusations due to rapidly 
deteriorating economic condition of the people. Firstly, 
since the Congress leaders were in jail and Jinnah was 
propagating ^against the Congress, he was fighting in 
the air and thus the League was loosing its impact on the 
masses. Secondly, the Congress adopted progressive mea-
sures and the Muslims began to come into the Congress fold. 
Thirdly, there was unemployment and shortage of food and 
27, see for details Jinnah Faces on Assassin, (Bombay, 
1943). 
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famltte in Bengal, Assam, Mysore, Coorg, Travancore due 
to supply t o the warring A l l i e s . Fourthly, cyc lone and 
f loods destroyed stocks on a very large s c a l e which resul-
ted in famines in Bengal i n 1943-44. The people blamed 
the League m i n i s t r i e s and held i t re spons ib le for t h e s e 
c a l a m i t i e s . Indian s o l d i e r s in Bengal and Assam wanted 
immediate assistance for the people of Chittagong and 
28 
f e l t that "the Sarkar had already f a i l e d in duty." Like-
wise , the f a m i l i e s of the s o l i d i e r s of East Bengal were 
"already apprehensive of t h e e f f e c t s of food shortages 
29 
upon t h e i r f a m i l i e s . " The I n d u s t r i a l , economic, s o c i a l 
hygienic and p o l i t i c a l problems had worried the people . 
As a resu l t of a l l these the League minis try f e l l 
in Bengal in s p i t e of Governor's support. 
The p o l i t i c a l deadlock continued and Rajaji a l so 
continued to propagate the r e a l i s a t i o n of the p a r t i t i o n 
28. A.C. Oiha, I n d i a ' s Struggle Quarter of a Century, 
1921»1946, Part I I (New Delhi , 1982) , p . 685. 
29. Ib id . 
30. Humayun Kabir, Muslim Politics, 1906-1947 and other 
Essays I(Calcutta, 1969), p.58. 
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of India to settle the Congress-League differences for 
the sake of Indian independence which was considered by 
31 
B.Shiva Rao worthy of consideration. At the AICC Bombay 
session on August 6, 1943, the League policy was dis-
cussed and Azad, Nehru and Abdul Latif did not approve 
of any scheme of Partition. However the AICC made the 
32 
fo l lowing concess ions to Muslim League tha t : 
(a) for the interim period i f the B r i t i s h agree 
to the formation of a rea l National Government 
Mr. Jinnah would be asked t o form a Government, and 
(b) in regard t o the permanent c o n s t i t u t i o n , the 
Congress would prepare t o accept the l arges t 
measure of autonomy being conceded t o the f e d -
erat ing u n i t s and residuary powers v e s t e d in 
them. If however, a t e r r i t o r i a l u n i t would not 
agree with the b a s i c s tructure of the new c o n s -
t i t u t i o n , and des ired s e c e s s i o n the federat ion 
would not resort to coerc ion , 
Tifxe above proposal did not s a t i s f y the League. I t 
gave an impression t o the Indians that se t t lement between 
the Congress and the League was imposs ib le . 
31 , B.Shiva Rao, India, 1935-48, in C.H.Phi l ips and 
M.D. Wainwright, o p . c i t . , p. 456. 
32, Ib id . 
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Meanwhile a new development had taken p l a c e . Sir 
Archbold Wavell» the F ie ld Marshall of India^was appointed 
the Oovernor-General of India . Churchil l was the Prime 
Minister and Amery was the Secretary of s t a t e for India* 
Amery declared in the House of Commons that h i s appoint-
Rient, did not imply any change in the s e t t l e d p o l i c y t o 
which His Majesty's Government were pledged with regard 
33 
to the development of Indian self-government.•• Wavell 
took charge of the Viceroyalty from Linlithgow on 
October 20, 1943. E a r l i e r , Wavell was the Commander-in-
Chief of India and had taken a prominent part in the 
nego t ia t i ons between d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s and the Government 
during the Cripps Mission in India. Wavell was caut ious 
that the Indians would demand and press for independence 
of India a f t er the war which had dragged India i n t o a 
However ^ 
severe state of misery./ WavelIs speeches gave an encourag-
ing inspiration to the Indians that the British Govenunent 
was keenly interested In breaking the constitutional 
deadlock and in arranging the Transfer of Power but the 
precarious situation in India made him to review the whole 
affairs in view of Amery*s direction. 
33, V.P.Menon, op.cit., p. 153. 
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Wavell knew the attitude of the British Prime 
34 
Minister Mr. Churchil l and was convinced that under such 
a roan so h o s t i l e t o Indian problem, i t was d i f f i c u l t for 
him t o take any i n i t i a t i v e for a new l i n e , Amery was a 
loya l conservat ive and des ired that India should remain 
uni ted and be an equal partner in the B r i t i s h Commonwealth, 
Wavell had decided t o turn the Executive Council of the 
Viceroy i n t o that of a Cabinet with power to the Viceroy 
for e i t h e r r e j e c t i n g or agreeing t o the d e c i s i o n s . He 
hoped that the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s would co-operate in f i n d -
ing a s u i t a b l e c c m s t i t u t i o n . But h i s Ass i s tant Secretary, 
35 
Joseph Patr lc , was apprehensive of J innah's o p p o s i t i o n . 
However Wavell l iked that India should have the s t a t u s of 
Dominion in the in ternat iona l s o c i e t y of comrmanities. 
Further, the Secretary of S ta te for war. Sir James Grigg, 
opposing the reconmendations of the India committee, a s s e r -
ted that "a sett lement in India i s imposs ible as long as 
36 
Gandhi i s a l i v e . 
On October 28, Amery, in a speech in the House of 
Commons, pointed out that the Congress had "embarked upon 
34. A.C. CXiha, o p . c i t . , p . 685. 
35. I b i d , , p. 689. 
36. I b i d . , p . 690. 
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a policy of irresponsible sabotage of the war effort* and, 
hence, no negotiations could be undertaken with the Cong-
37 
r«8S, He warned Wavell that he should not "go beyond the 
38 
Crlpps proposals during the war," Therefore, Wavell felt 
himself quite unable to rectify the "mistake" and "blund-
ers" committed in the past and cmly declared that Crlpps 
offer still remained open for negotiation. But it could 
satisfy neither the Congress nor the League and the dead-
lock continued. 
Pour groups were politicising the freedom movement. 
By the end of Oeceraber 1943, Wavell was anticipating 
that the Indian leaders would demand for independence 
soon after the War and it would be difficult to deny or 
delay the transfer of power. Congress was alimbst 
inactive because Gandhljl was in Jail and he wanted to 
talk with Jlnnah to find any solution. He knew that the 
League leaders had realised that they had committed a mis-
take In rejecting the Crlpps proposals, but was astonished 
that Jlnnah continued to reject it. He anticipated that 
Jlnnah might reconsider the Congress August 1943 offer. 
39 
Contrarily, Jlnnah established 'Action Committee* and 
37. Pattabhl Sitaramayya, Vol.11, op.clt., p. 558. 
38. D.C.CXipta, op.clt., p.239. 
39. Its member were Nawab Mohamed Ismail Khan, Sir 
Contd.... 
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40 
Parli«unentary Board, at the A l l - Ind ia Muslim League 
Karachi Session held on Decenber 24-26» 1943, in order 
t o supervise the working of the League in the S ta te Assem-
b l i e s and "to organise the Muslims a l l over India t o r e -
s i s t the imposit ion of a unitary c o n s t i t u t i o n and to pre-
pare for the coming s t r u g g l e for the achievement of 
41 
Pakistan." In the absence of Congress l e a d e r s , the Hindu 
Mahasali^a had emerged as an e f f e c t i v e organisat ion and 
in a meeting in Amritsar i t demanded "the preservat ion 
of the i n t e g r i t y of India , the introduct ion of Federation 
with a strong centre , and the re fusa l to any province, 
42 
conniunity# or sec t ion of the r ight to secede*" I t ra i sed 
a new slogan asking the Government, for Divide and Quit", 
43 
as a counterblast t o "Quit Ind ia ." 
(Continued from the previous page) 
Nazimuddin, Oazi Mohammad Isa , G.M.Syed, Haji Abdus 
Sat tar , Ishaq S a l t , Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Nawab 
If t ikhar Husain Khan (of Mamdut, Llaquat A n Khan 
and Syed Zakir A l l . See Mohammad Raza Khan, o p . c i t . , 
p .109, and Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, o p . c i t . , p .280 . 
40. Khaliguzz^nan had opposed the formation of a 
"Supervision Committee" but on the advice of Jinnah, 
the Committee of Action and Parliamentary Board were 
e s t a b l i s h e d . See Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, o p . c i t . , 
p . 311. 
41 . V.p. Menons, o p . c i t . , p . 153, 
42, Ib id . 
43 , A.C, <^ha, o p . c i t . , p. 697, 
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On February 13, 1944, Wavell delivered his first 
speech in the joint session of the central legislature and 
emphasised on "United country enjoying complete and un-
qualified self government as a willing partner of the 
44 
British Commonwealth* and laid the responsibility of de-
laying the transfer of power mainly on the shoulders of 
the Congress and the League which failed to accede to a 
45 
common proposal, Jinnah criticising the use of the word 
'united country* said that the Viceroy was "fishing in 
46 
Congress waters," and the Congress and Liberals accused 
the Viceroy for his refusal to release the Congress lea-
ders. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru regretted that co-operation 
of th« political parties to form a national government 
47 
was not forth-coming, dissatisfied with the Viceroy's 
policy, the Congress and the League joined in the Central 
Legislative Assembly, and defeated a number of Government 
decisions. In particular, they threwjout the Finance Bin, 
However, Liberals efforts failed to break the impasse 
between the two communities and Wgvell refused the forma-
tion of provincial Executive Councils with hostile legis-
44. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 154. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Ibid. 
47. Ibid. 
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latures. While, these negotiations were going on the 
Congress was demanding the release of Ganflhiji. Since 
GandhiJi got malaria, he was released on May 6, 1944, on 
48 
medical grounds. Hie Congress leaders were apprehensive 
of sorae accusations for their launching the Quit India 
Movement which caused national destructions and riots. 
To minimise the impact of its consequences they began to 
call the movement as Civil Disobedience Movement. However, 
after Gandhiji's release, the Movement came to an end. 
On July 27, 1944, Gandhi wrote to Wavell that he 
was prepared to advise the Congress Working Committee 
for giving its cooperation in the war efforts "if a dec-
laration of immediate Indian independence is made and a 
national government, responsible to the Central Assembly 
be formed subject to the proviso that during the war,the 
military cooperation should continue as at present, but 
49 
without involving any financial burden on India." Wavell 
observed that this was the same offer as was made by Azad 
to Cripps In April 1942. The Viceroy made it clear that 
48. D.C.Gupta, op.cit., p. 242. 
49. D.O. Tendulkar, Mahatma, Vol.VI, (Delhi, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 
June, 1962), p. 263, 
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freedom was made condi t iona l upon the framing of a c o n s t i -
t u t i o n agreed t o by the main elements of I n d i a ' s nat iona l 
50 
l i f « , in order t o "safeguard the i n t e r e s t s of the r a c i a l 
and r e l i g i o u s minor i t i e s and of the Depressed c l a s s e s and 
51 
t h e i r t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s t o the Indian S t a t e s . " The 
Viceroy l a i d down the fo l lowing measures for the t r a n s f e r 
52 
of power to the Indian hands, "For such a t r a n s i t i o n a l 
govemraent to succeed, there must/ before i t i s formed, 
be agreement in p r i n c i p l e between Hindus and Muslims and 
a l l important elements as t o the method by which the new 
53 
c o n s t i t u t i o n should be formed.* 
The Viceroy also, sa id that the minor i ty ' s problem 
were not imaginery. They were rea l and could only be 
54 
solved by "mutual compromise and t o l e r a n c e . " 
Wavell 's proposal disappointed Gandhiji , who 
character i sed the Viceroy t o be a "conjurer" and suggested 
50, V.p. Menon, op.cit., p. 161. 
51, Sir Francis Low, op.cit,, pp. 879-80. 
52, Ibid. 
53, Ibid. 
54, Ibid,, p. 880. 
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that the Congress needed enough strength to wrest with tk 
54a 
the British by "purely moral means." Wavell did not care 
for such remark. His only worry was that in case of eli-
mination of Gandhiji the Hindu Mahasabha would replace 
Congress and adopt an even more hostile attitude towards 
55 
Muslims. 
On the other hand, Jinnah was convinced that Pakis -
tan would soon be a r e a l i t y . Help less ly* Gandhiji turned 
towards Jinnah for a face t o face t a l k , for a communal 
se t t l ement , whi le the Viceroy awaited the outcome of t h e i r 
meet ings . 
Rajaji be l i eved that Independence could be achieved 
only through Congress-League un i ty and peace could be 
maintained in future . For achievement of t h i s o b j e c t i v e , 
he wrote severa l times t o the Viceroy, Llnllthqow seeking 
permission to meet Gandhi, "but was not al lowed." 
However, according to other vet fdlcts , Rajaj i d i s -
57 
cussed the se t of proposals with Gandhiji in March 1943 
549. D.G. Tendulkar, op.cit,, p. 265, 
55. A.C. Guha, op.cit., p. 700. 
56. Ibid., p. 701. 
57. Mohamed Raza Khan, op.cit., pp.* 110-111. 
- 156 -
58 
and even before in jail in February, and Gandhi had given 
59 
h i s approval of -ttie same, Rajaji f e l t that the Viceroy 
had a strong anti-Gandhi ba is and was us ing the League 
as a counterpoise to the Congress. Therefore, he wanted 
a set t lement between the Congress and the League as soon 
as p o s s i b l e . With t h i s view, Rajaji wrote a l e t t e r t o 
Jinnah on April 8, 1944, enc lo s ing a draft of the formula 
on behalf of Gahdhiji . 
The formula embodied the fo l lowing s i x p o i n t s , to 
which Jinnah wts requested to agreei 
* ( i ) Subject to the terms setiout below as regards 
the Const i tut ion for free Ind ia , the Muslim 
League would endorse the Indian demand for inde -
pendence and would co-operate with the Congress 
in the formation of a prov i s iona l inter im 
Government for the t r a n s i t i o n a l per iod . 
(2) After the termination of war a commission would 
be appointed for demarcating contiguous d i s -
t r i c t s in the North-West and Bast of India wherein 
58. AICC F i l e 6 A 9 4 7 . 
59. Bombay Chronicle , October 31, 1942, Home Department 
Home Role F i l e No. 3 /21/42 conta in ing c l i p p i n g o f 
the papers Nat ional Archieve of India . 
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th« Muslim population was In an absolute majo-
r i t y . In the areas thus demarcated a p l e b i s -
c i t e of a l l the inhab i tant s , held on the b a s i s 
of adult Franchise or other prac t i cab le fran-
c h i s e , s h a l l u l t i m a t e l y decide the i s s u e of 
separation from Hindustan. I f the majority 
decided in favour of forming a sovereign s t a t e 
separate from Hindustan, such d e c i s i o n would be 
given e f f e c t to without prejudice t o the r ig^t 
of d i s t r i c t s on the border to j o i n e i t h e r s t a t e . 
(3) It would be open t o a l l p a r t i e s to advocate 
t h e i r points of view before the p l e b i s t i t e i s 
he ld . 
(4) In the event of separat ion, mutual agreements 
s h a l l be entered i n t o in respect o f Defence, 
Commerce and Communications and for other e s s e n -
t i a l purposes. 
(5) Any t rans fer of population would only be on an 
abso lute ly voluntary b a s i s . 
(6) These terms would be binding only in case of 
t rans fer by Bri ta in of f u l l power and responal -
60 
b i l i t y to the Government of India ." 
60, Gandhl-Jlnnah t a l k s . The Hindustan Times,(New ^e lh i ) , 
1944, p .36 , See a l s o Moharaed Raza Khan, o p . c i t . , 
pp. 110-111. 
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On Jun« 30, 1944, Rajaji sent a telegrame to Jinnah 
asXing for his consent otherwise he would publish his 
rejection of the proposal, Jinnah, on July 2, replied 
that he could neither accept nor reject It and he would 
place the formula before the Working Committee of the 
Muslim League If It was sent to him directly by Gandhlji 
himself. 
According to Jinnah, the proposal had many draw-
backs. On July 29, 1944, Jinnah discussed the proposal 
clause by clause. In clause 1, these words: "The Muslim 
League endorses the Indian demand for independence" implied 
that thii Muslim League was against Independence and thus, 
61 
it was the cause of insinuation to the Muslim League, in 
clause 2, Jinnah raised the question as to who would 
appoint the comrolssion, what would be its terms and condi-
tions^ personnels, and power. Jinnah opposed the words, 
"contiguous districts", while the Lahore Resolution embo-
dies "geographical contiguous units", where Muslims were 
in majority. In clause 3, Jinnah meant plebiscite to be 
held aocordlng to "geographical contiguous units," In 
clause 4, Jinnah questioned as to who would safeguard the 
defence, commerce and communication in case of separation. 
61, The Dawn (New Delhi)^ July 31, 1944. 
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as there was no ind ica t ion of the form, character and 
62 
personnels of the prov i s iona l government. In c l a u s e 5, 
Jinnah had no object ion t o t rans fer of populat ion abso-
l u t e l y on voluntary b a s i s . In c lause 6, Jinnah commented 
that a l l s t e p s for p a r t i t i o n would remain on paper pend-
ing transfer of pow«r to the Congress by the Br i t i sh Govern-
63 
ment. Therefore, Jinnah r e j e c t e d R a j a j i ' s formula s a y -
ingx " i t o f fered a shadow and a husk, a maimed, muti lated 
and raotheaten Pakistan that torpedoed the Muslim League 
64 
Resolution of 1940." 
The release of correspondence between Rajaji and 
Jinnah caused a great sensation and strong reaction in 
the circles of Hindu Mahasabha, Sikhs and the Lebirals, 
including V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, but they could not affect 
any change on Jinnah*s mind as he did not recognise Rajaji 
capable of carrying out these negotiations. He said thftt 
neither Oandhi nor Rajaji were authorised by the Congress 
62. Gandhi-Jinnah talk, op.cit., p.5, 
^3. The Dawn (New Delhi) July 31, 1944. 
64. Sandhya Chaudhry, Gandhi and the Partition of India. 
(1984), p. 109, See also D.O. Tendulker, op.cit., 
pp. 267-69, 
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to do so . Therefore Jinnah in terpreted them "as pure 
and simple d i c t a t i o n without a s i n c e r e d e s i r e t o nego-
65 
t latlon.** In fac t . League's p o s i t i o n in Bengal and Punjab 
was de ter iora t ing due t o Internal d i f f e r e n c e s with Pazlul 
Haq and Khizr Hayat Khan and in case of referendum. League 
could have l o s t the ground. 
Jawil-ud-Din Ahmad, a Muslim Leaguer, opined t h a t 
the motive of the formula was t o put Jinnah and the 
Mussalmans of India in the wrong and bypass the League's 
66 
demand for Pakistan. Dif ferent opinions were expressed 
by the Pres s . The Dawn observed that l i k e the Cripps 
proposals , the formula a l s o did not accept the p r i n c i p l e 
of se l f -determinat ion demanded by the Muslim League. Cripps 
"proposed a p l e b i s c i t e province to province" and the for -
67 
mula suggested " p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t by d i s t r i c t . " The 
paper character ised the formula "Booby trap**. The SP^Q-
t a t 9 r commented that Jinnah did not find i t a t t r a c t i v e 
as the whole formula "res t s on the a ir as i t t a l k s of 
Independence during war which w i l l not be granted by the 
68 
B r i t i s h . * The Tribune wrote that Jinnah had been treading 
65. The Dawn (New D e l h i ) , July 31, 1944. 
66. I b i d . , July 13, 1944, 
67. I b i d , , July 12, 30, 1944. 
68. The Spectator (London), July 13, 1944. 
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the path leading '•not to the heaven of peace and pros-
69 
perity but to the Jungles of civil strife and rancour." 
Moonje# Jayakar and Arundala opposed the fonnula as it 
envisaged division of the country, A number of politi-
cians said that the fonnula was '•fraught with dire conse-
quences for the future and will Imperil the very independ-
70 
ence of the country " The Sikh leader. Master Tara 
Singh, opposed it as it had to put 17 districts in Pakis* 
71 
tan and 12 d i s t r i c t s in Hindustan. Lord Wavell opined 
that the formula was a try out and GanHhl's aim was to 
"assess the strength of the Hindu f e e l i n g s aga ins t 
72 
Pakistan." Amery r i g h t l y observed: (1) i t was condi-
t i o n a l to t rans fer of power; (2) i t was p a r t i a l because 
i t did not include the whole of Punjab, Bengal and Assam, 
and (3) i t meant humi l ia t ion of Jinnah and h i s removal 
73 
from a l l - I n d i a P o l i t i c s , However, though the formula was 
a shrewdest sjttoke of p o l i c y , i t became the b a s i s for 
Oflndhl-Jlnnah t a l k s . 
69, The Tribune, (Lahore), July 12, 1944. 
70, Vlrendra, Pakistan t A Myth of Rea l i ty , (Lahore, 1946), 
pp. 109-10. 
71 , The Tribune,(Lahore)* August 21, 1944, 
72 , Nicholea Maneerg^, Const i tut ional Relat ion between 
Britain and India i The Transfer of Power, Vol .11 , 
tk Vol.IV, (London, 1973) , p, 1085. 
73, I b i d . , p . 1101. 
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Oandhi considered the demand for Pa)clstan a mere 
slogan of Jinnah, but the word 'two-nation* propounded by 
Jinnah created an Idea log ica l d i f f e r e n c e s , which stood in 
the way of t a l k s between them. The Congress wanted t r a n s -
fer of power according t o R a j a j i ' s scheme, whi le the League 
wanted i t under the aeg i s of the B r i t i s h so that the 
Muslims may not be l e f t on the mercy of Hindus, GandhiJi 
wrote to Jinnah on July 17, 1944, wishing t o d i s c u s s the 
74 
quest ion of the p a r t i t i o n of India. The A l l - I n d i a Muslim 
Leagu« Working Cotinilttee met in Lahore and f u l l y autho-
r i s e d Jinnah to n e g o t i a t e with Gandhi. 
Gandhi-Jinnah t a l k s continued almost d a i l y from 
75 
September 7 to 27, 1944. On the one hand, Jinnah was 
alone carrying on the t a l k s , without a s s i s t a n c e of Llaquat 
All Khan, the Muslim League General Secretary , while on 
the other s i d e , Oandhijl was a s s i s t e d by Rajajl and a few 
o t h e r s . There were d a l l y exchange of l e t t e r s reducing 
the d i scuss ion in w r i t i n g . They held 14 s i t t i n g s and 
discussed a l so R a j a j i ' s formula. On September 10, Jinnah 
questioned the representa t ive character of Gandhi to con-
t inue the t a l k s . Jinnah remarked t "1 thought you had 
7 4 , See for d e t a i l s V.p.Menon, o p . c i t . , p. 163. 
75 , The matter of d i s cuss ion was brought in wr i t ing for 
tii].arlflcatlon and r e c o r d . s e e Lat l f Ahmad Sherwanl, 
Pakistan Resolut ion to Pakistan. 1940-1947/ (Delhi , 
198^), p. 83 . 
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come here as a Hindu, as a representative of the Hindu 
Congress." Qandhiji said; "No I have come here as an 
76 
Individual? Oandhiji assured that he would be able to 
g«t his agreement with him, if any« ratified by the AICC, 
On September 27, the talks brokdown as there was 
a world of differences between their viewpoints. 
On September 11, Gandhiji laid down the following 
conditions before Jinnaht 
"(l) The immediate grant of independence to India as 
one single unit; 
(2) The immediate formation of a provisional interim 
government responsible to the existing central assembly 
or a newly elected one (naturally with a 75 per cent Hindu 
Majority), 
(3) Hie provisional government to frame the constitu-
tion of India or to set up an authority to frame the cons-
titulon after withdrawal of British power; 
(4) This government to draft the treaty and agreements 
as regards administration of matters of common concern 
such as foreign affairs, defence, communications, customs. 
76, Mohamed Raza Khan, op.cit,, p. 113. 
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ccntnerce and the like which would be matters for efficient 
and satisfactory administration under a central authority. 
(5) The provisional government to setup a commission 
to demarcate contiguous districts having an absolute 
Muslim majority. After all these conditions had been 
complied with, the demarcated areas would be permitted to 
decide through a plebiscite of all their Inhabitants 
whether they wished to form a sepirate state. But in any 
case all matters of vital importance were to be adminis-
77 
tered by a centra l authori ty with a Hindu major i ty ." 
Gandhiji c a l l e d t h i s scheme a p a r t i t i o n between two 
brothers , but Jinnah refused to accept i t as i t ind i ca ted 
an overwhelmingly Hindu federal authori ty and demanded a 
78 
sovereign Pakistan, 
On September 24, Oandhiji put forward another pro-
posal t o Jinnah btit Jinnah r e j e c t e d that a l s o as t h e s e 
w«r« fundan»entally against the Lahore Resolution of 1940. 
Jinnah I n s i s t e d for acceptance by the Congress the fo l l ow-
i n g termst 
77, M.A.H. Ispahan!, 'Factors l e a ^ n g t o the P a r t i t i o n 
of Br i t i sh India in C.H.Phil ips and M.D. Walnwright, 
o p . c i t . f p» 347. 
78 . M, Owyer and A, Appadorai, Speeches and Documents of 
th% Indian Const i tu t ion , 1921-1947, (London, 1957), 
v o l , i l , pp. 54^-50. 
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(1) Hie Muslims should be recognised as a nat ion with 
9H Inherent r i g h t of s e l f determination. 
(2) Pakistan should comprise s i x prov inces , that i s , 
Sind« Baluchistan, the NWPP, the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, 
subject only to minor t e r r i t o r i a l adjustments; 
(3) Important matters l i k e Foreign A f f a i r s , Defence, 
Internal Ooraraunlcatlons, Customs and Commerce should not 
79 
be delegated to the Central Government, 
However, no set t lement between Gandhi and Jinnah 
could take p lace . According t o Pyarelal x "They met, they 
^ o o k hands, they embraced each other . There seemed to 
be a genuine human touch in the i r f i r s t meeting, Jinnah 
came out in to h i s porch to r e c e i v e the Mahatama and to 
e scor t hlffl back at the time of l eav ing and even posed with 
hire to be photographed. Observers fancied they not iced 
80 
in J innah's part ing warm handshake a mere h i s t o r i c ges ture ," 
On July 27, 1944, Gandhi declared that the t a l k s 
had f a i l e d . 
But by these t a l k s , Gandhi had recognised the Muslim 
Leadership of Jinnah, vrtio found a v i r t u a l equa l i ty with 
79. I b i d , , pp. 550-551. 
80, Pyare la l , Mahatroa Gandhit The Last Phase (Allahabad, 
1956), p. 
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81 
Gandhi. Maul una Aaad s ta ted that these t a l k s were a great 
82 
p o l i t i c a l blunder of Gandhi. The Hindu Mahasabha c r i t i -
c i s e d the t a l k s as i t gave importance t o Jinnah, The 
Sikhs considered Gandhi's of fer a sword hanging over t h e i r 
83 
heads* Aiiqiril;! B^aar Patrika c r i t i c i s e d the increas ing 
demand. The Bombay chronic le h i g h - l i g h t e d the uncoopera-
t i v e a t t i t u d e of Jinnah. Ihe Tribune held Gandhi and 
Jinnah both respons ib le for the f a i l u r e of the t a l k s . In 
the League c i r c l e ^ Llaquat All Khan character i sed Gandhi's 
o f f er as "a fraud c a l c u l a t e d t o thwart and f r u s t r a t e the 
85 
Muslim demand of Pakistan." However, J innah's r e j e c t i o n 
of Gandhi's o f f e r of ' p l e b i s c i t e ' caused the deprivat ion 
of Muslim majority areas (11 d i s t r i c t s in Punjab and 12 
d i s t r i c t s In Bengal inc luding Amrltsar and Calcutta) to 
86 
Pakistan. However, the U n i o n i s t s , the Sikhs and MahaseJoha 
were pleased on the breakdown of the t a l k s , whi le the Pro-
v i n c i t l Leaguers were happy that Gandhi conceded to the 
87 
p r i n c i p l e s of Pakistan. 
81 . Michael Brecher, Nefaru : A P o l i t i c a l Biography, 
(London, 1959), p. 294, 
82. A.K.Azad, op.clt., p. 93. 
83. The Tribune,(Lahore) , October 2, 1944. 
84. Home Poll 10/10/1944 Press Report, N.A. of India. 
85. The Dawn.(Delhi), October 31, 1944. 
86. Nicholas Mansergh, Vol,IV, op.clt., p. 1085, 
87. Fortnightly Report for Punjab for first half of 
October, 1944, Home Department. Political, F.No, 
18/10/44. 
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Th« Viceroy, however, pressurised the Congress and 
the League to settle their differences so as to establish 
a Central Goveniinent. Further, Gandhi also realised that 
independence was Impossible without an agreement between 
the Congress «md the League. Meanwhile, reports came that 
Liaquat All Khan was desirous to come to an agreement. 
88 
Oandhl advised Sapru and Bhulabhal J.Desal to meet 
89 
Llequat. Desal and Llaguat drew the following private 
and confidential proposals (known as Desal-Llaquat Pact) 
for settlement between the Congress and the Leaguet 
'^The Congress and the League agree that they will 
Join in forming an Interim Government in the Centre. The 
compoeltlon of such Government will be on the following 
llnesi 
(«) Equal number of persons nominated by the Congress 
and the League In the Central Executive. Persons nominated 
need not be members of the Central Legislature, 
(b) Representatives of minorities (in Particular 
Scheduled Castes and the Sikhs) ; 
(c) The Commander-in-Chief.•• 
The draft further explains: 
••Tlie Oovemraent w i l l be formed and function wi th in 
the frame work of the e x i s t i n g Government of India Act. 
88, B,Pattafc*iil Sittaramayya, Vol .11 , o p . c i t . , p .649, 
89» Syed Mahwud to Desal , November 18, 1944, Syed Mahmud 
C o l l e c t i o n . 
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I t ist however, understood t h a t , i f the Cabinet cannot 
get a p a r t i c u l a r measure passed by the Leg i s l a t ive Assembly 
they wi l l not enforce the same by r e s o r t t o any of the 
reserve powers of the Governor-General or the Viceroy, 
This w i l l make them s u f f i c i e n t l y independent of the 
Governor-General. I t i s agreed between the Congress and 
the League t h a t i f such Interim Government i s formed, 
t h e i r f i r s t s t ep would be t o r e l ea se the Working Commi-
t t e e members of the Congress* 
••The ateps by which e f fo r t s would be made to 
achieve ttiis end are at present indica ted to take the 
following courses! 
"On the bas i s of understanding, some way should be 
found to get the Governor-General to make a proposal or 
a suggestion t h a t he des i r e s an inter im government t o be 
formed in the Centre on the agreement between the Congress 
and the League and when the Governor-General I nv i t e s 
Mr, Jinnah and Mr, Desai e i t h e r j o i n t l y or separa te ly , 
the sbove proposals would be made, de s i r i ng t h a t they are 
prepared to join in forming the Government. 
••The next s t ep would be t o get the withdrawal of 
sect ion 93 in the provinces and to form as soon as poss ib le 
90 
Provincial Governments, on the l i ne s of a c o a l i t i o n , " 
90. Indian Annual Regis te r , Vo l , I I , July-December, 1945, 
pp, 125-26. 
- 169 -
Desal had drawn the proposals with the approval of 
Gandhi and latter had corrected somewhere in the papers of 
91 ' 92 
the former, and Gandhi had asked Desai to go ahead. On 
the other hand, Liaquat after remaining quiet for a con-
siderable tijne replied that whatever he told was his per-
sonal opinion and Jinnah, on January 20, 1945, disclaimed 
93 
any knowledge of the pact. In fact, the Congress was try-
ing to form an interim Government and to get the transfer 
of power* so that the demand for Pakistan may be dead. 
While the League was foreseeing in the near future a quick 
turn in Indian politics due to the ending of the war in 
near future in the west which would fetch for them Pakistan. 
At last Liaquat declared that it was a "cock and bull 
94 
stoxry" and It was never concluded, in consequences the 
Congress repudiated the pact and Desai, like Rajajl, 
made his exit from the Congress, 
91. Ib id . 
92, Pyare la l , Vo l , I , o p . c l t . , p. 103. 
') 93, C.H,Phil ips and M.D.Warnwright, o p . c l t . , p . 5 7 0 , Wavells 
impression was that Jinnah was "Playing h i s usual 
s l ippery qaae in fact "See Wavell Journal entry for 
February 26, 1945, p. 114. 
94, Indian Annual Reg i s t er , V o l . I I , July-December, 1945, 
pp. 124-27, 
C H A P T E R SIX 
THE SIMM CONFERENCE AND THE CABINET 
MISSION PLAN 
The war in Europe ended with the v i c t o r y of the 
A l l i e s on May 7, 1945, and the Br i t i sh p o l i c y in India 
took a new turn. On June 14, 1945, Wavell in a broad-
caat from Delhi o f fered the fo l lowing plan of an interim 
government t o end the communal deadlock: 
<1) Sxeoj t ive Council of the Governor-General was t o 
c o n s i s t of equal number of c a s t e Hindus and Muslims. 
(2) All the members of the Executive Council were t o 
be Indians except the Viceroy (who was a l s o the Governor-
General) and the Commander-in-Chief, and would re ta in the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for defence of India . 
(3) The war p o r t f o l i o was t o be re ta ined by the 
Government. 
(4) A Br i t i sh High Commissioner was to be appointed 
to look after the commercial i n t e r e s t s on the l i n e s of 
the Dominion** 
(5) Tint new Executive Council was to work within the 
frame work of the 1935 Act, and the Governor-General 
re ta ined the power of ve to against a majority d e c i s i o n of 
the c o u n c i l l o r s . 
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(6) The Inter ference of the Secretary of State was 
to be decreased to the minimum, 
(7) The p o r t f o l i o s of External A f f a i r s , Finance and 
Home Affa irs were t o be placed in charge of an Indian 
Members of the Council , The Members were to be e l e c t e d 
by the Governor-General a f t e r consu l ta t ion with p o l i t i c a l 
l e a d e r s . They were t o work under the Government of India 
Act, 1935, 
(8) The interim Government would in no way prejudice 
th« f i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l se t t l ement , and that the pro-
1 
posals intended to make a long term solution easier. 
On the same day, Amery also in a broadcast in 
IJondon said that the Viceroy had been empowered to make 
proposals for formation of an interim ^vernment and that 
"NO limit was set to India's freedom to determine her own 
destiny, whether within the Commonwealth or outside it, 
and secondly, this destiny could only be achieved by a 
2 
constitution framed and agreed to by Indians." 
1, see for details, Penderal Moon (ed.), Wave11 The 
Viceroy's Journal, (London i Oxford University Press, 
l^l^h pp. i4i-42. 
2, Se« for details B,N, Pandey, The Indian Nationalist 
Moygmtnt 18e5»1947, Selected Documents, (London, 197 
ij>,iei. See also Mohammad Raza Khan, op,cit., p,l23. 
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As announced by Wavell on June 14, important 
Congress leaders l i k e Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana 
Azad, Sardar Vallal^bhai Pate l , Dr. Rajendra Prasad and 
others were re leased three years a f t e r fac ing great hard-
ship in j a i l . This paved the way for a conference a t 
Simla, 
Wavell i n v i t e d twenty-one eminent l eaders of 
d i f f e r e n t communities at the Viceregal lodge in Simla, 
3 
on June 25, 1945, for d i s c u s s i o n . Wavell i n v i t e d Abul 
Kal«n Azad (Congress P r e s i d e n t ) , Bhulabhai Desai (Congress), 
G,S, Mot i la l (Congress), M.A. Jinnah (League P r e s i d e n t ) , 
Hus0ain Imwn (Muslim League), Liaquat Ali Khan (Muslim 
League), P»N. Banerjee (Leader of the N a t i o n a l i s t Par ty ) , 
Sir Henry Richardson (Leader of the European Group), Master 
Tara Singh (Si)ch l e a d e r ) , N, SivaraJ (Leader of the sche -
duled cas tes ) and Premiers and Ex-Premiers of the pro-
4 
vlnces^ e t c . e t c . The whole b a s i s of the Wavell propo-
sa l was an agreement on the p r i n c i p l e of 'parity* between 
Muslims and c a s t e Hindus and representat ion was given 
t o th« m«in communities and not to the p a r t i e s . But the 
Unioni s t s In Punjab were a party and had of fered support 
3 . R.C, Majumdar, Struggle for Freedom (Bombay 1969), p. 717. 
4 . V,P. Menon, o p . c i t . , p. 191, 
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to the war effort. They hoped to secure, at least, one 
seat in the Executive Council, because Sir Bertrand James 
Glancy had encouraged their expectations. Therefore, 
Wavell covmted the Unionists as Muslims. 
On June 25, 1945, Wavell invited Azad and agreed 
that the Congress could nominate Muslims and scheduled 
castes* but said that "the principle of parity must be 
5 
maintained." This was opposed by Jinnah who said that 
since other minorities win support the Congress, the 
League would be in minority in the council. The Viceroy 
did not agree to Jinnah's proposal that all the Muslim 
members should be nominated by the Muslim League, The 
Viceroy told Jinnah to keep in mind that he had to noml-
6 
nate a Unioni«t Muslim to which Jinnah reacted sharply, 
Jinnah interjected that the congress represented only 
Hindus, to which Dr. Khan Sahib vehemently objected. How-
ever, Wavell concluded that the Congress represented its 
7 
members and both Congress* and the Jinnah accepted t h i s . 
On June 26, the conference d i scussed point by 
point the various i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o the proposed Executive 
5, Wavell to Amery, Telephonic ta lk June 25, 1945, 
N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power.vol.V (London,1974), 
H>» 1151"54, 
6, Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the P a r t i t i o n of 
Xndl»i 1936-47, (Oxford Univers i ty Pres s ,1987) , p .120 . 
7, Wavell t o Amery, Telephonic t a l k , June 25,1945, 
li«Hanaergh, Transfer of Power. V o l . v , o p . c i t , , p p . l l 5 5 - 5 6 . 
- 174 -
Council of the Governor General. The Viceroy explained 
"caste Hindus meaning Hindus not belonging to the sche-
duled c a s t e s . Wavell sa id tha t the purpose of appoint-
ment the Br i t i sh High Commissioner was to safeguard the 
Br i t i sh I n t e r e s t s in India. Regarding the Congress goal 
of independence, the Viceroy referred to Amery's s t a t e -
ment of »^ une 14, and assured that "there was nothing in 
8 
the proposals t o brand the Congress as a communal body." 
Sir Henry Richardson supported Wavell*s proposals , Khizr 
Hayat Khan s«iid that the s h o r t t e m p l a n would a f f ec t the 
future. The Maharaja of Parlakimedl sa id that "The i n t e r -
e s t s of persons who supported the war e f f o r t should not 
9 
be neg lec ted ," Master Tara Singh did not i d e n t i f y the Sikhs 
with the Congress., SivaraJ asked for safeguard of the 
i n t e r e s t of h i s conamunlty i , e , schedxiled c a s t e s . Jinnah 
asserted thai the League would not agree t o any c o n s t i t u -
t i o n on any bas i s other than that of Pakistan and r e c a l l e d 
Oovernfflent's proclamation that future c o n s t i t u t i o n would 
be made by agreement and would not be imposed on the 
country* Jinnah said that s i n c e the League represented 
8, V,i», Menon* o p . c i t , , p, 196, 
9 , I b i d , , p. 197. 
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90 per cent of the Muslims and the Congress represented 
'90 per cent of t h e Hindus, the Congress could not claim 
to represent a l l the minor i t i e s and thus . I n s i s t e d t h e t 
d«cision« should be taken on the bas i s of communal pa r ty . 
On Jujtie 28, J innah-Pate l discussion produced no 
ayreement. Hence, the Viceroy proposed a l l the I n t e r -
ea t s t o send him by a specif ied date l i s t of the persons 
containing more names than sea t s in the council whom they 
would l i ke t o be included in the council and he would 
f ina l i s e the same by adding or excluding some names from 
h i s own a ide , Azad pressed for inc lus ion of members of 
al l communities, p a r t i c u l a r l y the scheduled ca s t e s and 
Chr is t iana , In h i s Congress l i s t . Sivaraj objected to 
i t and " In s i s t ed tha t the number of i t s members should 
bear the same r a t i o to t h e i r population as the Muslim 
10 
members ^ r e to t h e i r s , " By t h i s he meant tha t i f the 
Muslims were recognised on the bas is of J i n n a h ' s two nation 
theotY# the scheduled cas tes were a lso a separa te e l e -
ments in the nat ional l i f e of India . Sivaraj and Jlnnah 
said t h a t they would send the l i s t a f te r consul t ing t h e i r 
working committees. The Viceroy adjourned the conference 
t i l l Ju ly 14, 1945. 
10. R.C.Majumdar, o p . c l t , , p . 718. 
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The Congress Working Committee met on July 3 and 
selected a panel of the following names and submitted 
11 
it to Wavell. 
On July €t the Muslim League working Committee met 
and« the next day, Jinnah made three proposals to the 
Viceroy "(a) the Muslim League should not be asked to 
submit a panel, but i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s should be chosen 
on the bas i s of personal d i scuss ion between the Viceroy 
and himselfI (b) a l l the Muslim members of the Council 
should be chosen from the League; and (c) some e f f e c t i v e 
safeguard, other than the Viceroy's v e t o , should be prov i -
ded t o protect Muslim i n t e r e s t s from majority d e c i s i o n s 
12 
of the c o u n c i l . " Since the Viceroy did not guarantee 
these terras, Jinnah refused t o submit any l i s t . On the 
other hand, the Viceroy fotmd the Congress l i s t d i sappoint -
ing as i t included s tooges for Congress from the m i n o r i t i e s . 
MeanwhUre, he rece ived l i s t s from other d e l e g a t e s and made 
h i s provis ional s e l e c t i o n . Wavell met Jinnah on July 11 , 
11 . Pyarela l , V o l . I I , o p . c i t . , p. 135. 
12. V.P.Menon, o p . c i t . , p . 205. 
13 . Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, 
Vol .11 , o p . c i t , , pp. 502-oTI 
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and asked him to include in a 14 members c o u n c i l , four 
members of the Muslim League and one member of the Unio-
n i s t Party, to v^ich Jinnah did not agree and demanded 
that a l l the f i v e Muslim members should be nominated by 
tha League and that i t may be guaranteed that no d e c i -
s ion objected to by the Muslims should be taken except by 
a c l e a r two th ird majority, or some th ing of the kind. 
14 
However, Wavell did not agree t o these two proposa ls . 
His proviBional l i s t contained the fo l lowing: 
Muslim League 4 + 1 Liaquat Ali Khan,KhaHqu-
zzaman, Nazimuddin and 
£ssak Sa i t and Sir Mohammmad 
Nawaz Khan ( U n i o n i s t ) , 
Congress ( cas t e Hindu) 5 Nehru, Pate l , Rajendra Prasac 
Dr. M.S.Aney, and Sir 
B.N. Rau. 
Sikhs 1 Master Tara Singh 
Scheduled Caste 2 Dr. Ambedkar and M.Pilai 
Christ ian 1 Dr. John Matthai 
Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, 
On July 11 , 1945, Wavell informed Gandhi that due 
t o Jinnah's harsh terms, the conference had f a i l e d . 
14, Wavell to Jinnah, July 9, 1945, I b i d . , p.503. 
Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , 
pp. 244-245, 
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Khlcr Hnyat Khan, Maulana Azad and Pant expressed i n d i -
gnation at the League's a t t i t u d e . Jinnah sa id tha t the 
Congress and the League took e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t measures 
according t o t h e i r p o l i c i e s . Congress wanted a United 
15 
India and the League wanted Pakistan, i t may be conc-
luded that the Simla Conference "was a fraud upon the 
16 
Public as wel l as upon i t s members." 
Meanwhile there was a l so a change of Government 
in England. As a re su l t of e l e c t i o n s held on July 20, 
1945, the Labour party assumed power, Church i l l ' s caretaker 
Oovemment was replaced by A t t l e e ' s Government, and Amery 
was replaced by Lord Pethick Lawrence, as Secretary of 
State for India . 
The new Government in England v i s u a l i s e d the b o i l -
ing s i t u a t i o n in India, while the Muslim League was afra id 
of A t t l e e ' s re j ec t ion of i t s demand of Pakistan the Cong-
ress was happy as Churchil l had given veto power t o the 
Muslim League and was antagon i s t i c to the Congress, After 
the f a i l u r e of the Simla Conference, Cripps opined to he ld 
early e l e c t i o n s , to which the Muslim League, the Congress 
15. I b i d . , p. 245. 
16# R#C,Majumdar, o p . c i t . , p. 719. 
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and other parties agreed. In August 1945, Wavell held 
a meeting of the provincial Governors, who unanimously 
favoured the elections. 
On August 24, Wavell accompanied by Sir Evan 
Jenkins and Menon, left India and reached London on 
Auguat 25, 1<J45, On September 11, Attlee declared that 
the *broad definition of British policy contained in the 
Declaration of 1942 ..... stands in all its fullness and 
17 
purpose. ** 
Wavell returned t o Tndta on September 16, and made 
an announcement on September 19, 1945, on behalf of His 
Majesty's Oovemment, that the Government in consu l ta t ion 
with the leaders of the Indian opinion, would work for 
the ear ly r e a l i z a t i o n of f u l l self-government in India 
and a l s o convene as soon as p o s s i b l e a c o n s t i t u t i o n mak-
i n g body a f ter the e l e c t i o n s t o Central and Provincial 
Asseqtblies in winter, 1945. 
Wavell announced that the term of e x i s t i n g Assembly 
would expire on October 1, 1945 and the new members would 
take t h e i r s e a t s at the budget s e s s i o n of 1946. As the 
17. Anita Inder Singh, o p . c i t . , p. 125. 
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electoral rollis were not rendy, the life of the chamber 
wjia extended upto May 1, 1946, Wavell announced that 
election? to the Central Legislature would be held first 
and then elections to the provincial legislatures would 
take place. The elections to be held on the basis of 
1935 Act, with restricted franchise. 
The elections were a trial of Muslim League to 
prove that it was the representative body of the Muslims 
who favoured the creation of Pakistan in spite of opposi-
tion of the Congress off-shoots - the Nationalists, Ahrar, 
Jafnlat-ul-Ulama-e»Hind, Muslim Majlis, Morain Conference 
and Azad Board. It was very easy for the Congress to win 
the elections, as far as the general seats were concerned 
in view of its strong organisation, long experience, better 
financial resources and strong support of the Nationalist 
party, while the Muslim League had the experience of 1937 
18 
elections, had little financial backing, and had no English 
Press to support it, except the Dawan in Delhi, Star of 
India in Calcutta and Deccan Times in Madras. But the 
League had established its strong hold on the Muslim voters 
all over India. As a result many Muslims, who were ear-
lier in the Congress joined the League and Jinnah welcomed 
18, V,P, Menon, op.cit., p. 221, 
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them llk» lost sheep. For instance/ Abdul Qaiyum Khan 
of NWFP, the Deputy leader of the Congress party, in the 
Central Assembly changed his allegiance to the Muslim 
Lengue and 30 unionist Muslims joined the League since 
1944. In 1945, Major Mumtaz Tirana, the biggest Tiwana 
19 
land->own«r, joined the League. He was followed by Piroa 
20 
Khan Noon. 
Further the nationalist Muslims found themselves 
in a difficult position as they )cnew that Muslims would 
not vote for them until and unless they were assured of 
some protection from the Congress. 
However, the Muslim League declared to fight the 
elections on the issue of Pakistan and its title to repre-
21 
sent all the Muslims. But the Congress came out to dis-
prove it. The Parliamentry Board of the Muslim League 
guided by Liaquat Ali Khan and Choudhry Khaliquzzaman 
selected the League candidates. There was a heavy rush 
19. The statesman, October 4, 1945. 
20. Firoz Khan Noon, From Memory,(Lahore, 1966), p.184. 
21. The Dawn, August 31, 1945. 
22. Quarterly Survey of the Political and Constitutional 
PoBitioiit of the British in India^ Nos. 34 and 35 
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of Muslim I>«guers and p o l i t i c i a n s for the League t i c k e t 
and for every const i tuency there were three or four can-
d idates which indicated the success of the League, s ince 
G.M. Syed's group In Sind was not given League t i c k e t , 
23 
they put up t h e i r own candidates . 
On August 6, in h i s f i r s t e l e c t i o n speech at 
Bombay Jinnah s a i d "there are only two major p a r t i e s In 
t h i s country. I n v i t a t i o n s i s sued t o Mr, Gandhi and my-
s e l f were on the b a s i s tha t Mr, Gandhi was the recognised 
leader of one of the p a r t i e s and myself the leader of 
the o ther . The Br i t i sh c a l l e d them p a r t i e s , but in fac t 
24 
they were two major n a t i o n s . " At another speech, Jinnah 
sa id that every vo te in favour of the Muslim League can-
didate meant * Pakistan* and every vote against the Muslim 
League meant 'Hindu R a j , ' Jinnah advocated the two nat ion 
theory on the b a s i s of d i f f e r e n c e s In r e l i g i o n , c l v l l i z a t l o 
cu l ture , language a r c h i t e c t u r e , music, jurisprudence, law, 
25 
food, s o c i e t y and d r e s s . On November 1, he sa id that he 
23. The Statesman, January 3 , 5 , 9 , 1946 and February 1, 
1948, The majority of Syed's candidates were defeated 
and I t was a personal triumph for Jinnah, 
24. Jamll-ud-Din Ahmad, ^Retchea and Wrltlnnp of Mr.Jinn»h 
O p . c i t . , p . 3 8 7 . tYt*M«H' 
25. See for d e t a i l s I b i d . , p . 235, 
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would 'swe^ p' at the polls arxj did not care about the crl-
26 
tic* of his Pakistan plan« Hte charged the nationalist 
Muslims that they were not true Muslims because they did 
not join th« League. The election results were announced 
on December 31, 1945, January 1, 1946 showed the elected 
27 
members aa £ollowst 
Party Election 
Results 
Previous members of 
dissolved Assembly 
Congress 
Muslim League 
European Oroup 
Independents 
Akali Sikhs 
(Represented for 
f i r s t tijoe) 
O f f i c i a l 
Non-Off ic ial 
Total 
the 
Nominated 
56(57) 
30 
8 
5 
2 
on Janu 
26 
14 
40 
' ? ^ 4r 1946 
101(102) 
36 
25 
8 
21 
10 
100 
(Nationa-
l i s t s ) 
The results revealed that the Congress won an 
over whelming success in the General Constituencies and 
26. Ibid., pp. 426-28. 
27. Mohammad Raza Khan, op.cit., p, 135, 
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Muslim League won eveiry Muslim s e a t , whi le the N a t i o n a l i s t 
Muslim f o r f e i t i n g t h e i r d e p o s i t s in many i n s t a n c e s . The 
Congress secured 91.3% of the vo tes cas t in non~Mohe»nmadan 
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and the Muslim League 96.696 of the t o t a l 
28 
v<t>tes c a s t in Mohammadan c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . On January 11, 
1946, Jinnah ce lebrated the Leagvie's Victory and "congra-
t u l a t e d the League on winning a l l the Muslim s e a t s in 
29 
the Central Assembly." The r e s u l t proved that the Muslim 
LeHgue had f u l l contro l over the Muslim masses and that 
there were two major p a r t i e s the Congress and the League. 
Meanwhile e l e c t i o n to the Provinc ia l L e g i s l a t u r e s 
were a l s o to take p l a c e . E lec t ions commenced on Janiiary 
9, and l a s t e d up to the middle of April 1946. The Muslim 
League formed Parliamentary Boards in every province with 
President of the League as the President of the Board, 
the A l l - Ind ia Board s c r u t i n i s e d the recommendations of 
thu Provincial Boards, under the supervis ions of Liaquat 
All Khan. However, f i s s i p a r o u s tendencies had developed 
28, V.P.Menon, o p . c i t . , p . 226. 
29. Ib id . 
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and there was a keen competition amongst the League 
leaders for the League tickets, although the League's 
position In t;he provinces was not so good. 
In Punjab Khizr Hayat Ministry was in power and 
encouraged by Congress it was trying its best to secure 
as many Muslims seats as possible. In Sind, G.M.Syed 
had broken away from the League and was running a rival 
organisation. In NWFP, Dr. Khan Sahib was using his 
position for the defeat of the League. In Bengal, due 
to group struggle, which could cause harm to the League, 
Khwaja Nazimuddin retired himself, giving the leadership 
to Shahid Suhrawardy. 
The results of the elections were as follows: 
Prov inces 
Assam 
Sind 
NWPP 
Punj ab 
Bengal 
Bombay ) 
Madras ) 
Or i ssa ) 
Bihar ) 
C*P, 
Sea t s own by 
Conareas 
58 ou t of 108 
21 
30(19 N a t i o n a l i -
s t s Muslims) 
51(22 Akall Sikhs) 
20 (Unionis t ) 
87 out of X-iO 
Absolute Major i ty 
Sea t s own bv Leaoue 
35 (All Muslim Seats) 
27 (35 Al l Muslims) 
17 out of 38 
79 out of 86 
116 out of 119 
All Muslim Seats 
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The Congress won 930 aeats and the Muslim League 
428 seats. The result also showed an emergence of the 
Panthic AXalls In Punjab and disappearance of the Hindu 
Mahasalaha and Justice party in Madras and decline of 
Unionist Party, In brief, the Congress secured 80 per cent 
of th« general votes and the League 74 per cent of the 
Muslim votes cast* 
Thus the Congress and the Muslim League formed 
their ministries in the provinces in the following manners. 
Assam 
Sind 
NWPP 
Punjab 
Bengal 
Bombay 
Madras 
U.P, 
Bihar 
Orissa 
C.P. 
Congress Ministry 
League Ministry 
Congress Ministry 
Coalition Ministry (Congress, 
Akalis and Unionists) 
League Ministry 
Congress Ministry 
) 
On April 1, 1946 Jinnah convened a convention of 
Muslim League Leg i s la tor s at the Anglo-Arabic Col lege 
Delhi , which l a s t e d for three days, and which was un-
p a r a l l e l in the p o l i t i c a l h i s tory of Muslim India . The 
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convention* attended by 500 members of the Central and 
eleven provincial Legislatures, supported the League 
demand for Pakistan, Its importance may be assessed by 
the fact that there were 200 journalists representing 
the world press and among the eminent visitors were some 
Akall Leaders, Including Oiani Kartar Singh. Jinnah 
addressing the gathering said; 
It is heavy and sacred responsibility that we 
bear as elected and chosen representatives of our people. 
The convention is going to lay down once for all in 
unequivocal terms as to what we stand for and I have no 
doubt that we are of one and one opinion that we stand 
for Pakistan, and we shall not faltes or hesitate to 
fight for It, to die for it if necessary, and achieve 
30 
It we must or else we perish," 
Referring to the elections, Jinnah said that the 
League fought "against heavy odds, powerful organisations 
and all the manoeovers, and machinisatlonsof our enemies. 
We have routed our opponents. He addedt 
30. The Dawn, April 8, 1946, 
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"We can not accept any proposal which would be 
in any way derogatory to the f u l l Sovereignty of Pakistan. 
Our formula g i v e s t o the Hindus three fourths of t h i s sub-
cont inent . .« .Hindustan w i l l be a s t a t e bigger than any 
otlier s t a t e in the world, both in area and population 
31 
except China, and we s h a l l have only one fourth ." 
The Convention adopted the fo l lowing r e s o l u t i o n 
amidst thunderous cheers and shouts of Allah-o-Akbar. 
"Thia Convention of the Muslim League L e g i s l a t o r s 
of India, Central and Prov inc ia l , a f t er care fu l ConAidera-
t i o n , hereby dec lares that the Muslim Nation w i l l never 
submit to any const i tut ion-making machinery se t up for 
the purpose, and that any formula devised by the B r i t i s h 
Government for transferr ing power from the B r i t i s h to t h e 
people of India, v*iich does not conform to the fo l lowing 
j u s t and equi tab le p r i n c i p l e s , c a l c u l a t e d to maintain 
in terna l peace and t r a n q u i l i t y in the country, w i l l not 
contr ibute t o the s o l u t i o n of the Indian problem. 
(1) That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in 
the north-eas t and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, 
31 . The Dawjj, April 8, 1946. 
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Slnd and Baluchistan in the North West in India , namely 
Pakistan zones , where the Muslims are in a dominant majo-
r i t y , be cons t i tu t ed i n t o a sovereign independent s t a t e 
and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement 
the establ ishment of Pakistan without de lay . 
(2) That two separate const i tut ion-making bodies be 
s e t up by the people of Pakistan and Hindustan for the 
purpose of framing t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 
(3) l^at the m i n o r i t i e s in Pakistan and Hindustan be 
provided with safeguards on the l i n e s of the A l l - Ind ia 
Muslim League Resolution passed on March 23, 1940 at 
Lahore. 
(4) That the acceptance of the Muslim League demand 
for Pakistan and i t s implementation without delay are the 
s ing qua non for Muslim League cooperation and p a r t i c i p a -
t ion in the formation of an interim government at the 
32 
Centre," 
The British Government sent a Parliamentary Dele-
gation consisting of ten members, headed by P rof. Robert 
Richards, "to make personal contacts" with the Congress 
32, See Latif Ahmad Sherwani, op.cit., p. 98. 
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ami the L«agu« leaders to assess the depth of Congress-
League conftontatlon on communal problem, constitutional 
development and Independence. On January 28, 1946, the 
Viceroy, addressing the newly elected Central legislature 
said that the Government was determined to establish a 
constitution-making body and a new Executive Council as 
soon as possible. While Patel welcomed the speech,Jinnah 
opposed it and reiterated that "the Muslim League was not 
prepared to consider any thing short of immediate recog-
nition of the Pakistan demand." The delegation toured 
India and returned to Delhi in the middle of February and 
reported that Pakistan would have to be conceded and the 
sooner the better. 
In the General Election of 1945 in Britain the 
Labour Party came to power . with the success of the 
Labour Party there was a dramatic change in Indo-British 
relationship. At the conference of the Labour Party prior 
to elections, Mr. Bevin declared: 
"If we are returned, we will close the India Office 
33 
and transfer this business to the dominions." 
33, D,0. Tendulkar, Mahatmfjt : Lif^ of Mohandas Karamchand 
Gandhi. Collection of Writings and Speeches. Vol.VII, 
Bombay, p.6. 
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With c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r of Japan in August a f t e r 
t he bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima i t was not d i f f i c u l t 
fo r the B r i t i s h t o pos tpone the i s s u e of Ind ian Indepen-
dence f o r an i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d . But t h e Labour Government 
could not commit themselves t o a d e f i n i t e c o u r s e of a c t i o n 
wi thout a s t o c k - t a k i n g of t h e Indian s i t u a t i o n . The 
new Oovernment had a l s o t o c o r r e c t t h e misch ie f done by 
B r i t i s h in encourag ing the d i s r u p t i v e e lements in I n d i a ' s 
n a t i o n a l l i f e . In t h e s e r e s p e c t s t h e p o l i c y of t h e Labour 
Government recorded an a p p r e c i a b l e change . I t i n v i t e d 
Lord Wavell for c o n s u l t a t i o n s and on h i s r e t u r n from 
B r i t a i n on 19th September, he d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e e l e c t i o n s 
of t h e C e n t r a l and P r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s which were h e l d 
up because of war, would soon t a k e p l a c e and on t h e b a s i s 
of t h e r e s u l t s of t h e e l e c t i o n , t h e B r i t i s h Government 
would convene a ' C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly. ' In t h e d e c l a r a t i o n 
i t was a l s o po in t ed out t h a t t h e Government proposed t o 
converse with t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the L e g i s l a t i v e 
Assemblies t o a s c e r t a i n i f t h e p r o p o s a l s con ta ined i n t h e 
Cr lpps Draft were a c c e p t a b l e or some a l t e r n a t i v e scheme 
was t o be made (though i t was well-known t h a t t h e Cr lpps 
p r o p o s a l s were u n a c c e p t a b l e by t h e Congress) . Discuss ion 
were a l s o to be taken with t h e I n d i a n s fo r t h e i r r e p r e s e n -
34 
t a t l o n in t h e C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly, 
34, Indian Annual R e g i s t e r , Vol . I lyJu ly-December 1945, 
pp'^ 148-.49T 
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Whli# the e lec t ions were In progress the Br i t i sh 
Ooverijraent decided to send a Parliamentary Delegation 
drawn from d i f f e ren t p a r t i e s on a good-will mission t o 
India* Th« new year message from Lord Pethick Lawrence, 
Secretary of S ta te , was a lso very encouraging. He made 
i t p la in tha t the Br i t i sh Government had decided to grant 
India freedom and 1946 would be a fa te fu l year , "If we 
a l l bend our minds and w i l l s t o t h i s hi^h endeavour", he 
said, "we can do something in 1946 for the greatness of 
India , for the future of peace and p rosper i ty of Asia 
35 
and the world," 
The Parliamentary Delegation reached India on 
January 5, 1946. It toured throuc^ iout the country, con-
tacted the Indian leaders and registered their impressions 
36 
of the Indian situation, Jlnnah made it plain that with-
out a declaration on the part of British accepting the 
principle of Pakistan and of Muslim parity with all other 
parties he would not take part in an Interim Government, 
He would resist all attempt of a single constitution-making 
body to impose a constitution on the Muslims. He wanted 
35. V,P,Menon, op.clt., p, 227. 
36, Dr. V.S.P.Raghuvan Singh, Indian Nationalist Movement 
and Thought (Agra, 1959), p, 256. 
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two c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g bod ies and did not con templa te 
p re -dominan t ly Non-Muslim a r e a s l i k e t h e Ambala d i v i s i o n 
in t h e Punjab t o s t a y in P a k i s t a n . The demarcat ion of 
t h e f r o n t i e r between Pak i s t an and Hindustan could be 
37 
s e t t l e d by n e g o t i a t i o n , 
t h e e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s t o the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly 
a t t h e c e n t r e were a v a i l a b l e by the end of 1945, Congress 
tu rned v i c t o r i o u s a t p o l l s In gene ra l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and 
t h e r e was a complete r o u t of n a t i o n a l i s t Muslims fo r 
Muslim s e a t s , because of the Muslim League ' s o p p o s i t i o n . 
The f i g u r e s for 102 e l e c t e d s e a t s were a s f o l l o w s : 
Congrosfl ——" Muslim League Independent — Akali European 
Sikh 
57 30 5 2 8 
In the elections to the Provincial Assemblies the 
Congress had a notable success in the North-West Frontier 
Province where Muslims formed 95H of the population. In 
other provinces the general seats mostly fell to the 
Congress and Muslim seats to the Muslim League, The Cong-
ress formed ministry in eight out of eleven provinces gmd 
37. Ibid., p. 256. 
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in t h e Punjab i t e n t e r e d i n t o a c o a l i t i o n wi th t h e U n i o n i s t 
P a r t y . In Sind and Bengal t h e Muslim League formed m i n i s -
t r i e s * 
On February X9, 1946, Lord Pethick-Lawrence , 
Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , announced in the House of 
Lords that the Gcvernment had decided to send a Cabinet 
Mission to a s s i s t t h e Viceroy in t h e s e d e l e b e r a t i o n . The 
Cabinet Mission was to c o n s i s t t o Lord Pe th ick Lawrence, 
the secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , S i r S t a f f o r d C r i p p s , 
President of the Board of Trade , and Mr. A.V.Alexander, 
38 
F i r s t Lord of the Admira l ty , 
The s i t u a t i o n on the eve of t h e Cabine t Mission 
was gr im. The n a t i o n a l movement in I n d i a was a t i t s h e i g h t 
and i t had taken i t s i n s p i r a t i o n from t h e n a t i o n a l move-
ments of Ceylon, Burma, Indones i a , Indo-China , and Malaya, 
which were a l s o a g i t a t i n g fo r t h e i r independence . The 
r i s i n g s of the Royal I n d i a Navy in Bombay , Karachi and 
Madras had «1armed t h e B r i t i s h e r s , The s t r i k e of t h e Ind ian 
Air Force a t Ambala was i n i t i a t e d a t o t h e r c e n t r e s of Air 
Force and B r i t i s h f e l t i t . The t r a i l and a c q u i t t a l of t h e 
38 , Ind ian Annual R e g i s t e r , V o l . 1 , J a n u a r y - J u n e , 1946, 
pp . 129-30. 
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l ead ing o f f l c « r s of t h e Ind ian Na t iona l Army (INA) embold-
ened t h e people of I n d i a . Above a l l i t was r e a l i s e d every 
where t h a t t he B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e i r 
v i c t o r y had weakened and i t would not be ab le t o w i t h -
39 
s tand th« Indian r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , 
"Die Cabinet d e l e g a t i o n landed in Karachi on March 
23, 1946 t o exp lo re whether Ind i ans would l i k e t o a s s o c i a t e 
wi th t h e Commonwealth or would be comple te ly independent 
and to f ind out t h e means fo r t r a n s f e r of power t o t h e 
Ind ian hands . On March 24, 1946, t h e s e c r e t a r y of S t a t e 
sa id t h a t t h e d e l e g a t i o n i n t ended t o h e l p t h e Ind i ans t o 
dec ide t h e i r own c o n s t i t u t i o n themselves *with t h e minimum 
40 
of d i s t u r b a n c e and t h e maximum of speed" The d e l e g a t i o n 
made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e Muslim League would not be allowed 
41 
" t o p l a c e a v e t o on t h e advance of t h e major i t ;^ , ' ' which 
encouraged the Congress . From Apr i l 1-7, 1946, t h e Mission 
In te rv iewed 742 l e a d e r s in 182 s i t t i n g s , cove r ing every 
shade of op in ion in t h e c o u n t r y . The Cabinet Mission d id 
39« H.N.Sabharwal and R.G.Gupta, Indian P o l i t i c s and 
Government 1857-1956, (Kanpur, 1956), p . 8 0 . 
40. V.P.Meoon, o p . c i t , , p . 236. 
4 1 . K e e s i n g ' s contemporary Arch ives , 1946-1948, p .7786 . 
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not think Justifiable to renew the Cripps proposals. It 
"put aside the rl^t of provinces to opt out of an Indian 
Union If 60 per cent of the population voted in a ple-
biiclte, as the balance of Hindu and Sikh votes would 
42 
probably turn the vlrdict against Pakistan." Therefore, 
the Mission thougJit to form a constitution-making body 
and th«i to consider the principle of Pakistan. They were 
convinced that no settlement was possible on the basis 
of a Union Government, and that if Pakistan was conceded, 
the Hindu population could not be forced to stay in Pakis-
43 
tun, against their will. On the other hand, the racial 
sentiment was very strong and the loyalty of the armed 
forces was doubtful. Therefore, the British aimed to 
avert the Indian unrest through constitutional means. In 
view of it, Attlees had declared that the Indians will 
have "full control of their own destiny and the formation 
44 
of a new i n t e r i m government." The c a b i n e t was a f r a i d a l s o 
t h a t i f t h e armed f o r c e s had t o be c a l l e d t o suppress any 
r e b e l l i o n of t h e Congress and t h e League in c a s e of t h e 
f a i l u r e of tl ie Miss ion, i t was p o s s i b l e t h a t they would 
42 . Note by Pe th ick Lawrence, February 14, 1946,N,Mansergh, 
Transfer of Power, Vol .Vl , (London,1976), pp .978-79 . 
43 . I b i d . , pp. 980-82, 
44. Cabinet Delegat ion t o Cabinet Of f i ce , Telephone, 
March 25 , 1946, N.Mansergh, T r a n s f e r of Power, 
Vol. VII (London 1977) , p . 6. 
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ob*y. In view of the rautlnees of the Royal Indian Air 
Forc« and Royal Indian Navy In January and February, 1946. 
Therefore, the Mission concluded tha t t h e i r "negot ia t ions 
45 
nnist succeed" and they must refuse to permit a breakdown," 
Further, they wanted to transfer power to a Unitdd India 
to keep the army undivided so that, in case of war, they 
may use India for operational and administrative purposes. 
They knew that the Congress would not like to stay In the 
Commonwealth at all and Pakistan would be economicallV and 
46 
militarily unviable. They preferred a settlement between 
the Congress and the League, and if there was no agree-
ment the British would produce a settlement, Jinnah had 
declared that he would boycott the interim government,They 
thought, if they would allow the Congress alone to form 
the government, it would mean suppression of the Muslim 
League, which they wanted to avoid because the Muslims 
had supported them in their war efforts and wished to 
47 
jo in thre Commonwealth, However, the cabinet decided to 
•Secure t he i r long term aim of maintaining India within 
45. Note of meeting between Cabinet delegat ion and 
Viceroy's Executive Council, March 26 ,1946 , Ib id .p .7 , 
46. Note by Abell discussed by Mission and Navell on 
May 16,1946, N.Manserqh,Transfer of Power, Vol.Vii , 
o p . c i t . , pp. 568-69. 
47. Note by Craft and Tumbul l , I b i d . , p . 337. 
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the imperial security system; and therefore made every 
48 
effort to achieve it,* 
Further the British were anxious due to civil 
war situation in India. In Punjab, the Sikhs feared 
49 
Muslim domination in the form of Pakistan. In NWFP Muslim 
League volunteers* had been carrying spears in their 
50 
processions. Liaguat Ali Khan inspired the Muslims in 
51 
his speeches declaring "Pakistan or death.•• Sikandar Hayat 
Khan had called the Muslim ex-military personnels to 
52 
command the force of Muslim, League National Guards, in 
U.P,, there were deteriorating communal relations. In 
Sind, the RSS was playing a sinister role in every violent 
53 
communal i n c i d e n t , and had given a s logan "Hindustan on ly 
54 
fo r Hindus . " 
48 , Anita Inder Singh, o p . c i t . , p . 152. 
49, J e n k i n s t o Waveil, A p r i l 1,1946, N.Mansergh, Transfer 
of power. Vol .VI I , o p . c i t . , p . 272. 
50, F o r t n i ^ t l y Report f o r NWFP for second h a l f of March 
1946, HoniA Department. P o l i t i c a l F i l e No. 1 8 / 3 / 4 6 . 
5 1 , The C i v i l and M i l i t a r y Gaze t t e e , March 26, 1946. 
52, The Eag tem Times, May 11 ,26 ,29 , 1946. 
53 , F o r t n i g h t l y Report for Sind for f i r s t h a l f of May 
1946, Home Department^ P o l i t i c a l , F i l e No.lO/5/4_6. 
54, L e t t e r t o s e c r e t a r y , AlCC from Tuta Singh AICC 
F i | e NO. _G;-.60* 1945346, pp. 37-38 . 
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In these circumstances, the Mission inv i ted Azad 
t o meet them on April 1, 1946. Azad pleaded for indepen-
dence and af te r i t , for the formation of a cons t i t u t i on -
making body to draw the cons t i t u t ion of United India , He 
said t h a t the const i tut ion-making body should cons is t of 
f i f teen members. (11 provincia l r ep resen ta t ives and 4 
places for m in i s t e r s ) , He suggested a federal c o n s t i -
tu t ion (Central Control over Defence, Comrminications and 
Foreign Affairs ; and provincia l control over o ther sub-
55 
J e c t s ) • He suggested tha t a f t e r the cons t i t u t ion was made, 
the provinces would e i t h e r (1) stand out of the c o n s t i -
t u t i on ; or (2) enter the cons t i tu t ion by federa t ing for 
the compulsory subjects only, or (3) to federa te for the 
compulsory as well as for the opt ional sub jec t s . He urged 
tha t the provincial l e g i s l a t u r e s should be taken as fed-
era l col leges t o choose the const i tut ion-making body. He 
re jected the p a r t i t i o n proposal of J innah. 
After Azad, Gandhi was interviewed, Gandhi urged 
that Rajagopal«chari*s formula should be implemented. He 
denounced J innah ' s two nation theory and urged for one 
consti tution-making body. He suggested tha t Jinnah may be 
55, V.P.Menon, o p . c l t . , p. 238. 
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asked to fonn the Government for the interim period and 
56 
If he re fused , t h e o f f e r should go t o t h e Congress . The 
In t e r im Government must be a b s o l u t e l y n a t i o n a l . The 
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e s a i d t h a t in t h i s c a s e , J l n n a h ' s Govern-
ment would be predominant ly Hindu as t h e r e would always 
be m a j o r i t y of t h e Congress . Gandhi s a i d i t was " i n e s c a -
p a b l e . " 
J innah was i n t e rv i ewed on Apr i l 4 , 1946, N a r r a t -
i n g t h e h i s t o r y of I n d i a from the days of Chandragupta 
to t h e B r i t i s h Raj he proved t h a t Ind ia was never one . 
He demanded Pak i s t an on t h e b a s i s of h i s two n a t i o n 
57 
t h e o r y . 
Dr. Ambedkar and J a g j i v a n Ram opposed t h e C o n s t i -
58 
t u e n t Assembly and demanded s e p a r a t e e l e c t o r a l c o l l e g e 
fo r t h e i r communit ies . Giani K a r t a r Singh demanded a 
s e p a r a t e sovere ign s t a t e - K h a l i s t a n . Baldev Singh demanded 
a Uni ted I n d i a , Sapru and J a y a k a r , t he L i b e r a l l e a d e r s , 
sugges ted Immediate format ion of an i n t e r i m Government, 
56. R.C,MaJumdar» o p . c i t , , p , 729, 
57 . See for d e t a i l s V.P, Menon, o p , c i t , , pp . 240-41 . 
58 . I b i d . , p . 241 . 
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opposed Pakistan and suggested equality of Muslim and 
caste Hindus In the Central Government. The leaders of 
the princely states expressed their willingness to join 
59 
an All India federation. 
On April 26, 1946, Jlnnah reiterated his demand 
for Pakistan and the Mission concluded that constitutional 
settlement was possible In one of these two ways: (1) 
Acceptance oi a separate state of Pakistan Including Muslim 
majority districts of Bengal, Panjab and Assam, and (2) 
the establishment of a union at Centre for essential sub-
jects. Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications for-
ming a i federation Including the proposed territories 
of Pakistan with equal representation of Congress and 
60 
League with provision to secede after 15 years. 
Crlpps proposed that there should be no Union 
Parliament, but Instead an Union Executive should be 
formed by the federation choosing the members with equal 
rights to the Congress and the League, but Jlnnah said 
that It was not possible within the same Governmental 
61 
system, and opposed the Indian Union, because in this case 
59, Ibid. 
60, Ibid., p. 49. 
61, V.P.Menon, op.cit., p. 250, 
- 202 -
th« Muslims always had to remain under the domination of 
the Hindus. The Secretary of State sa id that i f the s i x 
provinces and Calcutta, demanded by League, are accepted 
as Pakistan, the Hindu population would i n t e r n a l l y , and 
India e x t e r n a l l y would oppose i t and thus , i t would be a 
very h o s t i l e and dangerous s i t u a t i o n . Jinnah sa id t h a t 
i t was an exaggeration as " a l l the non-Muslim could not 
62 
be counted aa Hindus. 
n iere were three contes tant s in the f i e l d of 
c laiming Power from Bri ta in (1) Congress (2) Muslim 
League and (3) the S t a t e s . 
On April 17, Azad had proposed two l i s t s of Central 
subjec t s comfHilsoxy and o p t i o n a l . The Sectetary of State 
explained that i t would invo lve s u b - d i v i s i o n s of the 
Centre i n t o two partst (a) "the provinces that had opted 
for the f u l l range of s u b j e c t s , and (b) the provinces that 
63 
wer» federated for the compulsory subjec t s o n l y , " which 
would "work out In p r a c t i c e aa separate c e n t r e s for 
Pakistan and Hindustan" though the Congress refused t o 
62 . I b i d . , p. 251. 
63 . I b i d . , p. 252. 
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accept the three tier basis agreed to by Jinnah, Azad 
on April 26, agreed to it# and hence on April 27 the 
Secretary of State sent letters to Jinnah and Azad to 
send four names o£ negotiators for discussing and adopt-
ing either of the following* 
Section A 
There should be a loose federation in the form of 
a "Union of all India" consisting of three principal 
parts* the Hindu majority provinces^ the Muslim majority 
provinces^ and the states, with Defence, Foreign Affairs 
and Communications nominally in the hands of the Union 
Government, but with a wider range of optional powers 
that Might, by agreement, either be exercised by provinces 
cooperating as groups, and thereby constituting a third 
tier in the pattern of Government, or be transferred to 
the Centre. 
There should be two India Hindustan and Pakistan. 
The Pakistan element consisting only of the majority 
Muslim Districts that is roughly Baluchistan, Sind, North-
west Frontier Provinces and Western Punjab in the North 
West and Eastern Bengal without Calcutta, but with the 
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Sylhet D i s t r i c t of Assam in the North East . The two 
divided parts would have a t rea ty of a l l i a n c e o f f e n s i v e 
and defens ive but nothing in the way of an actual execu-
t i v e centre and, there fore , no common defence of the 
sub-continent . 
The Congress sent Aznd, Nehru, Pate l and Abdul 
caiaffar Khan and the Muslim League sent Jlnnah, Mohammad 
Ismail Khan, Liaquat Ali Khan and Abdul Rab Nishtar . Thiey 
met at Simla between May 5 and 12, 1946. The main point 
of d i f f erence between the two groups was t h a t the Congress 
wanted a United India and a uni tary nat iona l government 
and the League opposed I t and wanted crea t ion of Pakistan 
on the b a s i s of two nation theory. 
On May 6, Jinnah sa id "if the Congress would accept 
65 
the Groups the Muslim League would accept the Union. Gandhiji 
had re jec ted the Viceroy's formula saying that i t was 
66 
worst th«ui Pakistan. 
As the matter could not be s e t t l e d , Nehru on May 
9, proposed an umpire t o s e t t l e the d i f f e r e n c e s inc luding 
64, Sandhya Chaudhri, o p . c l t . , pp. 159-60, 
65, N.Manserg^, Transfer of Power, V o l . V i i , o p . c i t . , p , 4 3 7 . 
66, I b i d . , p. 466. 
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67 
Americans, 8ut J i n n a h re fused the p roposa l of an umpi re . 
S ince no settlement could be reached t h e Vlcer<6y asked 
them t o sutimit t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s . The League and t h e 
Congress , t h e r e f o r e , submit ted t h « i r memorandum on May 
12, r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e i r s tand taken e a r l i e r . The League 
i n i t s t en fjoints memorandum (May 12, 1946) s a i d t h a t 
th« s i x Muslim Provinces (Punjab, NWFP, B a l u c h i s t a n , S i n d , 
Bengal and Assam) should be grouped t o g e t h e r in one and 
would d«a l wi th a l l t h e s u b j e c t s except Foreign A f f a i r s , 
D«ftnce snd Communication. A s e p a r a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n mak-
i n g body fox s i x p rov inces would frame the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
« t c . * t c . While t h e Congress s tood for one C o n s t i t u t i o n -
making body and a f t e r t h e C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly has d e c i d e 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n for t h e A l l - I n d i a Federa l Union, t h e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o^the P r o v i n c i e s may form groups t o dec ide 
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n for t h e i r g roup . Thus both t h e p a r t i e s 
68 
had d i f f e r e n t approach . The Viceroy c l o s e d t h e conference 
on May 12 and r e t u r n e d t o Delhi on May 14, and pub l i shed 
69 
h i s own scheme on May 16, 1946, 
67 . V,P,Menon, o p . c i t . , p . 2 6 9 . 
68 , l ^ e Indian Annual R e g i s t e r , V o l . 1 , j a n u a r y - J u n e , 1 9 4 6 , 
pp . 142-143. 
69. Jami luddin Ahmad, H i s t o r i c Documents, ftp.rit-. rPPr^Q*^-
507. 
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Th* Flan may be divided Into three parts: 'One 
first part envisaged examination of the proposals for 
creation of Pakistan/ the «econd, setting up of an interim 
Oovemment (short term) ; and the third, a long term 
70 
plan i.e. application of the cabinet scheme. 
With regard to the first part, the League claimed 
the fotmation of Pakistan including the six provinces -
Assam* Bengal, Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan to which 
th« Cabinet did not agree. The Cabinet proposed that the 
Pakistan should consist of the Muslim majority areas which 
was not acceptable to the Muslim League, However, the 
Mission rejected the claim of Pakistan on certain grounds 
such as, the number of Muslims in India, and non-Muslims 
in Pakistan would remain considerable; predominated Hindu 
areas in Pakistan was inconsistent; the partition of Punjab 
was against the wishes of Sikhs; it would be very diffi-
cult for the Indian states to join either India or Pakistan 
71 
and so on. 
The second part, related to the shorjterm plan, 
which meant establishment of an interim Government, comp-
70. Ibid. 
71. V.P.Menon, op.cit., pp. 263-64. 
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rising of only Indian Ministers, having fullest coopera-
tion of the British Government, which later became 
operative* 
72 
Th« third part regarding long term plan , envisaged 
a union of India, residuary powers vested in the Provinces; 
states retaining all powers, except Defence, Foreign Affairs 
and Communication ceded to the union, freedom to provin-
ces to form groups with executives and legislatures, terms 
of constitution to be reconsidered after 10 years, and 
mainly. Constituent Assembly to have three sections:-
(i) Section A - Madras, Bombay,U.P./:.P, Bihar,Orissa 
(ii) Section B - Punjab, NWpp and Sind, and 
(iii) Section C - Bengal and Assam 
The plan also envisaged that each of the above 
three sections would decide its provincial constitution; 
the groups would settle the union constitution, and the 
union Constituent Assembly would negotiate with the British 
for Transfer of Power. 
The Mission announced that elections to the union 
Legislative Assembly would be held and, the party not 
72. Ibid., pp. 470-75. 
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accepting the plan of May 16, would be excluded from the 
Interim Oovernment. This forfeited the veto power of the 
Muslim League. The Mission opened a list of number of 
representatives to *e elected by each provincial Legis-
lative As3«nbly in the following manneri 
Provlncea 
Madras 
Bombay 
U.P. 
Bihar 
C.P. 
Orissa 
Total 
G e n e r a l 
45 
19 
47 
31 
16 
9 
Muslim 
4 
2 
8 
5 
1 
0 
167 20 
Total 
49 
21 
55 
36 
17 
9 
187 
S e c t i o n B 
Punjab 
NWFP 
Sind 
Total 
S e c t i o n c 
Bengal 
Aflsam 
Tot a I 
Grand T o t a l 
Hax« f o r I n d i a n 
8 
0 
1 
9 
27 
7 
210 
S t a t e s 9 3 . 
16 
3 
3 
22 
33 
3 
,„?6 
78 
S i k h s 
4 
0 
0 
4 
-
-
4 
28 
3 
4 
35 
60 
10 
70 
385 
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In Group A the states were Congress dominated 
provinces. In Group 3, the Muslim League could 
form the Mlnlatxry using influence over other Muslim 
leaders. In Group C in Aasam the Congress had dominated 
position* 
The above plan, accepted the Congress demand of 
a United Indla« and also the League demand of compulsory 
grouping. Thus making the creation of Pakistan. Though 
Gandhi expressed to wreck the compulsory grouping of 
provinces but on May 20, 1946, wrote that the Interim 
73 
Oovemment should be formed immediately. 
On May 27, 1946, Jinnah complained that Pakistan 
was divided in to groups B and C; that ins tead of two only 
one const i tut ion-making body was devised; that there was 
no ind ica t ion how the Union would r a i s e f inances , e i t h e r 
by contr ibut ion as des ired by the League, or by taxat ion 
as des ired by the Congress; that in the Leg i s la ture there 
would always be the majority of Hindus; that there was no 
provis ion that Pakistan might secede after 10 years from 
the finlonii that how the representa t ives of Baluchistan 
73, Gandhi to Pethick Lawrence, N.Mansergh, Transfer 
of Power, Vol .VII, o p . c l t . , pp. 636-37. 
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no 
would be elected; and th«t thero- was/provision of adding 
more subjects to the Union GK?vernm«nt against the principle 
74 
of three »ubj«dts. However, since the Congress proposed 
to make an attack on the compulsory grouping and opposed 
th« "parity" In the Interim Executive^ which the League 
demanded to be retained. 
On June 12, Nehru had given a list of 15 members 
for the Ir>terim Council (4 League, 5 Congress Hindus, 1 
Non-Congress Hindu, 1 Congress Scheduled caste and 1 
Congress women)# which was unacceptable to Jlnnah. Thus, 
the constitutional deadlock continued. To break it, the 
Viceroy suggested 13 members (6 Congress including a 
member of scheduled . caste, 5 Muslim League and 2 minori-
ties) . Jinnah proposed to place it before the League 
Working Committee, but the Congress turned it down. 
Therefore, the Viceroy submitted another formula on June 
16, 19+6 (6 Congress including scheduled caste, 5 Muslim 
League, 1 Sikh, 1 Indian Christian and 1 Rarsl •> . The 
Viceroy declared that if the Congress and the League had 
failed to form a coalition Government, he would invite 
those to form the government who would be willing to accept 
75 
the statement of May 16. The Mission left India on June 
29,1946. 
74. For details see The pawn. (New Delhi), May 23, 1946, 
75• Papers relat^ inq to the Cabinet Mission to India, 
Delhi, Manager of Publications, Publications Division 
Government of India, 1946, pp. 43-44. 
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Th# Viceroy I n v i t e d t h e fo l lowing t o form t h e 
76 
In t e r im OCfVernmentx 
1. S»rdar aaidev aincjh 
2 . s i r N.P. Engineer 
3 . Hi* J a g j i v a n Ram 
4 . P a n d i t J a w a h a r l a l Nehru 
5 . Mr, M.A.Jinnah 
6. Nawabzada Liaquat All Khan 
7. H.K. Mahtab 
8. Dr. John Mathal 
9. Nawabzada Mohamtnad Ismail Khan 
10. Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin 
11. Sardar Abdul Rnb Neshtar 
12. C, Rajagopalacharl 
13. Dr. Rajandra Prasad 
14. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. 
Jinnah said that the names of five Muslim League 
members were included without calling a list from the 
League leaders; that Parity between the Muslim and caste 
Hindus had not been devised; and that Jagjivan Ram would 
add strength to the Congress. However, he requested for 
the distribution of portfolios. 
76. Paper Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India, 
op.clt., pp. 43-44. See also Jamiluddin Ahmad, 
Historic Documents, op.cit., pp. 517-18. 
The Viceroy did not agree to the Congress demand 
to include « Muslin? of the Congress choice. However, 
on June 25, 1946, Nehru became President of the Congress 
>iorking Committee in place of Azad and in reply to a 
correspondent who asked about his future plan Nehru said 
that he had "every intention of modifying the plan "and 
the "Constituent Assembly was a sovereign body and that 
in all probability there would be no groups at all. The 
non-Palklstan provinces (Section A) would decide against 
grouping and so would the NWFP and Assam, leading to the 
77 
col lapse of the other groups as we l l , " He said tha t he 
78 
would solve the minor i t ies problem as a domestic problem, 
Nehru's statement touched the hear t of Muslims 
and Jinnah exploi ted i t for boycott ing the Interim Govern-
ment, On Ju ly 27, 1946, he convened the Al l - Ind ia Muslim 
League Council a t Bombay and, addressing a gathering of 
4^0 follower* from every provinces, said t h a t Pandit Nehru 
on Ju ly 10, in Bombay had said t h a t "the Congress was 
committed to nothing (Long-term p l a n ) , . . What i s the use 
79 
of imagining things and dreaming," He a l so said t ha t 
77. A,G.Noorani, 'The Cabinet Mission and i t s Aftermath 
in C,H.Philips and M,D, Wainwright, o p . c i t . , p,109. 
78. D.C, Gupta, o p , c i t . , p , 259, 
79. Jamiluddin Ahmad, Speeches and Writings of Mr.Jinnah 
op,clt., pp. 408-11. 
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Oandhijl had begun to ta lk l i ke a Universal adviser , who 
saldt "The Congress . . . . . i s the txrustee for the people 
of India we have enough experience of one t r u s t e e 
t h a t ha« been here for 150 years . We do not want the 
Congress to become our t r u s t e e . We have now grown up, 
80 
The only t r u s t ee of the Muslims i s the Muslim na t ion . " 
Th« Muslim League u l t imate ly on July 29, 1946, withdrew 
i t » acceptance of the Mission 's May 16, proposals and 
declared to r e so r t to Direct Action. Jinnah sa id : 
"Throughout the painful nego t i a t ions , the two 
p a r t i e s with whom we bargained held a p i s t o l a t usj one 
with power and machine-guns behind I t , and the other with 
non-cooperation and the t h r e a t t o lunch mass c i v i l d i s -
obedience. This s i t ua t ion must be met, we a lso have a 
81 
p i s t o l . " 
By the end of July election results for the Interim 
Oovemment were declared and the Congress won 209 seats 
and the Muslim Leagae 73, out of a total of 296 seats 
82 
allotted to British ^ndia. Jinnah realised that the 
80. Syed Sharifuddin Perzada, Foundations of Pakistan, 
Vol,II, op.cit., pp. 548-49. 
81. Ibid., p. 560. 
82. Manmath Nath Das, Partll^ion and Independence of 
India (New Delhi, T9§n'V""p.~TC 
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Congress wcnald u s e every p o s s i b l e means t o supp re s s t h e 
Leagues demand for Pak i s t an and t h e Assembly woild prove 
the graveyard of P a k i s t a n s i n c e t h e Congress would always 
be In ma jo r i t y in t h e Assembly, 
J lnnah c a l l e d upon the M\»lims throughout I n d i a 
t o obseirve F r i d a y , August 16, 1946, as ' D i r e c t Action 
Day' ' a s a p r o t e s t and in token of t h e i r deep resentment 
83 
of t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e ' B r i t i s h , " 
In C a l c u t t a , r i o t s broke out on August 16, and 
l a s t e d up t o August 20, 1946, l e a v i n g 3,000 dead and 
84 
17,000 I n j u r e d . More Muslims than Hindus were k i l l e d . 
The cause of the r i o t were goonda e l e m e n t s . However, t h e 
85 
r i o t proved t h a t Hindu-Muslim c o - e x i s t e n c e was i m p o s s i b l e . 
The Viceroy i n v i t e d Nehru t o form I n t e r i m Govern-
ment on t h e formula of 6-5-3 i . e . 6 Congress mahj5 Muslim 
Leaguers and 3 o t h e r s m i n o r i t i e s . On September 2, t h e 
In t e r im Government was i n a u g u r a t e d . The p o r t f o l i o s were 
d l n t r i b u t e d as fo l lowsi 
83 , Jaml ludd in Ahmad, H i s t o r i c I>ocuments ,op .c i t . , p . 536, 
84, N,Mansergh. T rans f e r of Power, V o l . V l l i (London, 
1979), p . 274. 
85 , F r a n c i s Tuker-Whlle Memory Serves (London,1950), p .158, 
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Pandit Nehru Vice President (Virtual P.M.) 
Sardar Patel Home Affairs (Police) 
Baldev Singh Defence (War) 
Muslims 3 (Nominated by Viceroy) 
Muslims 2 (Left for Muslim League 
members) 
Members 6 
The Leaguers led demonstrations, processions 
meetings and hartals and hoisted black flags on residences, 
plAc* of business and mosques and there was going to be 
86 
a total war in every city, town, street and house. Jinnah 
oalledi the Viceroy's action as double betrayal for its 
87 
ignoring «jid by passing the Muslim League. 
Oandhiji being much grieved due to riots, toured 
NOskhali and Bihar to pacify the people though he was 
th«n 17 years old. 
On October 13, 1946, Jinnah wrote to Viceroy that 
the League had decided to join the Interim Government, 
and agreeing to the Cabinet Mission Plan, abandoning the 
Pakistan proposals, as conditioned by the Viceroy, On 
86, The Dawn (Delhi), August 3, 1946, 
87, The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), October 20,1946, 
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October 14, 1946, J i nnah proposed f i v e names of Muslim 
League mefnb€'fs, who j o i n e d t h e I n t e r i m Government on 
October 15, wi thou t accep t ing the long- te rm plan on May 
88 
16,1946. J innah nominated n achefJuled c a s t e i n t h e Muslim 
89 
League quota and decided t o wreck t h e In t e r im Government, 
The f i v e League members weret (1) L iaqua t Ali Khan (2) 
I.I.Chundrlgar (3) Sardar Abdur Rab Nesh ta r (4) Raja 
Ghazanfar Ali Khan and J o g i n d e r Nath Mandal (SC) , who were 
glv«n Finance, Commerce Communication, Hea l th e t c . Azad 
had propoaed t o g ive Home Department t o t h e League, but 
90 
Pate i did no t l i k e to p a r t with i t . Azad knew that i f 
Horn* w i l l be given t o ^•'eague i t would s a t i s f y i t . He 
wanted F inance to be with the Congress . But P a t e l opposed 
t h i s . He Wanted t o keep Home and g ive Finance , Maulana 
Azad knew t h a t such an arrangement would not be c o n g e n i a l 
due t o one reason or the o t h e r but he had t o accep t i t . 
Liaquat Ali Khan i n t r o d u c e d such a budget which harmed 
the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , businessmen and ma jo r i t y of Hindus . 
Further the budget handicapped t h e Congress Department, 
88 . N.Mansergh, T rans f e r of Power. V o l . V I I I , o p . c i t , , p . 7 0 9 , 
89, For tTi ight ly Report from New Delhi for t h e f i r s t h a l f 
of October 1946, Home Department, P o l i t i c a l , F i l e No. 
1 8 / 1 0 / 4 6 . 
9 0 . . Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, o p , c i t ^ ^ p , 166. 
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which almost paralyed them and the Congress realised 
that the Interim Government would not be workable for 
want of coot>eration between the Congress and the League. 
In consequence, the Congress bloc' and the League bloc* 
became rival without caring and national policy. The 
Viceroy declared to summon the Constituent Assembly on 
December 9, 1946. Jinnab, on Movember 21, declared to 
91 
boycott the same. 
On November 25, 1946, Jinnah proposed to the 
Viceroy for exchange of population as the best means for 
s e t t l i n g the communal tangle and a lso re jec ted the Mission 
Plan, and thus i t could not remain par t of the Interim 
Government. To break the deadlock, the Viceroys-Nehru, 
Baldev Singh, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan went to London 
on November 30, 1946, to discuss the matter with At t l ee , 
but t h e i r t a l k s ended in f a i l u r e , and a t t i t u d e of the 
became 
Congress and the League towards each other s t i l l / m o r e s t i f f . 
llie Congress suggested to bring the i r dif ferences in the 
Federal Court on tne proposal of May 16 but Jinnah r e j ec t ed . 
Howevie^ r on tne p r i nc ip l e of indiv idual s t a tu s of 
provinces , the Viceroy convened the Const i tuent Assembly 
on December 9, 1946. League's 79 members boycotted the 
91, The Indian Annual Regis ter , Vol.11, July-Decmeber 
r946, V."'279. •" ~ ^ 
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Assembly. On December 11, Attlee appealed "to all th%. 
communities in India to cooperate in framing a consti-
92 
tution •• M^ich encouraged Jinnah and he took more tough 
line ag«ln»t. the Congress. On the other hand, Nehru on 
Ptc^mber 13, 1946, declared "ThU Constituent Assembly 
declares its firm and solemn resolve to proclaim India 
as an Independent sovereign Republic, wherein all power 
and authority are derived from the people. The 
Muslim League continued to frustrate the Interim Government 
from outside and almost a civil war position dominated 
In all parts of India, 
Attl«e, the Prime Minister was convinced that the 
Viceroy, Lord Wavell, had failed to bring about an agree-
ment between the Congress and the League. He realised 
that the only solution lay in the partition of India into 
two sovereign states - Hindustan and Pakistan. Therefore, 
on December "10, 1946, Attlee called Lord Louis Mountbatten 
and offered him the Viceroyalty of India. After much 
hesitation, Mountbatten accepted Attlee's invitation. 
92. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, 
Vol. 431, pp. 1175-76. 
93, Dorothy Norman (ed,), Nehru : The First Sixty Years, 
Vol,II, London : (Bombay, 1965), pp. 278-86. 
C H A P T E R SKVEN 
THE MOUNTBATTEN PLAN AND PARTITION OF INDIA 
T r a g i c a l l y enough, J l n n a h , Gandhi, Nehru, Azad 
and P a t e l f a i l e d t o I ron out t h e i r d l sag remen t s and t o 
k(»ep pac* with communal problems for a peacefu l s e t t l e -
ment. On October 18, 1939, t h e Viceroy s t a t e d t h a t 
communal d i f f e r e n c e s would be s e t t l e d a f t e r t h e War 
wi th some m o d i f i c a t i o n s In t h e Government of Ind ia Act 
1 
1935« As th« communal Impasse c o n t i n u e d , t h e Congress 
bvcame a p a r t y t o p a r t i t i o n , though Gandhi b e l i e v e d In 
t h e u l t i m a t e v i c t o r y of gcxjd and t r u t h . J l n n a h ' s Lahore 
l^esolution and demand for Pak i s t an wi th c l e a r t e r m s , f a i l -
u r e of Wavell Plan and Simla Conference, Cabinet Mission 
Plan and t h e I n t e r i m Government made t h e p a r t i t i o n of 
I n d i a i n e v i t a b l e . 
In 1946, t h e Important f a c t i o n s were t h e Congress , 
t h e League, t h e S ikhs , t h e Backward and Scheduled Cas te s 
and t h e P r i n c e s in t h e p o l i t i c a l a r ena . Azad wanted 
2 
Independence first, and anything later, Jinnah wanted 
to settle the fundamentals of Pakistan first, and anything 
1, Speeches and Statements of Linlithgow, October 18, 
1939, Linlithgow Collection, National Archleve of 
India. 
2, V.P, Menon, op.cit.,pp. 238-39, 
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3 
afterwards, Ambedkar and Jagjlvan Ram opi^ osed the Cons-
tituent Assembly dominated by the Caste Hindus and de-
manded separate electoral college for the Scheduled 
4 
Castes, Qlanl Kartar Singh, aaldev Singh and Master 
Tara Singh demanded a separate sovereign state of Khalls-
5 
tan. The Hindu Mahasabha and the Liberal leaders vehe-
6 
mentally opposed the partition of India. The question 
of Princely states had lingered on due to war in Europe. 
After the failure of the Wavell Plan on May 16, 
1946, the League had refused to enter the Constituent 
Assembly and Nehru had installed the Constituent Assembly 
on December 9, 1946. Prime Minister Attlee informed the 
House of Commons on December 11, that conversation with 
the Indian leaders during the last week ended in a fall-
7 
ure. While Nehru had left for India on December 12,1946, 
3. N.Mansergh, Transfer of Powers, Vol.VII,op.cit.,p.240, 
4. Ibid., pp, 243-45. 
5. Ibid., pp. 242-43. 
6. Ibid., pp, 245-46. 
7. parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series 
Vol. 431, pp. 1175-76. 
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and Wavellf Jinnah and Liaqviat All Khan were s t i l l in 
London, Attl<^e was looking around for a successor of 
the Viceroy, because of the Wavell's f a i l u r e , Att lee 
looked to Dickie Mountbatten and the idea for the appoint-
ment of Lord Mountbatten struck to his mind. Mountbattftn 
Was suggested as a replacement for Linlithgow for the 
8 
f i r s t time by Leo Amery in the summer of 1942, and again 
9 
nine months l a t e r by Sir Ralph Glyn. Krishna Menon had 
also to ld Sir Stafford Cripps that Mountbatten's appoint-
ment as Viceroy of India would be welcomed by the Cong-
10 
ress in view of the fact t h a t Nehru had es tab l i shed 
good r e l a t i o n s h i p with the King-Emperor's cousin. At t lee 
also rea l i sed tha t the extremely l i v e l y and exc i t i ng 
personal i ty of the Royal family member would also i n f l u -
ence the Pr inces . Further, Mouhtbatten had l i b e r a l ideas 
and Was acceptable both by the Liberal Government as well 
as the ConseirvatIves. 
Prime Minister At t lee invi ted Mountbatten at 10 
Downing S t ree t on December 18, 1946, and offered him the 
8, Ju l i an Amt'ry t o Mountbatten* February 5,1968, National 
Archi^ves of India* p. 292. 
9« Amery Diary, May 18,1943. 
10, Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at 
Midnight (London. 1975), p. 8. 
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Vlceroyalty of India, Mountbatten agreed to the proposal 
on certain conditions. He insisted to fix a firm date 
for transfer of power. On March 18, 1947, Attlee fixed 
11 
June 1948, as the effective date. Mountbatten was granted 
•plenipotentiary powers* or 'discretionary powers' far 
wider than his predecessors. He had also the benefits 
of invention of the telegraph which had enabled him to 
consult with Whitehall from New Delhi within a few minutes. 
12 
On t h e r e q u e s t of Mountbatten Pethick-Lawrence was r e p l a c e d 
by Lord L i s towe l l i n A p r i l . F u r t h e r , he was f a c i l i t a t e d 
wi th a s t a f f of h i s own cho i ce t o be superimposed on t h e 
e x i s t i n g s t a f f in D e l h i . However, on February 11,1947, 
Mountbatten formal ly accepted t h e o f f i c e of t h e Viceroy . 
Mountba t ten '3 d e p a r t u r e t o I n d i a was f ixed for March 20, 
1947. On January 3 1 , A t t l e e had a l r e a d y informed Wavell 
13 
about t h e appointment of a new Viceroy . However, he was 
not o f f i c i a l l y , informed u n t i l February 13, I t ex t remely 
14 
shocked • W»vell who sa id to Abell t "They 've sacked me." 
1 1 , A t t l e * t o Mountbat ten, March 18,1947, N.Mensergh, 
T r a n s f e r of Power, Vol.IX (London,1980), o p . c i t . , p , 9 7 3 . 
12, Mountbatten t o Prof. Mansergh, Apr i l 24,1979, B.A. 
K1498, quoted in P h i l i p Z i e g l e r , Mountbatten : The 
O f f i c i a l Biography (London 1985), p.356 
13 , A t t l e e t o Wavell, J anuary 31,1947 : See Ayesha J a l a l , 
The Sole spokesman ; J i n n a h . t h e Muslim League and 
t h e Detnair^ a for P a k i s t a n (Cambridge, 1985) , p . 2 3 6 . 
14» P h i l i p Z i e g l e r , o p . c i t . , p . 358, 
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Before arrival to India, Mountbatten had studied 
the proceedingis of the House of Commons relating to 
Indian debate and almost daily consulted the Cabinet in 
London to find a solution of the thorny problem of estab-
lishing a unitary government or vivisection of India 
between the two major parties - Congress and the Muslim 
League. He concluded to advise the Indian leaders that 
the "retention of Indian Army under Central control was 
vital both to the external security of India and to the 
maintenance of internal law and order'* and that "he would 
not allow them to use British bayonets to keep law and 
15 
order, but only to protect British lives." Further, 
Mountbatten had the experience of visiting India with 
the Prince of Wales in 1921, when he realised that hos-
tile crowds, students boycott and the Congress demonstra-
tions were unlikely to be tranqullled. When Mountbatten 
had visited India, as Supreme Commander in 1943, he found 
Jlnnah in a better position than Gandhi, who was put be-
hind the bars, but the Civil Disobedience Movement launched 
by him w«8 still in progress. The same year, Linlithgow 
was replac«k3 by Wavell, who failed to reconcile with the 
demands of the Congress and the Muslim League, After the 
15. Cabinet Meeting, March 13, 1947, see N.Mansergh, 
Transfer of Power, Vol.IX, op.cit.,p.940. 
T 24 -
Japaaese threat dwindled, Whitehall became anxious for a 
rapid settlement in view of civil war condition in India; 
but Wavell was not allowed to have an informal talk with 
16 
Gandhi, Mountbatten thought it an important cause of 
the failure of Wavell's plan. Therefore, he decided to 
have an informal talk with Gandhi. 
Before Mountbatten*s arrival in India, Attlee had 
already declared on February 20, 1947, that the power 
would be transferred to responsible Indian hands by a 
date not later than June, 1948, (for which Wavell was 
unsuccessfully pleading for months), and if a constitu-
tion Was not framed by a fully representative Constituent 
Assembly by that date, the power would be handed over as 
17 
desired by the His Majesty's Government. This statement, 
on the one hand, deferred Congress demand that the League 
should be asked to leave the interim government so as to 
watch the League's actions to the new policy of the Govern-
ment, and, on the other, closed the doors of all possibi-
lity of the creation of Pakistan in the event the League 
failed to Join the Constituent Assembly. Jlnnah would not 
16, Nehru Memorial Lecture, June 24, 1980, quoted in 
Philip Ziegler, op.cit., p. 352. 
17, R.C.Majumdar, op.cit., p. 757. 
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l i k e t h i s and feel ing his humil ia t ion, became more anta-
gonis t ic to the Congress and an agreement with the Cong-
ress ins ide the Assembly became more unl ike ly than ever . 
Jinnah reacted to the statement because i t meant p a r t i t i o n 
but not on the p r inc ip l e des i red by him. He did not l i k e 
the t r ans f e r of power to d i f fe ren t Muslim majority s t a t e s , 
but to a union of Muslim majority s t a t e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
of Punjab and Bengal, to which the Congress and Hindu 
Mahasabha did never agree. Nehru echoed tha t Bengal and 
19 
the Punjab should be pa r t i t i oned , including only Muslim 
majority provinces, because League pe r s i s t ed set t lement 
on the basis of s trong States or groups of S ta tes with a 
w«ak Federal Centre, which could make the Congress qu i t e 
incapable of handling India'f? problems of poverty, i l l i -
teracy and out-moded aocial customs. Therefore, Nehru 
preferred "to lop some of the branches from the main 
20 
trunk" and " to l e t Jinnah and the League take the areas 
18« Abell to Har r i s , February 25, 1947, see Ayesha J a l a l , 
opjClt. , p . 237; See N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, 
Vol.IX, o p . c l t . , p . 813. 
19, Wavell t o Pethick Lawrence, February 22,1947, see 
N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.IX, o p . c i t . , 
pp. 785-86; see also Mehru to Wavell, March 9,1947, 
I b i d , , p, 898. 
20, Penderal Moon, Divld_e_anc[ Quite, (London, 1962), p,64, 
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21 
which they could indisputedly claim." This hypothesis 
was agreed to by all the Congressmen, except Gandhiji, as 
it involved much shedding to blood. 
On March 15, 1947, Woodrow Wyatt advised that the 
Muslim League would be "warned that if they no longer 
hold their portfolios by June of next year, the power will 
22 
be given to t'he Congress Interim (3overnment." He also 
suggested that the Army should not be handed over to any 
on« party but to a Central Government and that the military 
should not be used to suppress communal disturbances so 
that the Indians may learn the problems of law and order. 
23 
Wyatt also suggested partition. On that very day Attlee 
declared in the House of Commons: 
"India herself must choose what will be her future 
Constitution. What will be her position in the 
world. I hope that the Indian people may elect to 
remain within the British Commonwealth The 
British Commonwealth and Empire is not bound toge-
ther by chains of external compulsion. It is a 
free association of free peoples."24 
21. Ibid. 
22. "India-what next" . The New Statement and Nation, 
o p . c i t . , p . 170. 
23. Ibid. 
24. George Bennett (ed.) The Concept of Empire, 1774-1947 
(London, 1962), pp. 420-21. 
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Prime Minister At t lee had r ea l i s ed t h a t the power 
of veto given t o minority had blocked the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
development ever s ince . Therefore, he declared thet the 
British Government "cannot allow a minority to place a 
veto on the advance of the major i ty ." He warned t h a t any 
attempt " to p e r s i s t with old methods would lead not to 
25 
^ solution but a deadloc)<." He wrote to Mountbattent 
" I t i s the de f in i t e object ive of His Majesty's 
GJovemment t o obtain a un i ta ry Government for 
India and the Indian S ta tes , if poss ib le within 
the Br i t i sh Commonwealth, through the medium of 
a Consti tuent Assembly . . . and you should do the 
Utmost in your power to persuade a l l p a r t i e s to 
work together to t h i s end . . . If by October 1, 
you consider that there i s no prospect of r ea -
ching a set t lement on the bas i s of a un i t a ry 
government . . . you should report to HMG on the 
steps which you consider should be taken for 25 
the handing over of power on the due date •• 
Ttie Cabinet Mission was sent t o India to br ing 
about an agreement between the Congress and the League 
in view of the probable "d i r ec t action* by the Congress. 
25. ,Keesinq*s contemporary Archives, 1946-1948, p.7785, 
26, Attlee to Mountbatten, March 18, 1947, N.Mansergh 
Transfer of Power, Vol.IX, o p . c i t . , pp. 972-74. 
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Though th« object of the Mission was a l l r i g h t , yet i t 
were r e s t r i c t e d to make any d i sc re t ionary arrangement i . e . 
they were not allowed to make an •Award' in case of defaul t 
of 4h agreement, Wavell was of the opinion tha t due t o 
lack of d i sc re t ionary powers, the Cabinet Mission could 
27 
not produce a b e t t e r plan. The r i g i d i t y of the Mission 
Plan Was also responsible for i t s f a i l u r e . On the one 
hand, the Congress claimed t h a t the groupings of s t a t e s 
w6r* not 'Compulsory' and •Fundamental'# while the Muslim 
League considered i t otherwise. This was the fundamental 
point of d i f ference . Pethick-Lawrence did not allow Wavell 
28 
to explain these points to Gandhi in the r i g h t perspec t ive 
for s ix inonths as a r e su l t the Consti tuent Assembly delayed 
i t s i n s t a l l a t i o n . Since the Congress did not accept the 
29 
'compulsory groupings' as At t l ee s t a t ed on December 6, 
1946, the Muslim League emphasised that the Congress did 
30 
not accept i t . Further , Nehru's statement t ha t he would 
make amendments in the grouping p r inc ip le a f t e r the forma-
t ion of the Congress Interim Government, had annoyed the 
27. aee tfavcll's lettep-^to the King date February 24,1947, 
N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.IX, o p . c i t . , p . 8 0 1 , 
28. H.M.Seervai, P a r t i t i o n of India i Legend and Real i ty 
(Bombay 1989), p . 108. 
28. See for d e t a i l s N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power,Vol.IX, 
o p . c i t . , pp. 295-96. 
30. I b i d . , pp. 647-51. 
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Muslim League. Even in view of such a challenge, it was 
Wavell's favour that Nehru was allowed to form the Interim 
Government and later, when Muslim League members joined 
the Councils the Congress and League members sat in oppo-
sition as the greatest rival and, thus, the Interim Govern-
ment did not work properly. Therefore, Mountbatten was 
empowered to impose his own scheme, in case the Congress 
and the League failed to produce a common plan for estab-
lishing a unitary Government to which power could be 
transferred and which could frame a constitution agreed 
to by them. In such circumstances, Mountbatten was sent 
to India. On November 14, 1968, Mountbatten, delivering 
the Second Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Lecture at Cambridge, 
stated that he W3.s sent "to expedite the withdrawal" and 
was given the power to make his own decisions in India 
and that he was given "plenipotentiary powers'^  
There was controversy over treating the 'Interim 
Government* as 'Dominion Government'. Wavell's letter to 
the Congress President, Azad, and the statement of the 
Secretary of State for India in the House of Lords on 
March 13, 1947, had made it dlar that "the Interim Govern-
ment would not have the same powers as a Dominion Government", 
31, The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 15,1968. 
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but HMO would "give it the greatest possible freedom in 
the day-to-day exercise of the administration of the 
32 
country** The Congress Working Committee which met on 
March 8, 194*7 resolved that transfer of power should be 
made to the Interim Government deeming it "Dominion Govern-
m«it with effective control over the services and adminis-
tration* and converting the Viceroy into its •'constitu-
33 
tional head.* If this scheme was practised, the Congress 
Centre kept all the existing powers without devolution of 
authority to the provinces and denying the Indian states 
to have authority in matters of Fofeign Affairs, Defence 
and Communications. In this way the Congress aimed to 
34 
preserve the unity of India, Since the Congress dominated 
tdie Interim Government, the acceptance of the Congress 
35 
plan could have established a Hindu Raj after Independence, 
which Jlnnah could never tolerate, and it was a betrayal 
of the British pledges to the League and the Princes. 
32« Letter dated March 18,1947, to Mountbatten; see 
NiManserc/h, Transfer of Power, Vol.IX, op.cit., pp. 
972-74. 
33, Ibid., pp. 899-900, 
34« Note on p roposa l s handed t o the S e c r e t a r y of s t a t e 
by Sudhir Qnoah, Annexure I I to Document 524, 
N.Mansergh, Trans fe r of Power, Vol .IX, o p . c i t . , 
pp . 923-24. 
35* Ayesha J a l a l , o p . c i t , , p . 249. 
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Further* it would have had a very hot discussion between 
th« Labour and the Conservatives. Mountbatten conceived 
thl» problem and, hencri, was granted the plenipotentiary 
powers. Thus, Mountbatten "came to India with a freer 
hand to make and to impleiaent policy than any proconsul 
36 
before him in the history of British India." 
Louis' Mountbatten, the nineteenth and the last 
Viceroy, reached New Delhi on March 22, 1947 accompanied 
hy hia own staff, including General Lord Ismay, as Chief 
of the Viceroy's Staff, Sir Eric Mieville, as Principal 
Secretary, Captain R.V, Brockman, as Personal Secretary 
better known as Private Secretary, George'Abel 1', as 
Public Secretary, Lt, Col. Baskine Crum as Conference 
Secretary, V.P. Menon as Reforms Secretary, and Allan 
37 
Campbell-Johnson as Press Attache. The new Viceroy was 
greatly welcomed by the Congress. Since Nehrus had good 
38 
relations with Mountbatten, Lord Ismay had already warned 
the British Government that Mountbatten*s appointment as 
Viceroy would be considered as a favour to the Congress, 
39 
and an affront to the Muslim League. Jinnah had no such 
relationship with the Mountbattens as Nehru. 
36. I b i d . , p . 250. 
37. See for d e t a i l s V.P. Menon, o p . c i t : . , p , 352. 
38» The Manchester Guardian, Febfuary 25, 1947. 
39, A Campbell-Johnson, Mission wi th Mountbat ten, 
(London, 1951), p . 2T, 
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Mountbatten met Wavell the day he ar r ived, and 
discussed the p o l i t i c a l s i t ua t i on in India . Wavel br iefed 
Mountbatten what happened s ince the Mission l e f t and the 
confi iot between the Congress and the League members in 
the Interim Government. Between April 1947 and June 1948, 
there was only a gap of f i f teen months. Mountbatten noted 
tha t the Indian leaders were not r e a l i s i n g the problem of 
transfer of power before June, 1948. Wavell wondered 
"whether the p a r t i t i o n of Punjab and Bengal could take 
place inside the cabinet Mission's p lan ," Mountbatten said 
that he would l ike t o t r ans fe r power to some strong auth-
o r i t y In India and tha t "any solut ion must be based on the 
40 
Indian Army," Mountbatten r ea l i s ed tha t the Indian leaders 
were not appreciat ing the s i n c e r i t y of the Br i t i sh Govern-
ment in the t r ans f e r of power in view of statement of 
P.C. Josh l , General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
41 
India , that " the Br i t i sh had no r ea l In ten t ion of l eav ing . " 
However, at the swearing-in-ceremony on the mocning of 
March 24, the Viceroy, addressing h i s audience sa id: " I 
40, Minutes of meeting, March 22, 1947, N.Mansergh, 
Transfer of Power, Vol,IX, o p . c i t . , pp. 1011-12. 
41 , Phi l ip Zlegler , o p . c i t . , p . 366, 
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am under no illusion about the difficulty of my task... 
I shall need greatest goodwill of the greatest possible 
42 
number and I am asking India today for that goodwill," 
wavell left New Delhi the next day. In the afternoon, 
MOuntbatten met Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, He had already 
written to Gandhi and Jinnah to meet him in New Delhi 
at their earliest convenience, Gandhiji met him on March 
31 and April 4, and Jinnah on April 5. 
The Viceroy, without loss of time, started collect-
ing an overall information about the political ideas of 
the Indian leaders of all communities^ Hindus, Muslims, 
Christians and Parsees, He quickly observed that the 
real powers and decisive forces were the Congress led by 
Gandhiji, Nehru and the Congress Party "boss" Sardar Patel, 
«nd -the Muslim League solely led by M.A,Jinnah and his 
right-hand man, Liaquat Ali Khan, Meeting with each 
leader lasted for one hour and the discussions were imme-
diately recorded. 
Later when Mountbatten met Nehru, he asked Nehru 
about his estimates of Jinnah, Nehru presented him as 
42, N,Manserg^, Transfer of Power, Vol.X (London,1981), 
P. 9. 
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a "monster of negativism, a man who would agree to noth-
ing because it might split his followers if he did." Thus, 
Nehru showed his hatred for Jinnah, understimating his 
real position. Nehru also spoke of him "with mingled 
43 
respect and loathing." About India's remaining within 
Commonwealth after Independence, Nehru wondered how it 
could remain within it. Instead of partition, Nehru pro-
posed "relationship between the Centre and the provinces, 
and the right of the provinces to associate with each 
other on grounds of politics, propinguity or religious 
44 
faith." However Mountbatten realised that the Congress 
was ''grouping for a formula" which might keep India inside 
45 
the Commonwealth, Nehru was surprised to learn that "the 
British intended to withdraw all their officers in the 
army and the civil service regardless of how far the 
nationalisation process had progressed," The Viceroy 
conveyed to Pethick-Lawrence that Nehru wanted to retain 
the services of the British officers for some time after 
43. Viceroy's Interviews Nos. 3,20 and 39, March 24, 
April 1 and 8, 1947, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, 
Vol.X, op.cit., pp. 11, 70 and 154. 
44. I b i d . 
4 5 . Moun tba t t en ' s I n t e r v i e w wi th Nehru, March 24,1947, 
N. Mansergh, T r a n s f e r of Ppwr, Vol.X, o p . c i t . , p .13 , 
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46 
power was t r ans fe r r ed . Since Mountbatten considered t h a t 
whichever au thor i ty would con t ro l 'an unif ied army, or 
the most e f f i c i en t divided army* would cont ro l India* ' -• 
the question of the future of Indian army had become h i s 
47 
biggest bargaining point with the Congress, However, 
Nehru emphasised the need for the p a r t i t i o n of Punjab 
and Bengal and Mountbatten assured t o Nehru " to approach 
48 
the problem in an atmosphere of s tark rea l i sm." i t may 
be noted t h a t , on tJ-ie one hand, the Congress was pleading 
for p a r t i t i o n , and on the other , Gandhi was declar ing in 
49 
Biharj tha t '*he could not give constent to the idea of 
pa r t i t i on inq Punjab and Bengal or any other province," 
He was afraid t ha t p a r t i t i o n would make the communal trou-
ble a permanent f ea tu res . 
46. Mountbatten to Pethick-Lawrence, March 25, 1947, 
N.Mansergh, Transfer, of Power, Vol.X, o p . c i t . , p. 19. 
47. Minutes of the v ice roy ' s Fourth Staff Meeting, March 
28, 1947, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, 
o p . c i t . , p . 35. 
48. Mountbatten 191, Interview No.3, Nehru, March 24, 
1947, Miscellaneous Meetings (Minutes March-August, 
1947, Manmath Nath Das, P a r t i t i o n and Independence of 
India t Inside Story of the Mountbatten Days, 
(New Delhi, 1982), 
49. The Tribune (Lahore), March 14, 1947 (Gandhi's 
Speech on March 13, 1947, 
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Haul ana Azad was i n v i t e d by t h e Viceroy t o meet 
him on March 27, 1947, Azad expressed hope t h a t t h e r e 
was s t i l l p o s s i b i l i t y of a Uni ted I n d i a under t h e Cabine t 
Mission Plan and r e q u e s t e d t h e Viceroy t o d e f l a t e J lnnah 
" p a r t l y by f l a t t e r i n g him and p a r t l y because he r e a l l y 
50 
has no th ing t o s tand o n , " 
Mountbatten had met P a t e l on March 25 , 1947 who 
t a l k e d on l i n e s of h i s March 9 speech in which he s a i d 
t h a t power should be t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e C e n t r a l Government 
"as i t then s t o o d , " and i f t h e r e was t o be any c o n f l i c t 
51 
in t h e Cabinet t h e ma jo r i t y would r u l e , and a l s o r e i t e r a -
ted Nehru ' s v iews , Mountbatten had a l r e a d y heared about 
Gandhi ' s Patna speech d e l i v e r e d on Match 13 , 1947, in 
which he had opposed t h e p a r t i t i o n of I n d i a . When "^andhi 
reached De lh i , on March 31 , Azad met him, Gandhi f o r c e -
fxilly s a i d t h a t the p a r t i t i o n would be over h i s dead body. 
So long as he was a l i v e , he would never agree t o t h e p a r -
52 
t i t i o n of I n d i a . After the V i c e r o y ' s mee t ing , P a t e l met 
Gandhi and they t a l k e d for two h o u r s . La t e r , when Azad 
50, Mountbatten 191, I n t e rv i ew No.14, Azad, March 27, 
1947, See N.Mansergh, Trans fe r of Power, Vol.X, 
o p . c i t . , p . 34, 
5 1 , N.Mansergh, T rans fe r of Power, Vol.X, o p . c i t . , p p . 7 1 6 - 1 7 , 
52, A^K.Azad, op.cit^, pp, J86-87 , 
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met Gandhiji he fcxind that Gandhiji had changed his view 
53 
and supported Patel's opinion that partition was inevi-
table. Earlier Patel, addressing a public meeting in 
Lucknow, had said, "The earth may split and the heavens 
54 
may fall, but India will not be divided." But now he had 
changed his arguments. Thus, the opinion of the Congress 
leaders was fast changing and wide rift had come up bet-
ween the Congress ranks, Mountbatten concluded that par-
tition had become inevitable as the Congress and the 
Mu«lim League both argued for the same, 
Mountbatten met Gandhljl »t five separate meetings 
from March 31 to April 4, 1947, During discussion, 
Gandhiji pror.»osed that Jinnah should be asked to form a 
Cabinet and if he accepted--(his offer, he should be ass-
ured of Congress cooperation so long as his all measures 
were In the Interests of the Indian people with Mountbatten 
as a sole referee. He suggested that no National Guards 
were to be there, not even private army and Jinnah would 
be free to present for acceptance a scheme of Pakistan, 
even before the transfer of power, 
Mountbatten on April 2, suggested Gandhiji the 
transfer of power "to the areas in accordance with the 
53. Ibid, 
54, D.C.Gupta* op,cit,, p, 267. 
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wishes of the majority of the residents in those areas.* 
"Broadly speaking this could make a Hindu India with a 
Congress Government in India, a truncated Pakistan, and 
the large states like Mysore, Travancore, Kashmir, 
Hyderabad and groups of States, each having separate 
power turned over to them, owing allegiance to a Central 
authority for Defence, External Affairs, Communications, 
55 
and possibly food." Gandhijl was convinced, but he per-
sisted that whatever decision be taken should be implemen-
ted as early as possible. The Vlcerdy informed Azad 
accordingly. Azad felt the greatest shock of his life. 
However, he met Gandhi on April 2, and was surprised and 
grieved that Gandhi "began to repeat the arguments which 
Sardar Pat«l had already used. Azad writes that he pleaded 
with Qandhtji for over two hours "but could make no imp-
56 
ression on him," 
The withdrawal of the British was to give the 
problem of Defence. Since partition of India into Pakis-
tan and Hindustan was possible only if law and order and 
defence arrangement was ensured in both the regions, the 
55, U,N.Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, op.cit.. Interview 
NO,23, Vide Viceroy's Discussion with Gandhi, April 
2, 1947. 
56, A.K.A^ad, op.cit., pp. 186-87. 
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question of division of army became an important problem. 
Therefore, considering the defence implications, the 
Chiefs of ^.aff (India) at a meeting on April 1, 1947, 
resolved that expenditure on the aaintenance of two 
separate defence forces for Hindustan and Pakistan would 
increase since "the administrative overheads must be dup-
57 
licated and there is no flexibility." The important prob-
lem Was that in that case "it will be impossible for 
Pakistan to maintain defence forces of the proper size" 
and "it will be impossible to find the necessary officers 
and technicians for many years" and it will not be possi-
ble for India to afford the "duplicate administrative lay-
58 
out." Therefore, it was considered that "the proposal to 
have separate defence forces for Pakistan and Hindustan 
was economically wasteful and quite impracticable, since 
Pakistan was in fact quite incapable of maintaining the 
59 
forces required. This problem was also being considered 
by the Muslim League, the Congress and the Viceroy as a 
major step before partition of the country. The Muslim 
League claimed that the Defence Forces should be divided. 
57. L.A. Sherwani (ed.) op.clt., pp. 220-221. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Ibid. 
- 24 0 -
Jinnah in a statement said "The t rans fe r of power to 
Pakistan and Hindustan Governments must mean d iv is ion 
of the defence as a s ine qua non of such a t r ans fe r and 
the defence forces should be completely divided . . . and 
the s t a t e s of Pakistan and Hindustan should be made abso-
lu t e ly free, independent and sovereign. This i s a c lea r 
cut road and the only p r a c t i c a l solut ion of I n d i a ' s cons-
60 
t i t u t i o n a l problem." 
Mountbatten inv i ted Liaquat Ali Khan to meet him 
on April 3, 1947. The Viceroy charged t h a t the Muslim 
League was responsible for a l l the dis turbances in 
several provinces in order to advance t he i r demand for 
E^kistan and s trongly said tha t "they should e i t h e r resign 
or re f ra in from taking any ac t ive par t in the Committee 
of Action." The Viceroy asked whether the League would 
agree t o the Cabinet Mission Plan if the Congress would 
accept i t . Liaquat Ali Khan's reply was in negat ive be-
cause of the lack of the s p i r i t of compromise with the 
61 
Congress. 
Liaquat Ali Khan explained t h a t the re was no 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the establishment of a un i t a ry government 
60. The Indian Annual Regis ter , January-June, 1947, 
Voi . I , p.247. 
61, Mountbatten, 191, Interview No.26, Liaquat Ali Khan 
April 3,1947, See N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, 
Vol.X, o p . c i t . , pp. 101-02. 
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under the Cabinet Mission Plan, but regarding transfer 
of power, he gave such a statement, which later made 
Jinnah to accepts a truncated Pakistan. Discussion with 
Llaquat All Khan also revealed to Mountbatten that the 
Muslim League would accept even the smaller size of 
Pakistan rather than comprising of six provinces and 
62 
Calcutta. If Jinnah was interviewed first, he certainly 
had demanded the larger Pakistan and Liaquat Ali Khan 
had to follow suit. 
Mountbatten informed Lord Listowel, the Secretary 
of State for India about the Indian situation, who cau-
tioned him that he had to face the toughest Jinnah "whose 
Pakistan Day message suggests that even in the new cir-
cumstances he does not contemplate a conciliatory move, 
63 
at any rate in the first instance." Agreeing on some 
points he wrote to the Viceroy that: 
"...in spite of its grave practical difficulties 
and dangers, the partition of the Punjab to such 
degree and in such form as will satisfy the rival 
nationalisms in the Province is really unavoidable 
62. Ibid. 
63. Ibid, 
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from the p o l i t i c a l point of view of the t r ans fe r 
of au thor i ty in June, 1948, If, however, we were 
to go for P a r t i t i o n in the Punjab, we should, I 
think, have to go for i t also in Bengal for broadly 
s imilar reasons ." 
Nehru had bad t a s t e s during the Interim Government 
formed by him. He was qu i t* sure to become Prime Minister 
65 
of Independent India, Hence, h« was shocked to know 
that Gandhijl offered the Prime Minis tership to J innah. 
Nehru c r i t i c i s e d tha t s ince Gandhijl was out of Delhi for 
four months, he did not know the present events at the 
66 
Centre. Nehru and Patel did t h e i r best t o sa t i s fy Gandhijl 
tha t p a r t i t i o n was necessary. As Gandhijl did not agree 
to t h e i r views, Nehru and Patel began to i s o l a t e him from 
the Congress Po l i c i e s , Had Gandhi's proposal was conveyed 
to Jinnah, I t was qu i t e poss ible t h a t i t had some effect 
on Jinnah^s ego and p a r t i t i o n was any how avoided. However, 
Nehru during the course of discussion to ld to the Viceroy 
67 
tha t Gandhij l ' s offer was "qui te imprac t icab le . " 
64. Mountbatten 176, Secretary of S ta te to Mountbatten, 
April 3, 1947, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, 
o p . c i t . , p.105, "" 
65, Stanley Wolpert, Jirinah of Pakis tan, o p . c i t , , p . 316, 
66, Record of Mountbatten-Nehru Interview, April 1, 1947, 
N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, o p , c i t . , p . 7 0 . 
67. Stanley Wolpert, Jlnnahs of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p . 3 1 7 . 
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After talking with the Congress leaders and Liaquat 
All Khan, the Viceroy was fully convinced that the Cabi-
net Mission Plan had totally died and partition of India 
was the only problem before him. The Viceroy realised 
that if Pakistan was created in the East and the West, as 
demanded by Jlnnah, it would be a 'truncated Pakistan* 
while India still would remain a big dominion, which 
could, sooner or later, absorb the Muslim Indian States 
or they would Join India willingly or unwillingly owing 
to their geographical situations. Then he had only to 
break the hard nut, Jinnah, to come to a definite conclu-
sion regarding partition. Mountbatten prepared a list 
of 'Awkward Questions to Ask Jinnah', which included, among 
others, as to how Jinnah would justify "the claim to the 
thirteen districts in the Punjab and the eight districts 
(Including Calcutta) of Bengal which did not have a Muslim 
68 
majority", and how he would organise defence of Pakistan 
in view of strained resources and whether he would like 
69 
to have a defensive alliance with Hindustan. Further, the 
Viceroy, as expressed by Nehru on March 24, thought that 
Jinnah would come down to a settlement for immediate 
transfer of power in view of the inflexibility of the 
68, Ayesha Jalal, op.cit., pp. 250-51. 
69. N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, op.cit.. 
Document No.64', pp. 100-1. 
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time-limit by June 1948,- If Jinnah persisted for Pakistan, 
it Was a truncated Pakistan and the army was necessarily 
to 'be divided.* If army was not to be divided, then 
India had to remain united, which was impossible in those 
circumstances. But abolishing the centre meant, cutting 
up the army and delaying the British withdrawal beyond 
June, 1948, which Mountbatten did not like because it would 
manifest "the thankless role of an umpire powerless to 
70 
endorse the rviles," Moreover, he wanted to evolve a 
71 
mechanism to avoid bloodshed after Independence and left 
no stone unturned to make it clear that the only solution 
of India's problem was a "surgical operation" of India, 
Mountbatten invited Jinnah on April 6, and his 
siSter« Fatima, to dine with him. They had 
their food till late in the night. During this Jinnah 
gave a fearful account of Congress atrocities on Muslims 
and told the Viceroy of his own fear that Congress could 
72 
do anything to "deprive" him of Pakistan, He said the 
only way left for the Muslim League was to get Pakistan 
70, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Viceroy's Staff Meet-
ing, April 5, 1947, p. 128, 
71, Mountbatten's Interview with Liaquat All Khan, 
March 24, 1947, Ibid., p. 14. 
72, Alan Campbell Johnson, op.cit,, p, 56, 
- 245 -
by force, that is, by direct action which involved 
•violence' and 'riots' to prove the reality of his "Two 
Nation Theory." In spite of these arguments, the Viceroy 
stuck to his proposal of a unified India, which made 
Jinnah to realise that all things would not go as he 
liked and he was unable to influence the Viceroy. 
Mountbatten and Jinnah met again in the afternoon 
of April 7, while the Viceroy, tried by every means to 
get Jinnah agreed to the Cabinet Mission Plan and enter 
73 74 
the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly, he remained adamant, and s a i d : 
••That was i m p o s s i b l e , i t was q u i t e v a l u e l e s s 
e n t e r i n g t h e C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly o r t r y i n g 
t o go back to the Cabine t Mission Plan s i n c e 
t h e whole of t h a t p l an was c o - o p e r a t i o n and 
mutual t r u s t . Now a yea r l a t e r , t h e a tmos-
phere , f a r from improving, had t aken a s e r i o u s 
tu rn for t h e worse and i t was c l e a r t h a t Cong-
r e s s had no i n t e n t i o n of a ccep t i ng e i t h e r 
75 the s p i r i t or t h e l e t t e r of t h a t p l a n . " 
However, J i n n a h ' s demand t h a t power should be 
handed over as soon as p o s s i b l e " p r e f e r a b l y Prov ince by 
7 3 . Record of I n t e r v i e w * , Apr i l 7 ,1947, N.Mansergh, 
Trans fe r of Power, Vol.X, o p . c i t . , p . 1 4 9 . 
74. S tan ley Wolpert , J innah of PakislLan, o p . c i t . , p . 318. 
7 5 . I b i d . , p . 318. 
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Province, and let the Provinces themselves choose how they 
76 
formed Into groups" was not realistic and it was a pro-
grafwne of Balkanization of India which could never have 
been beneficial for the people of the provinces. Secondly, 
there were large number of Hindu majority states encircling 
the Muslim majority states in the South, such as Nizam of 
Hyderabad, in the North, Rampur, and in the Central India, 
Bhopal. In these three provinces, the majority of inhabi-
tants were non-Muslims. The ruler of Kashmir was a Hindu 
and the majority of tjhe popuJatlon was that of Muslims. 
However, In the East, East Bengal and Sylhet, the Muslim 
majority areas, and In the West, West Punjab, Slnd, Balu-
chistan and NWFP could join to form Pakistan. Jinnah 
wanted to create Pakistan In the heart of India, which 
could never be agreed upon by the Congress. The Viceroy 
Was also convinced that it could be the cause of perpe-
tual conflict ending in the merger of Hyderabad, Rampur 
and Bhopal into India vanishing Jinnah's dream of a larger 
Pakistan, 
Jinnah forgot the Congress claim that Punjab and 
Bengal should be partitioned due to majority of Hindus 
76. Manmath Nath Das, op.clt., p. 83. 
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in East Punjab and West Bengal and that it wculd be 
injustice to leave the Hindus on the mercy of the Muslims 
of Pakistan, to which the Congress would never agree, 
Jinnah could not calculate the depth of the intense situa-
tion going against him and thought the Congress claim as 
"bluff" to frighten him in order to force him accept the 
Cabinet Mission Plan. As the matter could not be settled, 
Jinnah^ as a sole spokeman of Muslim India# demanded a 
settlement by a British award, provided 'Pakistan* was 
accepted in principle with the right to maintain its 
separate army. On the question of 'Defence', Jinnah said 
that "he had come to the conclusion that the Defence 
forces must be separated and that Pakistan and Hindustan 
must be responsible separately for their own defence. On 
no other basis would it be possible to have any form of 
77 
central organisation on terms of parity." Liaquat Ali Khan 
also informed Moun-tbatten on April 7, 1947, that a Pakistan 
78 
without an army would collapse like a 'house of cards,' 
Jinnah as a shrewed politician knew that it would be impo-
ssible for the Viceroy to divide the army and partition 
77, Record of Mountbatten's Interview with Jinnah, April 
7, 1947, N, Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, 
op,cit., p, 149, 
78, Ibid., p, 152, 
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of India before June 1948, and, thus, a permanent settle-
ment would be delayed and the Viceroy's Mission would be 
unsuccessful. But the Viceroy had plenipotentiary powers 
and was determined to transfer power by that time. Mount-
batten, as a man of great wisdom, felt the inncer motive 
of Jinnah, Therefore, the Viceroy made it clear that it 
would be impossible to cut the army into half by June, 
1948, and the time table could not be delayed. This came 
79 
to Jinnah as a "shocX.** Jinnah asked as to how they would 
l i ke to propJ^e the terms for leaving India by June, 1948, 
Whether they intend to leave India turning the "country 
80 
over to chaos and bloodshed and c i v i l war?" Mountbatten 
warned t h a t the Muslim League had e i t h e r t o accept the 
Mission's ,ciproposals or to take i t s ' Pak i s t an ' carved out 
of India by p a r t i t i o n i n g Punjab and Bengal. 
Mountbatten to ld Jinnah that he had decided t o 
recommend to the Br i t i sh Government how best t he power 
could be t ransfer red to the Indians a f t e r hearing the 
views of a l l major p a r t i e s and tha t he would not wait for 
the p a r t i e s t o reach an "agreement" in view of the date 
79, Ayesha J a l a l , o p . c i t . , p . 250, 
80, Record of Mountbatten's Interview with J innah,Apri l 
7, 1947, N.Manser^, Transfer of Power, Vol,X, 
o p , c i t , , p . 150, 
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already s e t . Jlnnah became anxious as he had agreed to 
abide by the decision of the Viceroy and he had no power 
of ve to . Seeing Jinnah thoughtful , the Viceroy imagined 
the f a l l of the Muslim leader in to h i s own net of e a r l i e r 
arguments. To bring him to the most d e l i c a t e problem, the 
Viceroy as^ced Jinnah as to what was h i s solut ion i f he was 
in h i s (Viceroy's) p lace . Jinnah immediately said that 
hje would have accepted the demand for Pakistan and the 
s p l i t t i n g of the Defence Forces. Acceptance of Pakistan 
meant 'partition of India' and s p l i t t i n g of 'Defence Forces ' 
meant ' c r ea t ion of two powers ' , tha t i s , India and Pakistan. 
Thereafter , Mountbatten asked Jinnah to put forward h i s 
arguments for p a r t i t i o n . Jinnah r e i t e r a t e d the two-nation 
theory, which implied tha t the Muslim jfiajority areas would 
l ike t o join Pakistan and the Hindu majority areas would 
l ike to join Hindustan and i t was qu i t e i n j u s t i c e to put 
the Muslim majority areas a t the mercy of Hindustan and 
v ice-versa . On t h i s Mountbatten pointed out t h a t h i s 
remarks "applied also to the p a r t i t i o n of the Punjab and 
%ngal , and t h a t by sheer logic if I accepted h i s (J innah's) 
arguments in the case of India as a whole, I had also to 
81 
apply them in the case of these two provinces ." Thus, the 
81 . Record of Mountbatten's interview with Jinnah, April 
8, 1947, N. Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, 
o p . c i t . , p . 159, 
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Viceroy offered only a "'moth eaten Pakistan." Jinnah 
became very upset, dismayed and distressed, because by 
partitioning these two provinces he could not be in a 
stronger position to bargain with Hindustan. Appalled by 
the Viceroy's firm determination, Jinnah begged the Viceroy 
"not to destroy the unity of Bengal and the Punjab, which 
had national characteristics in common; common history, 
common ways of life; and where the Hindus have stronger 
feelings as Bengalis or Punjabis than they have as members 
82 
of the Congress," Mountbatten put the second pressure on 
Jinnah by insisting that "what was good for the Muslims 
83 
was good also for other communities." Jinnah still did not 
believe that the two provinces would really -be partitioned. 
Therefore, he said: "this demand for partitioning the 
Punjab and Bengal was a bluff on the part of Congress to 
try and frighten him off Pakistan. He was not to be ftigh--
84 
tened off so easily." in a statement Jinnah said "The 
Hindus have their homelands .,, consisting of six vast 
provinces purely because a portion of the minorities in 
the Pakistan provinces have taken up this attitude, the 
82. Ibid. 
83 . Ayesha J a l a l , o p . c i t . , p . 252. 
84. Mountbatten 191, I n t e r v i e w No.41, Apr i l 8,1947; See 
a l s o N. Mansergh, T rans f e r of Power, Vol.X, o p . c i t , , 
pp . 159-60; See a l s o H.V. Hodson, o p . c i t . , p . 2 2 7 . 
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British Government should not now continence it because 
85 
the result of that will be logically, that all other 
provinces will have to be cut up in a similar way, which 
will be dangerous....* 
Jinnah met Mountbatten again and appealed to the 
Viceroy not to give him a "moth eaten" and "truncated 
86 
Pakistan." But the Viceroy was adamant and replied: 
"I simply could not visualise being so incon-
sistent as to agree to the partition of India 
without also agreeing to partition with in g^  
any provinces in which the same problem arose." 
However, though Jinnah*s high hopes of a grand 
Pakistan were razed to the ground and he was feeling 
secluded. He, being a man of great courage and ambition, 
wanted to be successful in achieving Pakistan in any way. 
April 10 was an important landmark in the history 
of partition of India when Mountbatten and Jinnah discu-
ssed for three hours on the future destiny of the countiry. 
Jinnah demanded 'viable* Pakistan. The Viceroy said that 
85. T^ ff ^nawA ^qi^^^i;, v o i . i , pp. 246,47. 
86. Mountbatten 191, In t e rv i ew No.42, J i n n a h , Apr i l 9, 
1947, N.Mensergh, T r a n s f e r of Power, Vol.X, o p . c i t . , 
p . 163. 
87 . I b i d . 
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he was bound to work on p r inc ip les and tha t he would l i ke 
to discuss only on the l i m i t a t i o n s of Pakistan, which 
would be "a s t a t e containing Sind, half of the Pxinjab, 
and probably the North-West Front ier Province in one 
88 
group, and part of Bengal in an other group." 
Since the adoption of Lahore Resolution in 1940, 
the Muslim League and Jinnah were demanding Muslim r igh t 
to se l f -de terminat ion . In view of t h i s , the ' r i g h t t o 
se l f -de terminat ion ' could not be denied to the subs tan t i a l 
non-Muslim minor i t ies l i v i n g in contiguous d i s t r i c t s in 
the Punjab and Bengal* Jinnah threatened to demand a par-
t i t i o n of Assam i f the Congress i n s i s t e d on the p a r t i t i o n 
of the Punjab and Bengal. Mountbatten said tha t the League's 
claim on Assam would be considered on the same meri ts as 
89 
Congress's claims on pa r t s of the Punjab and Bengal. Jinnah 
knew t h a t in Assam, Sylhet was the only Muslim majority 
s t a t e , which, if included in Pakistan, would s t i l l make 
a 'moth-eaten Pakistan*« As he wanted a l a rge r and s t ron-
ger Pakistan, he r e t o r t e d on a d i f fe ren t l i n e and said tha t 
88. Mountbatten, 191, Interview No.46, J innah, April 10, 
1947. I b i d . , p.186. 
89. Mountbatten's Interview with J innah, April 10,1947, 
N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.x, o p . c l t . , 
pp. 186-87. 
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to avoid partition of India power should be transferred 
90 
to the provinces. Ayesha Jalal saysi "This was a line 
which fitted in well with the interests of his consti-
tuents in the Muslim provinces, but hl«''« weakness relative 
91 
to them had made him nervous of pushing it." However, 
Jinnah demanded that, after transfer of power, the pro-
vinces would then decide as to what groups they should 
join-whether Hindustan or Pakistan Constituent Assemblies. 
If Mountbatten had accepted this demand, the partition of 
India could have been avoided. Further, it was likely 
that the Indian states could have joined the Indian consti-
tuent due to encircled by the Indian territories. However, 
the remote areas in the East and West could have formed a 
strong independent and autonomous body to meet the Congress 
challenges at the weak Centre. There was also a possibi-
lity that the Muslim rfiajority states also joined India in 
future to form a stronger and larger India with a perpetual 
policy of keeping peace, friendship and cooperation between 
the Hindus and the Muslims. Thus the continued riots and 
bloodshed could have been avoided. Truly, by his proposal, 
Jinnah wanted to avoid the partition of the Punjab and 
Bengal, but Mountbatten did not like to include the Hindu 
90.Ayesha Jalal, op.cit., p. 253. 
91.Ibid. 
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majority areas in the Muslim sovereign states. Therefore, 
the Viceroy insisted that the Hindu majority areas from 
Bengal and the Punjab should be separated to meet the 
Congress demand. Whether Mountbatten be charged that 
he favoured the Congress demand as he was a close friend 
92 
of the Nehrus? If not, why Mountbatten did not pursuade 
the Congress to accept Jinnah's proposal without parti-
tioning the Punjab and Bengal. This, to some extent, 
infers that Mountbatten failed to understand the inner 
motive of Jinnah that India should not be partitioned. 
But the Viceroy's insistence made the partition of these 
two provinces inevitable which resulted also in the parti-
tion of India into Hindustan and Pakistan. 
However, on Jinnah's proposal for transfer of power 
to provinces, Mountbatten invited Jinnah to help him in 
working out the mechanics of a scheme which could ensure 
cutting out the Muslim majority districts from the Punjab 
and Bengal and transfer of Pov;er to them. Jinnah refused 
to assist and involve himself in the execution as he could 
92. Philip Ziegler, op.cit., p. 367; See also the Manches-
ter Guardian, February 25, 1947 7 Lord Ismay warned 
the British Government that Mountbatten's appointment 
would be considered a concession to the Congress 
and an affront to the Muslims; see A Campbell-Johnson, 
op.cit., p. 23; See also Leonard Mosley, p. 102. 
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be blamed and held respons ib le for the v i v i s e c t i o n of 
India , Moiintbat^en was shrewd enough t o lay t h i s respon-
s i b i l i t y on Jinnah and shirk t h i s prosecut ion from h i s 
own shoulders . Jinnah p l a i n l y sa id tha t he did not want 
v i v i s e c t i o n of India and p a r t i t i o n of the Punjab and Bengal 
but t rans fer of power t o undivided provinces . Jinnah 
asked the Viceroy t o see the Congress proposals regarding 
the p a r t i t i o n i n g of the Punjab and Bengal. By saying so 
h* aimed t o lay the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of p a r t i t i o n i n g of the 
two provinces on the Congress. Jinnah« requested the 
Viceroy "not t o s p e l l out the procedure t o be adopted in 
93 
determining the w i l l of the prov inces ," but the Viceroy 
warned that the Quaid-i-Azam was in danger of throwing 
away the "substance for the shadow*** g e t t i n g "an almost 
unworkable truncated Pakistan which would s t i l l be ob l iged 
to share a common organizat ion at the Centre t o arrange 
94 
o v e r a l l defence .* This comment of the Viceroy i s an ade-
quate evidence of h i s favourtlsm t o the 'Congress w i l l * for 
p a r t i t i o n i n g the Punjab and Bengal. 
93 . Record of Mountbatten's Intetrview with Jinnah, April 
10# 1947, N.Manserg^, Transfer of Power, Vol .x , mtapit 
o p . c i t . , pp. 186-87, 
94. I b i d . , p . 188, 
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Jlnnah, feeling that the Viceroy was determined to 
^he scheme of partitioning the Punjab and Bengal, demanded 
the partition of Assam also. The Viceroy agreed to this 
demand. Jinnah demanded also that without Calcutta Pakistan 
would be economically very uncertain and unworkable. The 
Viceroy agreed to It also. The Viceroy asked Jinnah as 
to why he was not prepared "to accept the Cabinet Mission 
Plan, which gave him the whole of the Punjab, the whole 
of Bengal including Calcutta and the whole of sind with 
complete autonomy ••• a really worthwhile and workable 
95 
Pakistan." The Viceroy tried to convince Jinnah that under 
the Cabinet Mission Plan, there would be a limited, weak 
and joint Centre at Delhi and he would be able to control 
Defence, Communication and External Affairs while he would 
also enjoy virtual independence in all his provinces. He 
said that he did not beli#ve in the Congress leadership 
and it would be difficult for the autonomous Pakistan 
xmder the Cabinet Mission Plan to work with such freedom 
as was held out in theory. He was afraid that since there 
was no constitution agreed upon by the Congress and the 
Muslim League, the Hindus being in majority in most of the 
provinces would be able to change the weak centre into a 
95, Mountbatten, 191, Interview No,46, Jinnah, April 10, 
1947. Ibid. 
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strong centre. It may be inferred from the discussion 
that Jinnah was fighting a losing battle. 
On April 11, when Mountbatten told Nehru that 
Jinnah had demanded partition of Assam also. The latter 
gave his consent forthwith as "this was a perfectly 
96 
reasonable request and cotild easily be agreed to," Like-
wise I>iaquat All Khan also statedi "I would in no circums-
tances prevent the Provinces from being partitioned if 
97 
I accepted the principle of Pakistan," He also saidi "If 
your Excellency was prepared to let the Muslim League 
h«ve only the Sind desert« I would still be prepared to 
98 
accept it," Patel still hoped that Jinnah would accept 
the Cabinet Mission Plan because the people of the Punjab 
and Bengal might revolt against partition of their pro-
99 
vinces, Azad expressed grief that Jinnah refused to 
accept the Cabinet Mission Plan which also gave him the 
right to secede from the rest of India after ten years, 
Azad felt that the truncated Pakistan would be a disaster 
for the MusBalmans, 
96, Mountbatten 191, Interview No.51, Nehru, April 11, 
1947. Ibid., p. 200. 
97. Mountbatten 191, Interview No,52, Liaquat Ali Khan 
April 11, 1947, Ibid,, p, 201. 
98, H,V, Hodson, op,cit,, p. 224, 
99. Mountbatten 191, Interview NO,55, Patel, April 12, 
1947, See N.Manseroh, Transfer of Power, Vol.x, 
o p , c l t , , pp, 213-15. 
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Mountbatten, on April 11, 1947, fully realised 
that the Congress accepted Pakistan with the partition 
of the Punjab and the Bengal, and Jinnah could be forced 
to accept the truncated Pakistan, The Viceroy needed the 
declared parties to negotiate with regard to the settle-
ment. 
Mountbatten, as he was a man of quick inference 
and Judgment, decided to take a quick decision at this 
stage. Mountbatten, to bring the Congress and the League 
leaders, the difficult contenders from "emotionalism to 
stark realism" set out alternative proposals with hard 
terms, that is, either a Balkan Plan - a transfer of 
power to provinees seferely to decide their future or 
divide the Punjab and Bengal creating a truncated Pakistan, 
The events in India and the question of permanent 
settlement were thoroughly thrashed out at the Staff 
Meeting held on AprJJ. H, 1947, while Mountbatten conceded 
that "there was no possibility of shifting Jinnah from 
his position, and that without his agreement unity could 
100 
only be imposed on India by force of airms," Mountbatten 
100. Philip, Ziegler, op.cit,, pp. 373-74, 
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discovered this reality quickly and that the solution 
was imposed on him. However, he reluctantly accepted 
the partition of India. The Staff Meeting recorded that 
the Viceroy said* 
"•.•he Wanted a most careful preamble to be 
written making it clear that his view had all 
along been completely Impartial; that it was 
only when it became apparent that the retention 
of any form of a united India would start civil 
war that he had regretfully been obliged to 
giva up this idea; and that he had therefore 
chosen a means which gave the choice of their 
future, as well as the somewhat primitive de-
mocratic machinery could allow, to the Indian 
people themselves."101 
Mountbatten devised a plan as follows* 
"the members of the Legislative Assemblies of 
Bengal and the Punjab should meet separately in 
two parts i.e. representatives of the predomi-
nantly Muslim areas, and representatives of the 
predominantly non-Muslim areas; and if both 
sections of each of these Assemblies voted for 
partition, then that province would be parti-
tioned. Under the plan, in the event of the 
partition of Bengal, the predominantly Muslim 
101. Viceroy's staff Meeting, April 11,1947, N.Mansergh 
Transfer of Power, Vol.X, op.cit., p. 192. 
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d i s t r i c t of Sylhet in Assam would have the 
102 
op t ion of j o i n i n g t h e Muslim p r o v i n c e . " 
By mid of A p r i l , t h e Viceroy was su re t h a t p a r t i -
t i o n was I n e v i t a b l e but i t was not c l e a r as t o what 
would be t h e form and how i t would be ach ieved . Before 
h i s a r r i v a l , t h e Indian l e a d e r s except Gandhi j i and Azad, 
had a l r e a d y decided for i t . Two weeks be fore t h e V i c e r o y ' s 
a r r i v a l * t h e Congress Working Committee had approved a 
103 
r e s o l u t i o n which envisaged t h e d i v i s i o n of t h e Punjab, 
Nehru t o l d Michael l e c h e r t h a t " p a r t i t i o n had become i n -
104 
e v l t a b l e a year before i t happened." J i n n a h was mouthing 
t h e s en t imen t s about Ind ian u n i t y , b u t , in f a c t , t h e cause 
was l o s t . The Viceroy asked Isroay to p r e p a r e a p lan fo r 
t h e p a r t i t i o n of I n d i a , which could be a c c e p t a b l e in p r a c -
t i c e t o everyone concerned . 
AS d i r e c t e d by t h e Viceroy , on Apr i l 1 1 , 1947, 
Ismay drew up an o u t l i n e fo r t h e t r a n s f e r of power, t h e 
102. Wall Kh«n, F a c t s a r e Pac t a t The Untold s t o r y of 
I n d i a ' s P a r t i t i o n (New De lh i . 1987) , p . 116. 
103. D.V.Tahmankar, Sardar P a t e l (London,1970), p . 2 0 7 , 
104. Michael Brecher, o p . c l t . , p . 3 7 5 . 
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main features of which "was the dimension of authori ty 
t o the provinees# or t o such confederat ions of provinces 
as might decide t o group themselves in the intervening 
105 
period before the actual t rans fer of power," Ismay sent 
the draf t t o V.p,Menon, an agent and mouthpiece of Nehru, 
for h i s amendments and working out a rough t i m e - t a b l e , 
Menon, carrying out the order, appended h i s own opinion 
106 
that the plan was "a bad one and c e r t a i n l y would not work.** 
The f in i shed plan was placed before the Governor's Con-
ference c a l l e d by Mountbatten on April 15-16, 1947, t o 
d i s c u s s the matter of the t r a n s f e r of power to the Indian 
l e a d e r s . 
A day before the Governor's Conference the Punjab 
Governor Sir Even Jenkins met Ismay, M i e v i l l e , Weightman 
and Abell 4nd expressed t h a t the p a r t i t i o n of Punjab would 
107 
mean an 'immediate blow up" and would be disastrous to the 
108 
province, involving a huge military operation. The Governor 
of Bengal* Sir Frederick Burrows, said that partition of 
105, Ishtiaq Husaln Qureshl, op.cit., p. 291, 
106, Ibid. 
107, V.P.Menon, op.cit,, p. 354, 
108, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power,Vol.X,op,clt,,pp.231-33, 
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the province "would reduce Eastern Bengal to a 'rural 
109 
slum*,* Mountbatten became more determined to implement 
his plan although the Governor were against the partition. 
On the other hand, "The greater the Insistence by Jinnah 
on his province-wise Pakistan, the stronger was the Cong-
ress demand that he should not be allowed to carry unwill-
110 
ing minorities with him." On April 17, the Viceroy wrote 
to the Secretary of State that a "partition is probably 
111 
inevitable." He continued* 
"This opens a new vista, since now we could go 
ahead giving Mr. Jinnah his truncated Pakistan 
whilst keeping a strong Centre for the rest of 
India at Delhi; all this on the assumption that 
the N.W.P.P. remains a Congress Government and 
that the Muslim League will not want the expense 
of trying to run a Province which needs 3 - ^ 
crores spent on it over and above its income 
(mostly for the tribes) and that Suhrawardy will 
not agree to the partition of Bengal and will 
throw in his lot with Congress," 
109. V.P.Menon, op.cit,, p. 354. 
110. Ibid. 
Ill, Mountbatten 120, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 
April 17, 1947. See N.Manser^, Transfer of Power 
Vol.X, op.cit., p. 294. 
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Jinnah, disagreeing with the Viceroy's proposal, 
112 
Said* "this i s your scheme not mine." 
All t h i s Was worrying Liaguat Ali Khan, who demanded 
an acceptable s o l u t i o n , and requested the Viceroy to use 
h i s in f luence t o bring considerable pressure on the two 
p a r t i e s t o agree to a plan produced by him in order t o get 
113 
them out of t h e i r 'present impasse . ' When the Viceroy 
suggested to modify the "Mission's plan t o al low for a 
centra l defence authority which would be supported by t a x -
ing the various groups according t o t h e i r populat ions and 
the s i z e of the armies they required" Liaquat Al i Khan 
jumped with joy thinking that the plan would al low a l s o 
a l l the Indian s t a t e s to remain within the Comijonwealth 
for a period of f i v e years . He completely supported the 
proposal in view of Lee^gue's 'j^iobia* against the word 
'Cabinet Mission.* Ayesha J a l a l says that the League a l so 
feared that "the Congress could e a s i l y deploy i t s numeri-
ca l s trength to frame a c o n s t i t u t i o n providing for a slc^ 
strong Central Government. Without par i ty for the League 
112. Viceroy's Report No.3 , April 17, 1947, N.Mansergh, 
Transfer of Power, Vo l .x , o p . c i t . , p . 2 9 9 . 
113. Mountbatten'8 interview with Liaquat Al i Khan 
April 19, 1947, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, 
o p . c l t . , pp. 331-33. 
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in the Central Government constitutional safeguards were 
simply promises on paper. There womld be nothing to 
prevent the centre from interferring in the Muslim provin-
ces; the Congress might use the Indian army to discipline 
the Muslim provinces, and, worse still, sqeMce their 
114 
domestic econonaies to raise finances to run the centre." 
Observing the emotions of Liaquat Ali Khan, the Viceroy 
assessed that Liaquat Ali Khan would be helpful in find-
115 
ing "a more reasonable solution than this mad Pakistan.*• 
The situation in the NWPP by that time had comple-
tely changed against the Congress. Therefore, the Viceroy 
decided that the will of the people should be respected. 
To solve the problem, he also decided to hold a referendum 
instead of elections, but the Congress believed that the 
party would be in the loss of province. 
However, Nehru "accepted the referendum without 
116 
much demur," He demanded that Caroe, the Governor of 
NWPP, must go and he went, Mountbatten said that if Caroe 
was present, "it would have been impossible to carry through 
114. Ayesha Jalal, op.cit., p. 258, f.n.4l. 
115. Mountbatten*s Interview with Liaquat Ali Khan, 
April 19,1947, N.Mansergh, Transfer, of Power, Vol.X, 
pp. 331-33, 
116. Philip Ziegler, op.cit., p. 377. 
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117 
the referendum,•• As the v iceroy intervened, an order 
was i s sued t o r e l e a s e the League pr i soners , but, backed 
by Jinnah, they refused t o accept freedom. After Mount-
b a t t e n ' s departure from the province, the Muslim League 
s t a r t e d i t s a g i t a t i o n of c i v i l d isobedience again with 
such a f e r o c i t y that the Viceroy f e l t that i f power would 
not be transferred soon, there would be no author i ty t o 
whom power could be trans ferred . All t h i s compelled 
Nehru t o dec lare: 
"The Muslim League can have Pakistan, i f they wish 
to have i t , but on the condi t ion that they do not take 
away other parts of India which do not wish t o Join 
118 
Pakistan." 
Nehru c a t e g o r i c a l l y t o l d the Viceroy that "there 
was no quest ion of the High Command accept ing a centre 
where Congress woxild share power with the League on the 
b a s i s of e^iuality between the "two and that Congress would 
not share power at a l l . Nehru a l so sa id that the Congress 
"would not t o l e r a t e *ny deal by which i t jo ined the League 
119 
and Pakistan at an a l l - I n d i a l e v e l . * Thus, d e c i s i v e 
117. Mountbatten t o Caore, June 30,1950, unpublished 
Memoir, in P h i l i p Z i e g l e r , o p . c i t . , p . 377. 
118. V.P.Menon, o p . c i t . , p . 354. 
119. Viceroy's Sixth Misc. Meeting, April 22, 1947, 
N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, op.cit.,p.364. 
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deteriQlnatlon of the Congress was ' p a r t i t i o n ' and not of 
the Viceroy* 
The urgent question before the Viceroy was how to 
grant some form of Dominion Sta tus during 1947 i f the 
Cabinet Mission Plan was not accepted. He decided tha t 
120 
the re should be some form of Pakis tan. But s ince the 
Congress did not agree to Dominion Status the Viceroy was 
unable t o recommend to His Majesty 's Government any pro-
posa l . Had the two s ides agreed to the Commonwealth pro-
posal* the p a r t i t i o n had become easy. 
On April 23, J innah, pressing h i s l a s t l ever , 
proposed the d iv is ion of army though he knew t h a t i t was 
impossible before June, 1948, He hoped tha t by t h i s delay* 
ing t a c t i c s . Congress would come t o terms and ' a l l i n t e r -
communal fee l ing would subside and Hindustan and Pakistan 
121 
would be able to come together and work out the d e t a i l s . ' 
On one hand, he wanted t o maintain a p a r i t y , and, on the 
other , he desired the I n d i a ' s array t o "march shoulder t o 
shoulder, to d i s c i p l i n e the common enemies of the Congress 
120. Viceroy's 17th Staff Meeting, April 19, 1947, 
N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, V o l . x , o p . c i t , , p . 3 3 0 . 
121, Ayesha J a l a l , o p . c i t . , p . 259. 
- 267 -
122 
and the League beyond the sub-cont inent ' s border." He 
arqued that India and Pakistan would not be able t o stand 
^ 123 
alone aga ins t a powerful aggressor . Jinnah hoped t o 
arrive at an u l t imate goal of par i ty by having par i ty over 
external defence, Jinnah a l so r e a l i s e d that In case of 
d i v i s i o n on coramxinal l i n e s , India w i l l r e t a i n a moth-eaten 
and truncated array because the Muslim regiments of the 
Punjab, which have the mainstay of India s i n c e the l a s t 
n inety years , would be separated and they would prefer to 
j o i n Pakis tan. 
On April 24, Mountbatten reported that Jinnah*• 
demand of par i ty over external a f f a i r s with common arrange-
ments with Hindustan and par i ty in terms of land and a i r 
forces had . put,Jinnah i n t o a ' r i d i c u l o u s s i t u a t i o n . 
On April 25, Pate l said to the Viceroy that the 
Congress had "reached the maximum l i m i t of t h e i r concess ions" 
and, hence, "(a) Congress would not accept any suggest ion 
for a further degree of par i ty for the present Central 
Government; (b) i f the Muslim League did not accept the 
122. Viceroy's 17th Misc. Meeting, April 23, 1947, 
N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, o p . c l t . , p . 3 8 1 , 
123. Ib id . 
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124 
Cabinet Mission's Plan, Congress desired partition." Nehru 
also declared "Our aim is to liberate as much of India 
as we can, and then to deal with the question of the 
125 
Independence for the rest:," Nehru also reiterated that 
126 
the Punjab and Bengal had no alternative save partitioh. 
At the ninth miscellaneous meeting on May 1, 1947, 
the Viceroy believed that the Cabinet Mission Plan was 
still alive, but Jinnah repeatedly stated that he did not 
accept it on the grounds that the Congress 'did not intend 
127 
to carry it out fairly,' The Viceroy stated that Jinnah 
was frightened with the prospect of a Centre permanently 
128 
dominated by the Hindus, Mountbatten and his senior 
colleagues were convinced that Jinnah'a fear had some 
129 
foxindation and it led to the rejection of the Cabinet Plan. 
Jinnah Insisted on Parity, but Patel warned the Viceroy 
th*t if he would raise the question of parity he would 
124. Mountbatten's Interview with Patel, 18th Misc. 
Meeting April 25, 1947, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power> 
Vol.X, op.cit., pp. 424-26, 
125. Ibid., p. 337. 
126. Ibid. 
127. Ayesha Jalal, op.cit., p,123. 
128. N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.x,op.clt.,P.507. 
129. Ibid., pp. 507-508. 
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have to incur the e v e r l a s t i n g enmity of Congress. He 
said that he would never agree to t h i s for which he had 
130 
been f i g h t i n g s i n c e long. Ayesha J a l a l r i g h t l y i n f e r s that 
"It was Congress that i n s i s t e d on p a r t i t i o n . I t was 
131 
Jlnnah who was against p a r t i t i o n , * Seeing a l l t h i s 
the Viceroy concluded that the Cabinet Mission Plan was 
dead and he had t o plan for the p a r t i t i o n of India . 
Jinnah r e j e c t e d the p a r t i t i o n proposal and c a l l e d 
for the t rans fer of power to the provinces aa they were 
then c o n s t i t u t e d . He urged the Viceroy "not t o f a l l i n t o 
the "trap" se t up by the Congress and "commit a grave 
132 
error ," The Viceroy was not sure whether J innah's a t t i -
tude was "due to fear of h i s own fo l lowers or merely h i s 
133 
maddening methods of bargaining," Further, Gandhi who 
130, Viceroy's Report No,5, May 1, 1947, N.Mansergh, 
Transfer of Power, Vo l ,x , o p , c i t , , p, 540, 
131, Ayesha J a l a l , o p , c l t , , p , 262, 
132, J innah's Press Statement, May 1* 1947, reproduced 
from Dawn, May 1, 1947, 
133, Viceroy's Report No,5, May 1,1947, N.Mansergh, 
Transfer of Power, V o l , x , , o p . c i t . , p. 533. 
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Was once the greates t opponent of p a r t i t i o n , had agreed 
to N^ru and Patel in proposing p a r t i t i o n provided i t 
134 
involved the p a r t i t i o n of Bengal and Punjab, Moreover 
the Congress Working Committee had a l s o " v i r t u a l l y accep-
135 
ted the o u t l i n e of the p lan." in view of the Congress 
firm determination for g e t t i n g p a r t i t i o n of the Punjab 
and Bengal, the Viceroy r e a l i s e d that Jinnah had become 
powerless to prevent p a r t i t i o n of India . 
Mountbatten wanted a formula within ten days to 
send Israay with the plan by the end of the month t o 
for 
London/acceptance by the Br i t i sh Cabinet and to c a l l a 
conference of the Indian l eaders at Simla on May 15, There 
136 
were "almost innumerable a l t e r n a t i v e drafts" and each 
formula have the same des ign , that i s , p a r t i t i o n of India 
with some form of Supreme Defence Council hoping that one 
day a federal India would emerge. Mountbatten appointed 
a conHnlttee c o n s i s t i n g of the Viceroy, Ismay, Abell and 
M i e v i l l e , for draf t ing an acceptable formula by a l l the 
134. Nehru t o Motmtbatten, May 1,1947, I b i d . , p p . 5 1 7 - 1 9 . 
135. Minutes of the Viceroy's 26th Staff Meeting, May 5, 
1947, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, o p . c i t , , 
p. 617, 
136. P h i l i p Z ieg ler , o p . c i t . , p . 378. 
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137 
parties. They adopted the following formula and sent it 
seegPtQjy to London with Ismay and Abell on May 2, 1947. 
The formula laid down that Pkklstan was inevitable. The 
division would involve district-wise partition of the 
Punjab and Bengal, and the appointment of a boundary 
commission. The formula also stated that before the divi-
sion has taken place members of the Legislative Assemblies 
of the provinces concerned should be given the opportunity 
to decide whether they would prefer to remain in the 
Indian Union or have a separate state for their areas. If 
the M.L.As. decided in favour of Partition then they 
would be asked to elect new representatives to a Consti-
tuent Assembly or Constituent Assemblies for their joint 
or separate areas on the basis of one representative for 
each million. The present Constituent Assembly for the 
Indian Union will remain intact. Only the members repre*. 
senting the partition areas would cease to be its members. 
Though the Viceroy kept the formula 'most secret', 
it was published in The Hindu, on May 2, and in The 
Hindustan Times on May 3. Since the Plan was published, 
it was commented by various newspapers and it had become 
137. Manmath Nath Das, op.clt., p. 91. 
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a matter of wide d i scuss ion in the country. On May 3 , 
the Viceroy reported t o the Secretary of S ta te : 
That the Congress had agreed for the d i v i s i o n 
of the country but the d i v i s i o n should be 
absolute and complete s i n c e that alone would 
g i v e the majority of the people of India the 
opportunity of bu i ld ing up a powerful s t a t e 
with a strong c e n t r e . The Viceroy further 
drew the a t t e n t i o n of the Secretary of State 
that there must be p a r t i t i o n of the Punjab 
and Bengal g iv ing chance t o the ncm-Muslim 
areas to jo in the Indian Union. Since v i o -
lence had become a part of p o l i t i c s Congress 
objected to i t s use , in the North-West Fron-
t i e r Province the Punjab and Assam to s e t t l e 
p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . 
The Viceroy further to ld the Secretary of S ta te that 
the Congress had no objec t ion t o a separate Const i tuent 
Assembly or Assemblies being summoned for those areas 
that choose t o stand out of the Indian Union but i t des ired 
that such areas should decide for themselves whether they 
138 
would remain independent or form union with other p a r t s . 
Mountbatten in t h i s communication to London had 
a l so urged that His Majesty's approval should be comrauni-
138. Mountbatten 114, Annex t o Minutes of Viceroy's 25th 
Staff Meeting, May 3, 1947, s ee N.Mansergh, Transfer 
of Power, Vol.X, o p . c i t . , pp. 579-85 . 
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cated to him by May 10. Meanwhile, the Viceroy planned 
to call a meeting of the Indian leaders of all the impor-
tant parties on May 17, to ascertain their views on his 
proposals, which may be considered the first stage towards 
the process of the partition scheme. 
Mountbatten's plan, which Ismay and Abell presented 
in London on May 3, provided for "partition, with Bengal 
and the Punjab having the option of being split between 
India and Pakistan, Joining in entirely with eit|?er state, 
139 
or going it alone." The plan had left the position of the 
Princely states quite obscure giving them the right to 4 
140 
decide their own future. The parliamentary draftsmen in 
London changed the Viceroy's plan to some extent. First, 
the revised plan, besides giving different parts of India 
to decide their own future, included the proposal that the 
N.W.F.P. should also be allowed to opt for Independence, 
which was opposed both by the Muslim League and the Congress, 
Prom London the Viceroy received the amended plan 
a week later and showed it to the leaders a day before 
139. Telegram of May 1, 1947, N.Mansergh, Transfer of 
Power, Vol.X, op.cit., pp. 550-53. 
140. Ibid. 
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the meeting on May 17, so that they should not get much 
time for suggesting amendments. But, having friendly terms 
with Nehru, Mountbatten gave the revised plan to Nehru 
in the night of May 10, when he was going to bed. Nehru, 
being anxious, read the plan at midnight and found it 
141 
quite unacceptable, Nehru woke up Krishna Menon and the 
two wrote a letter to Mountbatten up to 4,00 A.M, Next 
morning, the Viceroy received the letter which he referred 
as 'Nehru bombshell* in his diary. Nehru had charged 
142 
vehemently* 
•"Ihe whole approach was completely different 
from what ours had been, and the picture of 
India that emerged frightened me. In fact 
much that we had done so far was undermined 
and the Cabinet Mission's scheme and subse-
quent developments were set aside, and an 
entirely new picture presented a picture of 
fragmentation and conflict and disorder, 
and, unhappily also, of a worsening of 
relations between India and Britain." 
Nehru also observed that the proposals invited the 
Balkanisation of India* provoked certain civil conflict 
141, Philip Ziergler, op.clt., p. 379, 
142, Nehru to Mountbatten, May 11,1947, N.Menserc^, 
Transfer of Power, Vol,X, op,clt,, p. 756, 
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and 'disorder*/ and broke the Central authority which 
alone could prevent the chaos that was growing and, demo-
143 
rallslng th« army, the police, and the central services. 
Seeing Nehru's note, Mountbatten was stunned. "It was 
144 
one of the worst blow he had suffered in his life,** and 
"for a few hours he was as close to despair as he had 
145 
ever been.* Patel demanded that all power should be 
transferred to the Central Government as the London app-
roval had no force. 
Nehru hoped that Jlnnah would accept the proposal 
but, contrarlly, Jlnnah announced his disagreement to such 
*a monstrous proposal* as the one put forward by Mr.Patel 
146 
to restore peace, which was only a dream of his, 
Jlnnah demanded the partition of Indian provinces 
on the basis of population of Muslims and non-Caste Hindus 
in the Hindu majority provinces, though he knew that it 
was impossible. He raised this demand only to prevent 
143, Ibid. 
144, Philip Zlegler, op.clt., p. 380. 
145, Ibid. 
146, Mountbttten 114, Statement by Jlnnah, May 11,1947, 
See N,Manser^, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, 
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the partition of the Punjab and Bengali which, he believed, 
would be absolutely destructive and 'dangerous for the 
present but more so in the future,* 
However, referring the Congress and the League 
objections to the plan, Mountbatten immediately sent a 
telegram to the secretary of state on May 11, suggesting 
^ r "redrafting the plan." At this point, Attlee asked 
Mountbatten to fly home immediately. 
Mountbatten left for London on May 19 and he Informed 
Attlee and his Cabinet colleagues that "the Muslim League 
would resort to arms if Pakistan in some form were not 
147 
conceded." 
Jinnah demanded a 800-mile long "corridor" on May 
20 to link West and East Pakistan and wired to the Cabinet 
that • before Bengal and the Punjab were partitioned a 
referendum should be held in each province to determine 
148 
will of its people in this vital regard." The viceroy re-
149 
jected it as it could result in delay. 
147, Cabinet Minutes May 19,1947, N.Mansergh, Transfer of 
Power, Vol.X, op.cit,, p. 896. 
148, Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, op.cit.,p.325. 
149, Cabinet Minutes May 20,1947, N.Manser^, Transfer of 
Power^ Vol.X, op.cit., p. 922. 
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Mountbatten returned to India on May 31, 1947, He 
drafted a personal message to the people. On June 2, the 
Viceroy held a meeting In New Delhi with Llaquat, Nlshtar, 
Jlnnah, Patel, Kripalanl, Nehru, Baldev sin^ and gave 
150 get 
them the draft of the partition plan to/approval ^^ 
their Working Committee^ Nehru and Patel accepted the 
Plan. Jinnah refused to sign though the Muslim League 
Working Contnlttee had already authorised him to take any 
decision he would like suitable. He said that "he and 
hla Working Committee would have to go before their masters, 
151 
the people, for a final decision." Mountbatten realised 
that he was using the tactics of delaying the matter. There-
fore, he warned Jinnah that there should not be "No" from 
152 
the Muslim League. In fact, Jinnah did not like to be 
wholly responsible for the partition. On the same day, 
Jinnah met the Vlcexoy at 11,00 P.M. and about the accep-
tance of the plan, he used the word "hopeful.•* Mountbatten 
reports* "I finally asked him whether he felt I would be 
justified in advising the Prime Minister to go ahead and 
150. V.P.Menon, o p . c l t . , p. 374. 
151. Viceroy's meeting with Indian l eaders , June 2, 1947, 
Minutes, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.Xi 
(London, 1982), p . 46 . 
152. June 5, 1947, Mountbatten*s Personal Report, No,8, 
p.115, in Stanley Wolpert, o p . c l t , , p .327. 
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make the annoxinceraent, to which he r e p l i e d very f irmly, 
153 
"Yes." 
On June 3, Mountbatten called a meeting of the 
leaders and observed that there was 10056 acceptance of 
the plan. In the course of discussion, as promised,Jinnah 
noded his head and also promised to do his best to get 
154 
the plan accepted by his followers. The Viceroy declared 
that the Partition Act would be implemented not later than 
August 15, 1947. 
Immediately a f t er the morning conference on June 
3, Mountbatten communicated to the Secretary of State that 
Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh had accepted the p a r t i t i o n 
plan. In consequence, At t l ee announced the plan in the 
House of Commons <» June 3 , which came t o be known "the 
June 3rd Plan." In the evening of June 3, Mountbatten 
a l so broadcast over the Al l - Ind ia Radio. High l i c^t ing 
the cause of p a r t i t i o n , the Viceroy sa idj 
"To ray great regret i t has been impossible to 
obtain agreement e i t h e r on the Cabinet Mission 
153. I b i d . , p . 117. 
154. Viceroy's Meeting with Indian Leaders, June 3,1947, 
Minutes, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.XI, 
op.cit., pp. 72-77. 
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Plan, or any plan that would preserve the unity 
of India, But there can be no question of coer-
cing any large areas in which one community has 
a majority to live against their will under a 
Government in which another community has a 
majority. And the only alternative to coercion 
155 is partition.•• 
The Viceroy expressed gr i e f on account of the 
p a r t i t i o n and further saidx "l am, of course, j u s t as 
much opposed to the p a r t i t i o n of provinces as I am t o 
156 
the p a r t i t i o n of India h e r s e l f , * He a l s o sa id that the 
people of India should decide the quest ion of p a r t i t i o n 
themselves . He made i t c l e a r that though the people of the 
Punjab, Bengal and part of Assam would lay down the bound-
a r i e s between India and Pakistan, the u l t imate dec i s i on 
would be taken by a Boundary Commission. 
The Viceroy's speech was fol lowed by His Majesty's 
Government's Statement confirming the Plan. 
155. H.E.Lord Lou±s Mountbatten, Viceroy of India's 
Broadcast and Statement by His Majesty's Government, 
dated June 3, 1947 (Lahore,publicity Department, 
Punjab Government), pp.1-3. For June 3,1947, Plan 
see the Dawn, June 4, 1947. 
156. Ibid. 
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After the Viceroy, Nehru, Jlnnah and Bildev Singh 
broadcast their speeches. Nehru said " It must always 
be remembered that the future of India can only be decided 
by the people of India# and not by any outside authority, 
157 
however, friendly." 
Jlnnah without giving clear acceptance of the 
158 
plan* saidt *...• the plan does not meet in some important 
respects our point of view, and we cannot say or feel 
that we are satisfied or that we agree with some of 
the matters dealt with by the Plan." Jinnah also said 
that he had called the All-India Muslim League Council 
to meet on Jxme 9, and was hopeful of the acceptance of 
the Plan. He also commended Viceroy's "fairness and 
impartiality." He said that according to paragraph 11 
of the Statement, a referendum would be made to the elec-
torates of the then Legislative Assembly in the N.W.F.P, 
which weuld decide whether the province would join India 
or Pakistan. 
159 
Baldev Singh accepted the plan reluctantly. On 
June 4, Mountbatten, addressing a press conference, said 
157. Indian Annual Register, Vol,II, July-December,1947, 
p. 252, 
158. The Dawn (Delhi) June 5, 1947, 
159. V.p. Menon, op.cit., p, 380, 
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that "indepiendence through Dominion Status was complete 
and that the different administrations were at liberty to 
160 
opt out of the Commonwealth whenever they p leased ." 
Mountbatten he ld a meeting on June 5, with the 
p o l i t i c a l leaders in h i s o f f i c e , whi le Jinnah expressed 
painsthat both States would be independent and equal in 
161 
every re spec t . On the other side« the Hindu Mahasabha 
162 
resolved c a l l i n g for an a l l - I n d i a 'Ant i -Pakistan Day.' 
On June 1, the Viceroy produced a 33-page document 
e n t i t l e d : '*The Administrative Consequences of Par t i t i on" 
before the party leaders and formed a P a r t i t i o n Committee 
c o n s i s t i n g of Patel« Rajendra Prasad,LlaQuat All Khan 
and Abdur Rab Nishtar with Lord Mountbatten as the Chairman, 
On June 27, the Committee gave way to p a r t i t i o n Council . 
The A l l - I n d i a Muslim League's meeting held on 
June 9-10, 1947 in a r e s o l u t i o n sa id tha t the only so lu t ion 
of I n d i a ' s problem was t o d iv ide India in to two-Pakistan 
and Hindustan. The Council was of the opinion that a l -
though * l t cannot agree to the p a r t i t i o n of Bengal and 
160. I b i d . , p . 381, 
161. Mountbatten's Personal Report No.8, p .122 . see 
Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p .329. 
162. V,P.Menon, o p . c i t . , p . 382. 
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the Punjab, or g ive i t s consent to such p a r t i t i o n , i t has 
to consider His Majesty's plan for the t r a n s f e r of power 
as a whole. The Council authorised Jlnnah, the President 
of the ^ 1 - I n d i a Muslim League ' t o accept the fundamental 
pr inc ip l e s of the plan i s a compromise and leave i t t o him, 
with f u l l authori ty , t o work out a l l the d e t a i l s of the 
plan in an equi tab le and Just manner with regard t o carry-
ing out the complete d i v i s i o n of India on the bas i s and 
fundamental p r i n c i p l e s embodied in His Majesty's Plan i n -
163 
e luding Defence, Finance and Communication," ^ ^ ortho-
dox Mullahs, m i ^ t y landed barons and mercnat i le magnates 
cr ied out angri ly against the plan c a l l i n g i t "betrayal* 
and a "tragedy for Pakis tan." 
At the f i r s t meeting of the Interim Government on 
June 12« the Congress and the League members were almost 
to f i gh t on the quest ion of appointment of Pandit Nehru's 
s i s t e r , as an ambassador, which was opposed by the League. 
Mountbatten r e a l i s e d t h a t nature of Indians cannot be 
assessed and f e l t fear of the c o l l a p s e of h i s plan. There* 
fore he hurried to make arrangement for t r a n s f e r of power 
and t o leave India as ear ly as p o s s i b l e . A j o i n t conference 
163, The Dawn, June 4, 1947, 
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of Sikh organisations in Lahore also accepted the division 
of the Punjab on June 14, The Bengal Legislative Assembly 
and Punjab Legislative Assembly, opted partition on June 
20 and June 23 respectively. On June 26, Sind Legislative 
Assembly and Baluchistan Legislative Assembly opted to join 
Pakistan. In view of these options, Jinnah on June 27, 
reported to Mountbatten : "Thus, we can now look upcm the 
creation of Pakistan on the 15th August as legally decided 
164 
upon." 
On June 27, Mountbatten invited Jinnah, Liaquat 
Nehru, Patel and Baldev Singh to discuss this Important 
issue. Two High Court judges were chosen each by the 
Congress and the League to work as commission for parti-
tioning the Punjab and Bengal. Jinnah with the consent 
of the League suggested Sir Cyril Radcliffe to chair the 
commissions which was reluctantly accepted by the Congress. 
Radcliffe reached New Delhi on July 8. The Viceroy gave 
him five weeks to draw new national boundaries, soon 
separate committees went to work to partition the army and 
the territories, which remained for some minety years under 
the British control. 
164. Ibid. 
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Nehru had requested the Viceroy to remain on as 
the Governor-General of IndlTa* but Jinnah des ired himsel f 
t o be the Governor-General of , Pakistan on August 15, 
1947. Jinnah suspected that Mountbatten being a fr iend 
of Nehru would t r e a t Pakistan as a s t e p c h i l d . 
Jinnah assured the m i n o r i t i e s that in h i s Pakistan 
they would have "protection with regard to t h e i r r e l i g i o n , 
f a i t h , l i f e , property and c u l t u r e . They would, in a l l 
respect , be c i t i z e n s of Pakistan without any d iscr imina-
t ion . . . The same p r i n c i p l e . . . would apply t o the mino-
165 
r i t i e s in India as w e l l , " 
The Indian Independence B i l l was passed by the 
House of Commons on July 16, at i t s t h i r d reading, and 
on July 18, the Indian Independence At rece ived the Royal 
as sent . On July 19, Mountbatten announced the e s t a b l i s h -
ment of two separate provia ional governments India and 
Pakistan. A communique was i s sued confirming taking-over 
of the p o r t f o l i o s of d i f f e r e n t m i n i s t r i e s by the Congress 
and the League wings , in the Cabinet of t h e Interim 
Government of India and Pakistan r e s p e c t i v e l y , A s imi lar 
165, M.H. Shahld ( e d . ) , Quaid-i-Azaro Muhanmad All 
Jinnah, Speeches (Lahore, 1976), p. 82. 
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procedure was adopted in the Punjab and Bengal legislative 
assemblies before partitioning of these States. 
There were the following provinces in August^ 
1947, before partition of India: The strategic provinces 
were Bengal, Punjab, Sind, NWFP, Baluchistan and Sylhet. 
\3 decided by the members in the Legislative Assembly of 
Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas. East Bengal and West 
Bengal decided to join Pakistan and Hindustan respectively. 
Likewise, the members in the Legislative Assembly of 
Punjab of the Muslim maj^ ority areas and non-Muslim majority 
areas of West Punjab and Bast Punjab decided to Join 
Pakistan and Hindustan respectively, the Muhammadan and 
Indian Christian constituencies in Sylhet in Assam in a 
referendum favoured to join East Bengal (Pakistan), Sind, 
Baluchistan, and NWFP decided to join Pakistan, The other 
seven provinces, Assam, Bihar, Bombay, Central Provinces, 
Madras, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, being Hindu-majority 
provinces, decided to join India. 
The problem of accession of Princely States to India 
or Pakistan became controversial. The Viceroy, on June 
3, 1947, had announced: 
"When the British withdrew from India, para-
mountcy would lapse and the rulers of the 
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Indian states would become technically and 
legally independent; they could enter into 
any relationship with the successor govern-
ment or governments; or they could remain 
independent; and they were free to decide 
all this at their convenience,** 166 
The Congress pleaded that as 'paramountcy* 
came into existence as a fact and not by an agreement, the 
Congress had the right to rule over the princely states 
after independence and the princes would have no right 
to declare independence or to decide to accede to India 
3 67 
or Pakistan. Further, the Congress demanded that the 
people of every state should decide whether they wish to 
join India or Pakistan, while the Muslim League committed 
a grave mistake by claiming that the right to accede or 
secede to India or Pakistan should be given to the rulers, 
so that the Muslim states of Hyderabad, Bhopal and Rampur 
could join Pakistan, but it forgot that due to their geo-
graphical situation, it was impossible. 
Meanwhile, the Radcliffe's final Award was kept 
secret till the eve of the partition and declaration of 
independence. 
166. S.R, Mehrotra* op.cit., p. 247, 
167. The Leader, (Allahabad), June 16, 1947 (Nehru's 
Statement). 
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Jinnah with h i s s i s t e r l e f t for Karachi in the 
Viceroy's Dakota in the morning of August 7, They were 
welcomed by tens of thousands of admirers with the slogan 
of "Pakistan Zindabad.** The f i r s t Consti tuent Assembly 
of Pakistcui met on August 11, and unanimously e lec ted 
Jinnah to pres ide over i t s meetings. Two days a f t e r , 
Mountbatten reached Karachi and inaugurated the Dominion 
of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah was sworn-in as 
Governor-General of Pakis tan. The Viceroy flew back to 
New Delhi and inaugurated the Dominion of India on August 
15, 1947, The Radcliffe Award was given to the leaders 
of India and Pakistan on August 16, 1947, 
Chapter EIGHT 
C O N C L U S I O N 
In the preceding pages an attempt has been made 
to describe the relation between the Muslim League and 
the Indian National Congress, the two great political 
parties of the period between 1940-1947 which is a very 
crucial period in the political history of modem India, 
Their political faults and lack of adjustment ultimately 
led.to the vivisection of the country which cost tens of 
thousands of lives of the people of this continent and 
even today when more than four decades have gone by, the 
two countries are at dagger's drawn. One, not knowing 
much about Indian politics and Muslim League, takes it 
for granted that it was the Muslim communallsm that was 
opposed to a United India and the Muslim League was the 
precursor of many problems that led to the division of 
the country. 
But an objective study leads one to the conclusion 
that League from the beginning was not opposed to United 
India, neither was it founded to oppose the Congress. A 
study of its objectives reveals that it was not anti-Hindu 
since its birth. When the non-Muslim Secretary of the 
Nawab of Dacca issued a circular to the leading Muslims, 
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on behalf of the Nawab, inviting them to assemble at 
Dacca to form an anti-Hindu association, it was very 
much resented by almost every Muslim leader. It was 
suggested by them that the Muslim community needed a 
political organisation for the Indian Muslims with a 
1 
view to safeguard their political interests. It had 
nothing to do with the Hindus and the Congress. Thus 
the League was founded only to safeguard their political 
interests. The formation of the League was welcomed by 
the non-Muslim Press and save a very microscopic section, 
the Muslim move was appreciated. 
Some controversy had erupted at the grant of sepa-
rate electorate to the Muslims but sober-minded Congress 
leaders welcomed it also and Gokhale recognised the justice 
in the claim of trie Muslims for 'adequate, real and genuine 
representation in the Council through separate electorates. 
He wrote to Minto, 'My Lord, I sincerely believe that your 
Lordship and Lord Morley have saved India from drifting 
towards what cannot be described by any other name than 
1. See Mohammad Noman, op.clt., pp. 173-74; The Allqarh 
Institute Gazette, January 2,1907, Syed Sharlfuddin 
Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, Vol.1, op.cit., 
pp. 2-^, 
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chaos, Fctr, however strong a government may be, repre-
ssion never can put down the aspiratid)n of a people and 
2 
never will,' 
The Tripoli-Balkan War of 1911-12 uni ted the League 
and Congress. The Council of the All - India Muslim League 
chalked out a new policy in 1912 and the "achievement of 
self-government" was adopted as one of i t s objec t ives 
which was decidedly a departure from the current policy 
of the League and i t "marked an important s t ep in Muslim 
3 
p o l i t i c s . " Sir Ibrahim Rahimtulla who presided over the 
Muslim League session of 1913 at Agra very extensively 
deal t with the League's idea ls of 'self-government ' which 
astonished Maulana Azad who remarked tha t s ince the advent 
of Muslim p o l i t i c a l movement i t was the f i r s t speech in 
t h e i r p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e so coloured in Indian nat iona-
4 
lism. The Lucknow Pact (1916) fur ther cemented the bond 
of un i ty between the two o rgan i sa t ions . Their r e l a t i o n s 
2, Vidya i:*iar Mahajan, Some Aspects of Gokhale's Po l i t i ca l 
Thought - The Indian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science, 
July-September 1944, Vol.VI, No. l , p . 2 1 . 
3, The Times, January 1,1913, see a l so the l e t t e r of 
Mirza Salimullah Beg to the ed i to r of the Pioneer 
regarding "The Future pol icy of Mohammadans,"January 
15. 1912. 
4, The Tribune, January 1914, 
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were so cordial that the Congress Leaders attended the 
League annual session and the League leaders participated 
in the annual deliberations of the Congress, During the 
Khilafat-Non-Cooperation Movements, both the organisations 
worked amicably for the major gause of the country. This 
could have continued had not the Nehru Report annoyed 
Jinnah and ether Muslim political leaders* Jinnah wanted 
perfect safeguards for the minorities inspite of his beina 
a Congress leader which the Report failed to provide and 
5 
Jinnah withdrew himself from the Congress. Mohawnad All 
who Was once t^ p President of the Congress stepped into 
his boots on the same ground; withdrew himself from the 
Congress and this secession administered a severe blow to 
6 
the Congress. The Congress could have very easily concedec 
the Muslim demands without any loss tctits programme or 
prestige but it did not do so and thus missed many Influ-
ential Muslim leaders one after the other. During the 
Round Table Conference 1930-31 the question of minority 
was raised again and again and here aleo it failed to 
7 
reached any compromise and the deadlock continued. 
5, For Jinnah's speedh See The Times of India, December 
29,1928. 
6, For Mohammad All's speech see The Indian Daily Mall 
December 24, 1928. 
7, See Indian Round Table Conference Proceedings. 
Vol.Ill, pp. 157-166-167. 
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Then came the Act of 1935 under which e l ec t ions 
took place and both the Muslim League and the Congress 
fought for t h e i r dest iny . The Congress won the e l ec t ion 
by a thumping majority in e i c^ t out of eleven provinces. 
In the United Provinces the League won 27 s e a t s out of 64 
Muslim s e a t s . The Congress won almost a l l Hindu sea t s 
and was in a posi t ion to form a government. ^ut in view 
of the sett lement which had e a r l i e r taken place between 
the Congress and League for providing considerable sea t s 
to the Muslim League, the Congress could not f u l f i l i t s 
promise and ins tead of two sea t s in the cabinet i t proposed 
to give one on the condit ion tha t the Muslim League Par-
liamentary Board in the United Provinces would be dissolved 
I t was a high pr ice for the League and i t did not accept 
i t . . Leaguers formed the idea t h a t the Congress wanted 
to merge the League within i t s fold. 
According to Azad - "If the U.P. League's offer 
of cooperation had been accepted, the Muslim League par ty 
would for a l l p r ac t i c a l purposes have merged in the Cong-
r e s s . Jawahar la l ' s act ion gave the Muslim League in the 
U.P. a new lease of life It was from the U.P. that 
the League was reorganised, Mr, Jinnah took fu l l advantage 
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of the situation and started an offensive which ultimately 
8 
led to partition." This was Himalayan blunder. 
This view has been supported by many scholars 
also. Dr. S,P,Sen in his Dictionary of National Bioaraphie 
says: * In 1937 when the Congress was flushed with victory 
in the majority of Provinces, it was mainly because of 
Nehru that a chance of communal harmony was spoiled by 
his idealistic and doctrinarie intransigence The 
political destiny of India would have been shaped in an 
entirely different way if Nehru had shown more political 
maturity and accommodating spirit, hoping for a real 
rapproachement between the two major communities in India, 
9 
But Nehru could not rise to the occasion,' Dr, R,C,Majumdar 
has this to say in relation to the above: "To sacrifice 
collaboration with the Muslim League in the name of ideals 
which did not at all correspond with existing facts was 
an extremely unwise - almost fatal-step for which India 
had to pay very dear .,. The Muslims now realised that 
as a separate community they had no political prospects 
in future. The Congress ultimatum was the signal for the 
8, A.K.Azad, op.cit., p. 161, 
9, The Hindustan Times, May 21, 1974. 
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parting of ways, which by inevitable stages, led to the 
10 
foundation of Pakistan." 
Then came the Congress rule in eight provinces 
and the League raised much hue and cry for Hindu atroci-
ties on Muslims in their provinces. The Pirpur Committee 
Report; Fazlul Hague's Muslim Sufferings Under Congress 
Rule branded the Congress Rule as Hindu Raj and demanded 
its withdrawal. There is no doubt that in some of the 
provinces the Congress ministers did not take into account 
the Muslim grievances and it was injurious to the national 
cause. Since Hindi language was allowed an equal status 
along with the Urdu in the Congress ruled provinces,Hindus 
in vengeance Sanskritised the language throwing Urdu away. 
According to Ram Gopal "The more communal-minded among the 
protagonists satisfied their communalism by loading text-
books with biographical sketches of Hindu heroes,practical] 
ignoring Muslim heroes. The indiscretions committed at 
lower levels of the administration were capable of correc-
tion at the- '-ir.nual stock taking of administrative activi-
ties, but the Congress Governments stayed in office for 
barely two years, and had no time for correction. Two yearir 
10. The Sunday Standard, September 28, 1975, 
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11 
was too small a period for curing the chronic ills," This 
is one example of Congress negligence and Jinnah on these 
issues demanded the withdrawal of the Congress ninistries. 
The opportunity automatically came when the World War II 
was declared by the British and Lord Linlithgow announced 
India as a party to it. The Congress resigned the office 
and the League celebrated "The Day of Deliverance" on 
December 22, 1939. 
The gulf between the Congress and the League had 
widened. Jinnah was now completely a changed man. He 
started thinking on the two nation theory and in an article 
he strongly pleaded about two different languages and 
cultures - one of the Muslims and the other Hindus between 
which there was no meeting ground. This attitude of Jinnah 
had certainly shocked Jawaharlal Nehru who in December 
1939 wrote to Jinnah "It thus seems that politically we 
1. 
have no common ground and that our objectives are different. 
Jinnah could not be checked. Congress and League were 
now poles asunder snd in the annual session of All-India 
11. Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims, op.cit., p. 263. 
12,'. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.) My Leader (1944), 
p. 147. 
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Muslim League at Lahore on March 23, 1940 Jinnah presented 
a resolution, known as 'Lahore Resolution' demanding a 
separate Homeland for the Muslims on the basis of his 
popular two nation theory, "Musalmans are a nation accord-
ing to any definition of a nation and they must have 
13 
their homeland, their territory and their state." He 
later made a call to observe Pakistan Day on April 19, 
1940 which was taken by the Muslims as an occasion of 
14 
great festivities. By all this Jinnah wanted to prove 
the strenath of the League which had not been accepted 
15 
as a representative organisation of the Muslims. Thus 
from now an struggle between the Congress and League 
started which ended in the partition of the country, 
Jinnah had come to make the demand for Pakistan not 
all of a sudden. Though he had revived League but till 
1939 ne considered himself as nationalist which is clear 
from the letter he wrote on March 17, 1938 to Nehru in 
which he said. "It is the duty of every true nationalist 
13. Jamiluddin Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writing 
of Mr, Jinnah, op,cit., pp, 154-55, 
14. M.H.Saiyid, Mohammad All Jinnah, op,cit.,pp,688-89. 
15. In March 1937 Nehru said: "There are only two forces 
in India today, British imperialism and Indian nation 
alism as represented by the Congress."Jinnah imme-
diately responded to this and said that there was the 
third party also - the Musalmans." 
- 297 -
to whichever party or communitv he may belong to help 
16 
achieve a united front," 
Though the demand of Pakistan was made yet neither 
Congress tooX is very seriously nor the League insisted 
much on it, 3oth the parties still believed in evolving 
a formula on which Hindus and Muslims might have lived 
peacefully in a United India, Search for a solution con-
tinued. League wanted no more than the safeguard of the 
rights of minority. This feeling ultimately led to Desai-
Liaqat Ali Pact which proposed an equal number of persons, 
nominated by the Congress and the League in the Central 
Legislature and the formation of the Coalition ministry 
to repair the loss in their relation done in 1937. It was 
an attempt to bring parity between the Congress and League 
in forming the coalition Government. The rejection of 
the Pact by the Conqress was anothei jolt in the Congress-
League relation. 
Lord vavel , the Viceroy, was very sincere in his 
-^fforts to bring aoou-a solution of Hindu-Muslim problem 
to keep India united. The Conference he convened at Simla 
on June 25, 1945 agreed on the parity principle but Jinnah 
i6. arecher, Nehru, op.cit., p. 233. 
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insisted all the five members of the League. In other 
words the Congress did not have the right ^ o appoint any 
Muslim on its quota and thus the Conference failed. 
While Azad was aware of the Muslim fear about their 
safety which led them to oppose the nomination of any 
Muslim on the Congress quota, the Congress was not prepared 
to alley the fears of Muslims about their fate in a free 
and united India. He founded a solution of the Hindu-
Muslim problem in a proposal sent to Gandhi in a letter 
dated August 2, 1945 in which he rejected Pakistan on two 
grounds. Firstly, it would not be in the interest of the 
Muslims themselves and secondly its acceptance by the 
Congress would be a defeatist policy. The proposal he 
made in his letter was a midway between both the wrongs. 
He suggested (a) a federal government in which central 
subjects of an all India nature were agreed upon by the 
constituent unit, (b) The units were given the rights to 
secede (c) There were to be joint electorate in Centre 
and Provinces with reservation of seats, (d) There must 
be parity of Hindus and Muslims in the Central Legislature 
and the Central Executive so long as the cdmmunal suspi-
17 
cion and frenzy did not disappear. 
17, N.Mansergh, Transfer of Povver, Vol.VI, op.cit., p,156. 
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This was the best solution that Azad had founded 
but Gandhiji and the Congress was silent about it and 
nothing was heard of it. Had this proposal which was only 
a "rough outline".been accepted Pakistan could have bAen 
averted but the Congress did not take it seriously and 
it lost one of the best solutions founded by Azad, l^e 
-ongress further did not take any lesson from the results 
of December 1945 election wherein the Muslim League won almc 
every Muslim seat defeating every nationalist Muslim, and 
Was now the sole spokesman of the Muslim masses, ITiis 
was accepted by Gandhijl who signed with the Jlnnah the 
formula which said: 
"The Congress does not challenge, and accepts that 
the Muslim League now is the authoritative representative 
of the overwhelming majority of the MuslimbOf India, As 
such and in accordance with democratic principles, they 
alone have today the unquestionable right to represent the 
18 
Muslims of India," 
When in March 1946 the Cabinet Mission v i s i t ed India 
and discussed with Azad and Jinnah the future constitution 
of India , i t accepted Azad's proposal which while preservinc 
18, I b i d . , Vol. VIII, p . 673, 
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the unity of India also secured Hindu-Muslim Unity. The 
proposal did not provide for a strong centre and thus 
Muslims fear was allayed. The grouping of the subjects 
was reluctantly accepted by the Congress and was also 
accepted by the League. The Muslim community had secured 
all that Pakistan would give it. But the unfortunate 
statement of Nehru on July 10, at Bombay changed the whole 
situation. Replying to a correspondent Nehru said that 
"Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly completely 
unfettered by agreement and free to meet all situations 
as they arose,' This was slightly confusing. The "Press 
representatives further asked if this meant that the 
Cabinet Mission Plan would be modified." In reply Jawahar-
lal Nehru emphatically said that the Congress had agreed 
only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and regar-
ded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission 
19 
Plan." 
This left Jinnah unsatisfied and forced him to think 
that Jawaharlal's statement represented the real mind of 
the Congress, He argued that if the Congress could change 
so many times while the British were still in the country 
and power had not come to its hands, what assurance would 
19. A.K.Azad, op.cit,, p. 138. 
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the minorities have that once the British left, the Cong-
ress would not again change and go back to the position 
20 
taken up in Jawaharlal's statement." Thus the acceptance 
of the Plan changed into its rejection and this hastened 
the process of partition which took place on August 15, 
1947. Mount batten had fio choice. Jinnah was not so keen 
on Partition but he wanted safety for the minority. When 
Mountbatten argued with him for a United India Jinnah 
replied that 'even though nothing would have given him 
greater pleasure than to see such unity, it was the beha-
viour of the Hindus that had made it impossible for the 
21 
Muslims to share it." Jinnah was certain in his mind that 
if India got full independence and British withdrew from 
22 
here, Hinda majority could not be relied upon. Jinnah was 
a "strong bulwark* against the partition of the country 
but as B.Shiva Rao says that 'new and formidable forces' 
turned the 'apostle of Indian unity' for the first time 
23 
to see the need of the partition o^he country. 
There was a clash of personalities also which led 
to the partition. Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Jinnah were 
20. Ibid., p. 141. 
2 1 . The I l l u s t r a t e d Weekly of I n d i a , August 13 , 1972 
see A r t i c l e * Break-up of P a k i s t a n - A Prophecy 
Come True ' by Kuldip Nayar, p . 1 7 . 
22. The Hindustan Times, October 21 , 1971 . 
23 . The Sta tesman, August 22, 1966. 
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the top ranking leaders who were determined to decide the 
fate of India. Jinnah mistrusted both Gandhi and Nehru 
and Nehru in turn understimated Jinnah. Dr. Tara Chand 
criticises Congress for ignoring Jinnah which 'wounded 
24 
his vanity', The great scholar deplores the chauvinistic 
attitude of some of the Hindu leaders for alienating Muslim 
25 
sympathies, Kanji Dwarkadas says that if Congress leaders 
could have been friendly with Jinnah and his ego had not 
been hurt, Jinnah might not have raised a slogan for parti-
tion. Apart from this the Congress Ahd the League leader-
ship differed regarding the political set-up in the country. 
Jinnah had always stood for a loose federation with the 
centre having limited powers and residuary powers resting 
with the states. While on the other hand the Congress 
always pleaded for a strong centre. In these circumstances 
26 
a United India was an impossibility. 
Jinnah was not happy with the creation of Pakistan. 
At the height of his glory he was disillusioned and lonely. 
When the Nizam's emissary Laiqat Ali Khan met Jinnah, the 
24, See V,N,Datta's Presidential Address to Indian 
History Congress, 4 2nd Session, December 28-30,1981, 
Gaya, p. 6. 
25. Ibid, 
2 6, The Times of India, November 11, 1984, See Govind 
Talwalkers Review on Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanly 
Wo1pert. 
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later was in tears as he realised what great harm the 
partition of India had brought to the millions of innocent 
people who suffered beyond their control. He also vis-
ualised a poor future for Pakistan because of the poor 
calibre of the Pakistan leadership. He was not even happy 
with his Prime Minister, Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan who did not 
give any proof of his sharpness in political matters, 
Jinnah is said to have told his Prime Minister, "you have 
started thinking yourself as a big man. You are nothing*.< 
you think you have made Pakistan. I have made it. But I 
am now convinced that I have committed the biggest blunder 
of my life. "Jinnah was in his death-bed that time and 
after taking a fresh-breath he continued "If now I get an 
opportunity I will go to Delhi and tell Jawaharlal (Nehru) 
to forget about the folies of the past and become friends 
27 
^gain." It, therefore, appears from the above that Jinnah 
was not keen on Partition. He only needed protection for 
the minorities and used the idea of Partition merely as a 
bargaining counter. There appears to be much truth in the 
letter of Rajgopalacharl who wrote to Kuldip Nayar in 
October 13,1971 that 
"Mr. Jinnah was certain in his mind that if India 
got full independence and British control was altogether 
27. The Hindustan Times, November 28,1987, 
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eliminated, the Hindu majority could not be r e l i ed upon 
for deal ing j u s t l y v»ith the Muslim population of Ind ia . 
He, there fore , was c l ea r in h i s mind tha t some how or the 
other, overa l l Br i t i sh control must be re ta ined over the 
Indian sub-continent and i t s a f f a i r s . He never believed 
that Bri tain would withdraw leaving India t o t a l l y indepen-
dent. Nor did he wish i t . He consequently put up objec-
t ions and obs t ruc t ions to which, he ca lcu la ted , the Congress 
would not ye l l ed . He, the re fore , expected tha t the Congress 
demand for t o t a l independence would not be acceeded to by 
the Br i t i sh and the Muslim population would continue t o 
28 
have overa l l Bri t ish p ro tec t ion . " 
In h i s l e t t e r to the edi tor Dr. Chamanlal# brings 
to l i g h t one more Incident of h i s tory which goes to prove 
of J lnnah ' s ideas on the uni ty of Ind ia . He said tha t 
when he met Jinnah sometimes in 1943, Jinnah to ld him to 
wri te to Mahatma Gandhi, then in Poona J a i l , tha t if the 
p r inc ip le of Pakistan was accepted, he would not ask for 
a d iv is ion of the country. Dr. Gopichand Bhargava was 
expected to go to Poona to del iver tha t l e t t e r of Chamanlci 
but s ince he could not proceed the message had not been 
28. The I l l u s t r a t e d Weekly of India . August 13, 1972, 
Kuldip Nayar's Ar t i c l e Break-up of Pakis tan, p .19 . 
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delivered to him. Thus the opportunity was lost. 
Even before that Jinnah invited Chamanlal to a 
lunch. During conversation Jinnah asked him as to why 
the Congress did not give him the two annas. This financial 
conundrum confused Mr. Chamanlal who requested Mr,Jinnah 
to explain his point fully. In reply Jinnah said, "The 
communal award has given me 14 annas in the rupee, I 
want the other two annas," Mr. Chamanlal wanted more 
clarification to which Jinnah said. "f'lrst of all I want 
joint Electorates" and "secondly I want a 33 -7-% repre-
sentation inithe centre and suitable weightages in the 
U.P., Bihar and elsewhere." Mr. Chamanlal was so astoni-
shed that the fish knife and fork dropped from his hancl 
on the table. It was unexpected from Jinnah to be so 
mild. He would not believe it and asked the late Raizada 
Hans Raj who was also a friend of Jinnah to check it from 
the League leader. He did it and found that Jinnah actua-
lly wanted what he said. Just after this Mr, Chamanlal 
sent a letter to Gandhiji, briefing him the gist of his 
conversation with Jinnah. Gandhiji received the letter 
and wrote back to Chamanlal to wait for further instruc-
tions. Gandhiji consulted Jawaharlal Nehru whose reaction 
to this was most unfavourable, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to 
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Chamanlal that he had no objection to meeting Mr, Jinnah. 
But it was not Nehru but Gandhi with whom Jinnah wanted to 
talk and settle the problem once for all. Eventually 
Gandhiji wrote to Chamanlal that "he was not even a four 
anna member of the Congress, that he did not see the 
light, and that we must wait for a better opportunity," 
This was an excellent opportunity provided by Jinnah who 
happened to be in a conciliatory mood after League's deba-
cle in 1936, "Thus ended a dialogue", says Chamanlal 
29 
"which might have changed the course of recent events," 
In the face of all these evidences it is not wrong to say 
that the lack of the spirit of conciliation on the part of 
Congress leadership prompted Jinnah to go ahead with his 
plan, Durga Das holds that inspite of Congress opposition 
Jinnah was still a nationalist. He wanted only an acknow-
ledgement from the Congress that he was the 'sole spokesman 
of the Muslims.' "That is all that I seek", he told Durga 
Das, The election of Maulana Azad as a Congress President 
to preside over its annual session in March 1940, at Rara-
garh further irritated him. By electing Maulana Azad 
Congress wanted to show to the world that Jinnah was not 
the sole spokesman of the Muslims and Jinnah bitterly 
remarked that "they have now added insult to injury by 
29, The Statesman. August 23, 1966, 
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30 
se lec t ing tha t shew-boy .'• He held the Congress leaders 
responsible and to ld Durga Das that ' i f only Gandhi would 
jo in hands wlUi me, the Br i t i sh game of divide and ru le 
31 
would be frustrated." 
After this frustration Jinnah on March 23,1940 
in the Annual session of the All-India Muslim League at 
Lahore presented his resolution known as the Lahore reso-
tion. The resolution did not use the word Pakistan and 
when a Hindu correspondent asked him whether the resolution 
"meant a demand for Pakistan?" Jinnah avoided the word 
Pakistan and only replied that "it was open to him to think 
so and that he was prepared to accept his interpretation," 
After the session Durga Das met Jinnah and told him that 
'Sikandar Hayat Khan had categorically told me that the 
resolution was essentially a bargaining counter,• Jinnah 
replied: 'A bargain my friend, is struck between two 
parties. Let the Congress first accept the League as the 
other party," 
This amply goes to prove that Jinnah was Interested 
in the recognition of Muslim League as the only party of 
30, Durga Das, op.cit., pp, 193-4. 
31, Ibid. 
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Muslims to look after their interest. The vivisection of 
32 
India was far from his mind. 
Another question which is very much asked: could 
the Partition have been averted? The answer may be 'yes*. 
Tf the Congress had been in a conciliatory mood the League 
would not have insisted on it. To Jinnah the safety and 
security of the Muslims was the major issue. Had it been 
provided, it would have satisfied Jinnah. Even in the 
Cabinet Mission when the League accepted the Plan, thinking 
that it would secure *rhat it wanted, Jawaharlal's 
statement provoked nis ire and Jinnah took his last weapon, 
•The Direct Action* to get Pakij^tan, 
B. Shiva Rao by his personal experience further 
opines that the Partition would have been averted ifx 
(i) The Congress had accepted Gandhiji's advice 
of unconditional cooperation with the 
Government or 
(ii) The Congress leaders had accepted Sir Aurobindo*-
advice to accept the Cripps offer without 
discussion, 
32. Ibid. 
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In his opinion the League would have made no 
objection and cooperated the Congress as It had been 
33 
cooperating with the Government. These counsels were not 
accepted and as a result of many formidable forces in 
the latter half of the war, partition was thought out to 
be the only way out of a tangled situation. Both Jinnah 
and Gandhi a had accepted the partition much against their 
willingness but 'both Gandhi and Mr, Jinnah', says Shiva 
Rao, 'looked forward during their life-time to a happy 
relationship between India and Pakistan either on the 
34 
basis of a treaty or, at least, as a gentleman's agreement." 
Jinnah, as said earlier, till 1939 was a nationa-
list and he in spite of his two-nation theory and slogan 
of Pakistan continued to have soft corner for India. It 
is evident from the fact thfct when the Cabinet Mission 
decisively rejected the idea of Pakistan the Muslim League 
accepted its Plan. Jinnah himself was not clear about 
the implications of his demand, he only wanted at least 
•Pakistan' in principle to be accepted. He wanted 'statu-
tory safeguards' for the minorities to be incorporated 
33. The Statesman, August 15,1966 see B. Shiva Rao's 
article 'Road to Partition'Paved with Good Intentions.* 
34. Ibid. 
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on the basis of parity in any scfewne which was to deliver 
independence to India. To Jinnah India was a bigger 
whole to which both Pakistan and Hindustan (as he called 
the rest of India) were to belong. Elucidating his point 
Jinnah said "Let us therefore, live as good neighbours, 
let the Hindus guard the South and West ^and let the 
Muslims guard the frontiers. We will then stand together 
and say to the world 'Hands off India, India for the Indians 
Mr, Shri Prakasa India's first High Commissioner to Pakistan 
coroborates the above by saying that Jinnah wanted the two 
35 
states to be known as parts of India. This can further 
be seen in Jinnah*s dealing with the Cabinet Mission, The 
Cabinet Mission told Jinnah that he had to make choice 
between "an Indian Union, confined to defence and foreign 
affairs having under it two Federations of Pakistan and 
Hindustan and a sovereign Pakistan, but from which large 
blocks of territories inhabited pre-dominantly by non-
36 
Muslims, would be excluded," It was rejected by both the 
Congress and the League, Thereafter both the sides 
presented their proposals. The Congress proposals formally 
put forth on May 12, provided that "groups of provinces 
may be formed." In this connection what is most noteworthy 
^5* T^^ Sunday Standard July 30, 1967 see article "Why 
Cabinet Mission's ^l^n Tailed hy A.G. Nooranl, 
36, Ibid, 
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i s t ha t while on April 29, 1946 Mr, Jinnah sent to the 
Mission a copy of the reso lu t ion passed by the subjects 
committee of the Al l - India Muslim League Legis la to rs Con-
vention with a scheme of Pakistan the formal proposal he 
put to the Mission on May 11, did not provide for the 
P a r t i t i o n of India, but for a confederation of Pakistan and 
37 
the r e s t of India , This amply goes t o prove tha t Jinnah 
Was not keen on P a r t i t i o n and was wi l l ing to solve h i s 
differences with the Congress amicaMy, The s^ift Journey 
towards Pakistan also took place because of the Br i t i sh 
decision to leave India by June 3,1948, Lord Moxintbattto 
who succeeded Lord Wavell on March 22, 1947 was determined 
t o end the drama by any means accepted by the p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s , 
Jinnah had re jec ted the Plan a f te r Nehru's statement 
at Bombay and there was no means l e f t to him except the 
Direct Action demonstrated to the Government. An explo-
sive s i t ua t i on had come to surround the whole country. 
While the leaders of the Congress and League saw more 
d i s a s t e r in the coming months, Mbuntbatten on the other 
hand found tha t ' t h e Br i t i sh Government were s i t t i n g on 
3 7 . I b i d . 
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38 
the crest of a volcano,* General Ismay who accompanied 
Mountbatten to India as his Chief of Staff described the 
situation in 1947 as "an artHnunition ship on fire.' It 
could explode any time and it was Mountbatten*s business 
to see that when the explositon came the British were on 
39 
dry ground.' June 3, 1948 appeared to him to be a distant 
time for transferring power in such an atmosphere, l^e 
40 
Viceroy therefore hastened the process of division, 
Mountbatten*s persuasive power finally convinced the League 
and the Congress that Partition of the country was the 
only solution which could bring peace to India. According 
to Mr, R.Thaper, Nehru was "impatient to throw the British, 
and though emotionally opposed to Pakistan, immediate 
compulsion had become irresistable to him. There was a 
38. The Sunday Standard, September 28,1975, see article 
The Road to.Partition by D.P, Mishra, 
39. The Hindustan Times, September 1, 1980. 
40. Leonard Mosley says that since his youth Mountbatten 
decided that he would one day become the First Sea 
Lord and his first consideration, when he got his 
assignment as Viceroy of India was to see that it 
did not constitute a break in his naval career. It 
was the naval compulsion that made him rush the par-
tition. See The Hindustan Times, September 1,1980, 
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gnawing fear that delay would certainly spark uncontrolAble 
extremism - communal, feudal and secular-which even an 
exhausted alien ruler could exploit for further vlVLSection 
41 
of the sub-continent." it appears from a chronological 
study of documents that neither the British authorities, 
nor the Congress leaders nor the Muslim League contemplated 
over the partition in human terms. General Tukar opines 
that all the three forces in the sub-continent were absor-
bed in their own calculation. What worried Lord Wavell 
was the safe deportation' of the British army which could 
have been attacked by the mob any time. His successor Lord 
Mountbatten was worried for his next promotion as the First 
Sea Lord. The Congress finding the League slightly near-
ing its goal insisted on the partition of Punjab and 
Bengal, not anticipating the lose of human lives. The 
League which had raised the Pakistan demand as a bargain-
ing counter had lastly to accept the tnink-cated Pakistan 
42 
never believing if it could happen. This ultimately led 
the Congress to accept partition without foreseeing the 
magnitutude of the disaster that followed. With the crea-
tion of the two dominions, the migrations on either side 
of the border were so colosal, that imagination falls to 
41. The Hindustan Times, September 28,1966, See Was it 
Possible to Prevent India's Partition,* 
42. The Hindustan Times, December 31, 1972. 
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visualise. By the end of 1948 about 6,599,000 Muslims 
43 
.migrated to Pakistan and S,563,'>00 Hindus to India. In 
the wake off migration countless people - variously esti-
mated at 2,00,000 to two millions were massacred and the 
Viceroy and the Indian and Pakistani statesmen stood 
helplessly watching 'the calamitous consequences of the 
44 
decision to divide India.' The main actors of the drama 
were not aware of the magnitude of communal frenzy which 
had bewildered them and Jawaharlal had very candidly admi-
tted it to Liaquat All Khan that "we never foresaw any-
45 
thing like this when we agreed io it," Lord Mountbatten, 
vAio hastened the speed of Partition because of British 
disillusionment regretted it and felt that partition might 
have been avoided. Pakistan was not 'a gift of the Brlti-
46 47 
shers to the Muslims; as assessed by Y,B.Mathur. If it 
has been so why a million lives were lost and many more 
millions people were uprooted from their homes. The crea-
tion of Pakistan was due to some tactical mistakes of the 
43. Illustrated Weekly of India, December 19,1971. 
44. The Sunday Standard, November 16,1975, see Politics 
of Partition in t<etrospect being a Review on Larry 
Collins and Dominique Laplerres book 'Freedom at 
Midnight,' 
45. Ibid. 
46. See K.N,Sudd's Review on Y.B.Mathur's Growth of Muslim 
Politics in India, in the Hindustan Times, Jt±|tx2 July 
20, 1980, 
47. Ayesha Jalal, op.clt., p. 262, 
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Congress on one h«nd and of the last Viceroy's on the othei 
who had their nationals safety in view as well as their 
personal ambitions. In view of what had been discussed 
above it is not incorrect to say as Dr. Ayesha Jalal has 
said that "it was the Congress taat insisted on partition. 
It was Jinnah who was against it." 
During the Round Table Conference, "a palmist who 
read Jinnah's hand prophesied for him the headship of 
an indejDendent state at the end of his career, Jinnah 
48 
laughed at the suggestion as absurd,' Certainly in 
1930-31 when the 3ritish were at the top of their exce-
llence politically an'i administratively and when Jinnah 
himself a nationalist could not have thought of it, Neith<e 
at the end of 1946, there was any clue of his becoming 
the head of a country. it was the drift of events within 
six months that changed the course of Indian history; won 
Pakistan for League and headship of a Muslim states for 
Jinnah. 
48. The Illustrated Weekly of India, December 24, 
1972, p. 37, 
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